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INTRODUCTION
"Why is there so much evil in the world?" "Why is there illness; why are
people fighting each other; why are there earthquakes and hurricanes
that kill thousands of people?" Everyone who reads these questions
realises that they are fundamental to our human experience. Practically
no one can ignore these questions. From time to time everyone asks
himself or herself: "Why this?" or "Why me?" In addition, these
questions become even more important if one adheres to the Christian
image of an omnipotent and overall good deity. For then, the challenge
is to explain without contradiction how it is possible that God is all-
powerful and absolutely good, yet at the same time evil exists. This
problem, which we refer to as the problem of theodicy, constitutes the
basic subject of this study. It is expressed by the following question: If
God is omnipotent and perfectly good, why do human beings suffer?
Although this question is pivotal to this book, this is not a study in the
field of systematic theology. And so we do not pursue an apologetic
goal, trying to explain that God is not responsible for the existence of
evil, which, according to Ricoeur (1986, 26), is the true task oftheodicy.
Here, the problem of theodicy is considered as a subject matter for
religious education. In this respect, this is a study in the field ofpractical
theology that deals with the praxis ofreligious communication (Van der
Ven 1990).
But why study the problem of theodicy? Actually, the reason for our
interest in the theodicy issue is twofold. To begin with, the problem of
theodicy constitutes the core of present-day theological thought. As
Peukert (1978, 335) points out, if modern human beings in their present-
day cultural surroundings ask about God, they at the same time ask
about the problem of evil. These questions cannot be isolated from one
another. There is always a dialectical tension between these questions,
as expressed by the old Latin saying: "Si deus est, unde malum? Si non
est, unde bonum?" It is the longing for God, the Ultimate, which makes
people aware of the drawbacks and imperfections of our world, but this
objective, worldly experience at the same time `questions' the existence
of God (Neuhaus 1996). In this way, the problem of theodicy appears to
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be a matter of fundamental theology. But, secondly, the problem of
theodicy is not only a central theme in contemporary theology, it has
also become the sole problem that may give rise to religious thought
(Hutsebaut 1995, 79, 93). Living in a secularised world, there is hardly
any place for posing religious questions, except in our encounter with
evil experience. That does not mean, however, that the experience of
evil necessarily results in faith or strengthens faith. On the contrary, it
is one of the main reasons why people, and especially young adults,
renounce faith. Most people find it very difficult to adhere to the
Christian image of a good and almighty deity when there is so much evil
present in the universe. The least we can say, then, about the experience
of evil is that it always casts doubt on one's own religious convictions.
Given this twofold reason, we find it very important to study the
problem of theodicy especially from the point of view of practical
theology. For if the problem oftheodicy to a large extent does determine
whether or not people believe, and what they believe, then it is a topic
of great practical theological interest.
As mentioned already, this study deals with theodicy as a subject
matter for religious education. To enable people to reflect on the
theodicy issue, to deal with their religious doubts and perhaps even to
cope with suffering from a religious perspective, it is of the utmost
importance that religious education is attentive to the problem of
theodicy. But how do we do just this? Is it possible to `learn' theodicy?
And, if so, what do we mean by `learning'? What kind of aims and
objectives are desirable and attainable? These are only a few examples
of the many questions that arise when we consider theodicy as a subject
matter for religious education.
There are two theoretical premises that are important to set forth
here. First, we assert that through the study of theodicy we gain com-
prehension of several Christian answers to the problem of theodicy. And
second, comprehension of these Christian answers is prerequisite, we
claim, for passing a theodicy judgment that is pivotal in religious
coping.
This research tries to explain how the learning of these Christian
answers may be facilitated and how this learning process subsequently
affects a person's ability to cope with suffering with the help ofreligion.
We try to achieve this twofold aim by conducting empirical research on
the effects of an experimentai theodicy curriculum. This study reports
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on empirical theological research on the theodicy issue and is related to
empirical research conducted earlier at the theological faculty of the
University of Nijmegen and the Theological Faculty Tilburg (cf. Van der
Ven ói Vossen 1990).
This study consists of six chapters. The intricate relationship between
theodicy comprehension and theodicy judgment is dealt with in the first
three chapters, which together constitute the main theoretical part of our
study. Chapter one contains a detailed description of the coping process
and explains how religious symbols and metaphors may function in this
process. This chapter also offers a systematic survey of various
approaches to the problem of theodicy that have been elaborated
throughout the history of Christian theology. This results in the
construction of three ideal-typical theodicy models: the retaliation
model, the plan model and the compassion model.
The second chapter considers these theodicy models more closely
and investigates how these models relate to one another. The emphasis
here is on the validity of the arguments underlying these models with
regard to the theological dilemma: If God is omnipotent and perfectly
good, why do human beings suffer? As a result, one can argue that these
models differ in degree of rationality and that in this respect, the
compassion model is the most rational, followed by the plan model and
then the retaliation model.
Finally, the third chapter deals with theodicy judgment involved in
religious coping. In this way, the coping process in part is identified as
a problem-solving activity in which theodicy models play an important
role with regard to the solution of the theological dilemma.
Having dealt with the main theological aspects in this way, the fourth
chapter is dedicated to the educational issues sunounding the learning
of theodicy. An instructional objective is presented here as well as three
educational measures, which are meant to facilitate the learning of
theodicy models. With regard to this latter aspect, three types of
learning, experiential learning, information learning and evaluative
learning, are considered. Furthermore, this chapter contains a description
and analysis of the learning task resulting in a learning hierarchy on the
basis ofwhich the experimental theodicy curriculum has been designed.
The conclusion of this study, chapters five and six, contain the
methodology, results and discussion of our empirical research. Chapter
five discusses the planning and execution of our research and also
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reports on our research findings, whereas chapter six contains a critical




The word theodicy evokes images of the early eighteenth century when
the first systematic study concerning the problem of evil was published
by the German philosopher Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz (1646-1716). In
his well-known treatise Essais de théodicée sur la bonté de Dieu, la lib-
erté de 1'homme et 1'origine du mal Leibniz tried to defend the confor-
mity between reason and the Christian faith. He argued that reason could
reconcile the existence of an omnipotent and overal] good deity with the
existence of evil. In this way Leibniz introduced a narrow understanding
of the problem of theodicy into theological thought. Leibniz emphasised
the theoretical aspects ofthe problem of theodicy but neglected its prac-
tical aspects; he failed to see that the problem of theodicy is also an exi-
stential problem. In a critical discussion of Leibniz's theodicy Ludwig
Feuerbach attributed this shortcoming to Leibniz's strict philosophical
interest in the problem of evil. According to Feuerbach (1847, 109, 118),
Leibniz only dealt with philosophical questions regarding the nature of
God and neglected theological questions of a more phenomenological
nature such as, "How does God relate to humanity?" and "What does
God mean to human beings?"
The distinction Feuerbach makes between philosophy and theology
is controversial. Nevertheless, his understanding of theology fits in fairly
well with the interest we pursue throughout this chapter. When we deal
with the practical aspects of theodicy, we are not concerned with
whether the existence of evil is contradictory to God's nature as an om-
nipotent and overall good deity. Rather our interest is
phenomenological. Or, as we prefer to say: our interest is of a practical
theological nature. We seek to analyse the human experience of evil
from a religious point of view and thus we are occupied with questions
about how religion functions in the coping process, how people attribute
a religious meaning to suffering, and which religious symbols people
adhere to or reject in the coping process. In short, we ask: What does
God mean to human beings as they cope with suffering? As practical
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theologians we deal with the praxis of religious coping with suffering.
A practical theological interest in the problem of theodicy can be
specified with a brief reference to Berger's (1973, 61-87) distinction
between implicit and explicit theodicy. Explicit theodicy concerns the
theoretical answers to the problem of evil elaborated by theologians and
philosophers, whereas implicit theodicy is about the religious symbols
concerning evil that are present in the religious consciousness of
ordinary people. So, whenever we deal with the problem of theodicy
from a practical theological point of view, we are especially occupied
with implicit theodicy.
This study of implicit theodicy, of the religious praxis of coping
with suffering, consists of three steps. First, we examine the coping
process in order to elucidate the psychological aspects ofthe problem of
theodicy. Second, we present a systematic survey of some specific,
religious answers to the problem oftheodicy. And third, we summarise
our position by presenting a short review of our practical theological
approach to the theodicy issue.
1.1 RELIG[OUS COPING WITH SUFFERING
What does the concept of God mean for a human being who is coping
with suffering? In order to answer this question, it is necessary to dis-
cuss how people attribute a religious meaning to suffering. We intend to
do this by discussing the coping process in more detail and exploring
how religion functions as a system of ineaning But first we will more
clearly define our understanding of human suffering
1.1.1 Suffering and Evil
Within many theological studies concerning the theodicy issue, evil is
primarily a comprehensive term that encompasses the whole range of
moral, natural and metaphysical evil (Hick 1985, 12-14). This threefold
distinction is fairly widespread throughout theology, although the diffe-
rent kinds of evil are not always defined in the same way. Sometimes
moral evil is referred to as sin in order to distinguish it from natural evil.
In this case, moral evil refers to all evil that results from the unjust deeds
committed by human beings, whereas natural evil regards all evil that
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occurs independent of human actions. This distinction, however, does
not take all the unintended evil that is caused through human agency,
into consideration. For instance, is a car crash a moral or a natural evil?
Yet another line of theological thought attributes all evil, both moral and
natural, to human sin. This view argues that sin is the basic evil, which
causes humanity to experience the penal character of all natural evil, and
thus to experience natural evil as real evil. This view then, attributes all
evil, either directly or indirectly, to the misuse of human freedom.
Within another strand of theological thought the original imperfection
and limitation of the created universe, i.e. metaphysical evil, accounts
for all evil. Since theological literature defines evil in these many ways
(Griffin 1976, 27-28; Journet 1961, 53-60), we present a narrow
definition of evil from the very outset.
In this study, we refer only to situations that occur to human beings
by accident. These are situations of innocent evil, in which no one is to
blame. Earthquakes, cancer, and floods, are examples of this type of
situation. These situations can have a profound emotional impact on the
people involved. From a practical theological point of view it is useful
to distinguish between evil and suffering. Evil refers to a harmful event
or situation that causes suffering when it is experienced by a human
being. Hence, earthquakes, cancer, and floods, are all events or
situations to which the word evil refers. In contrast, suffering is the
active, emotional involvement of human beings in response to evil. The
word suffering, then, does not actually refer to evil situations. Suffering
is essentially a human activity; it is a human activity in which human
beings try to attribute some sort of ineaning to the evil situations they
experience. Evil and suffering are not the same, but are related to one
another. Evil is the external cause of suffering and suffering is the
active, emotional response to evil situations (Vossen 1985, 111-114;
Kreiner 1997, 33).
When someone experiences innocent evil, it is almost inevitable that
they will ask the existential question, "Why?". Searching for an
objective cause or explanation is futile; this existential question, "Why",
is the only thing that remains. The experience of innocent evil urges
human beings to attribute some sort of (religious) meaning to suffering.
And since the way people amibute a religious meaning to suffering
constitutes the central topic of this chapter, it is justified, to examine
only situations of innocent evil, or, as we prefer to say, to innocent
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human suffering. In the following discussion, we avoid using the word
`evil' as much as possible, unless evil situations as such are at issue, and
we adopt the word `suffering' instead in order to stress our practical
theological interest in the theodicy issue. Innocent human suffering
refers to the human, emotional involvement in harmful situations that
happen to us by accident.
This raises the question of how people attribute a religious meaning
to this kind of suffering. A description of the coping process, or
emotiona] processing, helps to provide an answer.
1.1.2 Emotional Processing
To describe the coping process, we refer to the theory of emotions
elaborated by the Dutch psychologist Frijda. In his book, The emotions,
Frijda ( 1986, 453) deals with two questions, "Why do certain stimuli
elicit the emotional response?" and "How does the stimuli elicit the re-
sponse?" Frijda answers both questions with the help of a model of the
emotion process that is based on the insights of cognitive psychology.
We consider this model first.
Within cognitive psychology, human cognitive activity is of great
importance. This cognitive activity is a mental activity, induced by an
external stimulus, which determines the human response to that certain
stimulus. Cognitive psychology then presupposes a cognitive activity
between stimulus and response. What, however, does cognitive mean in
this respect? In general, the word cognitive refers to knowledge or in-
formation. Cognitive psychology teaches that the basic human activity
regards the processing of information. Frijda's model of the emotion
process thus is an information-processing model, which basically in-
volves seven phases between stimulus and response. First, the stimulus
is analysed or coded for information uptake. Second, the stimulus is
compared with the individual's concerns in order to appraise its rele-
vance. Third, an overall diagnosis ofthe stimulus takes place; here the
subject determines whether there is anything that can be done about the
situation, resulting in the fourth phase, the evaluation of the stimulus in
terms of urgency, difficulty and seriousness. Next, an action proposal
is generated based on the information acquired hitherto, which then
results, in physiological change or arousal, the sixth phase, and fmally,
in overt or cognitive action. The phenomenon of emotion consists ofthe
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physiological change and overt and cognitive action (Frijda 1986, 454-
456).
In this model for the process ofemotion, in accordance with cogni-
tive psychology, Frijda also accounts for the human, emotional response
to a certaín stimulus by referring to human mental activity. His model
of the emotion process is essentially an information-processing model.
In this way, the above description ofFrijda's model already answers the
second question: How do certain stimuli elicit the emotional
phenomena? But if we are to elucidate the function of religion in the
coping process, or the emotion process, the first question is equally
important to us: Why do certain stimuli elicit the emotional phenomena,
particularly in regard to the kind of information involved in the emotion
process?
At first glance, it may seem strange to relate the emotion process to
the information-processing model, but Frijda nevertheless shows that
cognitive dispositions constitute an integral part of the emotion process.
His understanding of emotions, or the emotional experiences, as interac-
tion is of great importance. As Frijda states, "Most emotions, being
interactions, are events over time and are felt as events over time. They
not only have a beginning, but also an inition and a resolution, or an
explicit nonresolution" (Frijda 1986, 249). As we have already seen
above, Frijda distinguishes among emotional stimuli, emotional
responses and emotional processes of a cognitive nature between those
stimuli and responses. Using the information-processing model, Frijda
considers the emotion processes, or the cognitive processes, as
fundamental to the emotional experience since they determine the
emotional response; according to cognitive psychology, the relation
between stimulus and response is variable (Frijda 1986, 269).
What kind of information is involved here? What is the cognitive na-
ture of the emotion process? According to Frijda, the individual's con-
cerns are the information that is involved in the emotion process. These
concerns consist of the individual's goals, values, commitments, mo-
tives, expectations, and so forth, that may be considered as cognitive
schemes. In short, the individual's concerns are his or her cognitive dis-
positions (cf. Frijda 1986, 267, 277). This means that it is a specific
stimulus or constellation of events which are relevant to an individual's
concerns, which elicits an emotional response. As Frijda says,
"Emotions result from match or mismatch between events and concerns"
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(Frijda 1986, 278). This means the match between events and concerns
may account for positive emotions, while a mismatch evokes negative
emotions. For instance, whether a pregnancy results in a positive or
negative emotion depends upon the parents' concerns. Pregnancy
matches with the longing for parenthood and family life, but it may well
mismatch with financial goals or the pursuit of a career. This is an
example of how stimuli elicit emotional phenomena according to
Frijda's model ofthe emotion process.
This model of emotion process also applies to suffering. In the
framework of Frijda's theory, suffering results from a harmful situation
that interferes with the individual's concerns. If, for instance, a wife
suffers the death of her beloved husband, her concerns are harmed. That
is to say, the experience of loss interferes with concerns such as: love,
friendship, tenderness, sexuality, optimistic expectations of future life,
financial support, and so forth. The sudden awareness of this mismatch
subsequently evokes negative, emotional responses such as: distress,
grief, sorrow, anxiety, despair, and so forth. However, through
emotional processing, negative emotions can fade away over a period of
time. Emotional processing is essentially a human activity in which the
sufferer must engage in order to cope with suffering. Frijda describes
this activity with reference to several emotion processes: extinction,
habituation, competence gain and change in concerns.
Emotional responses may fade away when an emotional response to
a certain stimulus is no longer reinforced due to the decrease of the emo-
tional significance of the stimulus. This takes place when a stimulus, or
the response to that stimulus, no longer has or is expected to have posi-
tive or negative consequences. Frijda calls this emotion process extinc-
tion (1986, 314-318) In situations of loss, extinction will not occur until
the mourner accepts that the loss is final. Until then, each reference to
the deceased will generate an emotional response for as long as the re-
sponse continues to be reinforced.
Another emotion process is habituation, which implies that people
become accustomed to unpleasant events. The repeated occurrence of a
stimulus may account for habituation, but Frijda (1986, 320) relates ha-
bituation to cognitive adjustments. Due to cognitive adjustments the
mismatch between the stimulus and the cognitive dispositions of the
individual disappears. This can be achieved through a change in
amibution. For example, if a wife has lost her husband in a car crash,
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habituation may occur when the wife keeps telling herself that her
husband was a careless driver. Such a cognitive adjustment renders the
wife less sensitive to the stimulus event; subsequently, the emotional
significance of the stimulus decreases. However, habituation also
consists ofthe development of other coping strategies. This refers again
to another emotion process: competence gain.
The development of new ways of coping with emotional events is
what Frijda ( 1986, 320-322) refers to as competence gain. Competence
gain is reflected by a decrease in emotional response. For the develop-
ment of new ways ofcoping with an unpleasant situation enhances the
individual's control over the situation and in turn decreases the
emotional significance of the stimulus event. Looking for a new
relationship or a new partner is an example of competence gain with
respect to the experience of loss. In addition, competence gain also
enhances the individual's confidence in his or her ability to stand
negative emotions. This is referred to as an increase in a person's self-
efficacy.
Emotional processing, or the coping process, embraces the whole
range of activities described as extinction, habituation and competence
gain. The conditions that allow extinction, habituation and competence
gain to take place are in part achieved through human activity. Freud
called this human activity the work ofgrief (Frijda 1986, 322). Basically,
the work of grief, as we have already mentioned, is a cognitive activity
that is meant to transform a mismatch into a match. Fundamental to this
cognitive activity is the fourth emotion process called change in con-
cerns. Negative emotions result from a mismatch between events and
concerns; so a change in concerns may overcome this mismatch. The
establishment of a new, satisfying love affair not only represents com-
petence gain with respect to the experience of loss, but also reflects a
change in concern; the new partner has now become a concern (Frijda
1986, 313-314). Subsequently, extinction and habituation may occur,
because the emotional significance of all kinds of references to the lost
partner diminishes. This is what coping with suffering is all about. It
refers to the active, emotional involvement of the individual in harmful
situations. In order to cope with suffering, the individual has to take up
the work of grief.
Coping with suffering involves interplay among the different
emotion processes, extinction, habituation, competence gain and change
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in concerns. These processes do not follow each other in a fixed order
but interact. Coping processes then, can differ strongly from one
another. However, the involvement of the individual's concerns, which
are of a cognitive nature, is basic to the coping process. Coping with
suffering is a cognitive activity. Whenever one tries to attribute some
sort of ineaning to suffering, it is an attempt to overcome the mismatch
between the harmful situation and the individual's concems or cognitive
dispositions. This is a process of assimilation in the Piagetian sense of
fitting new information into existing cognitive dispositions or of
accommodating existing cognitive dispositions to the new information
(Frijda 1986, 358). Cognitive psychology emphasises the importance of
cognitive dispositions or insights in the coping process. This view
enables us to account for the function of religion in the coping process
as part of a person's cognitive disposition.
1.1.3. Emotional Processing and Religion
How do people attribute a religious meaning to suffering? In order to
answer this question, we have already presented a detailed description
of the coping process, so now we focus on the function of religion itself.
We consider religion to be a part of the individual's cognitive disposi-
tions. That is to say, religion is one of the cognitive schemes that are
used to encode new information from a certain, external stimulus. The
question of how religion relates to an individual's other cognitive
dispositions calls for a closer examination of the existential questions
that relate to suffering.
As mentioned earlier, suffering confronts people with existential
questions such as: "Why me?" and "Why this?" In part such questions
originate from the mismatch between an emotional event and the indivi-
dual's concerns, but existential questions also involve a deeper
dimension of human existence. Existential questions express the
awareness of human contingency and finitude. T'hey refer to the tragic
nature of human existence, especially with regard to innocent suffering.
Let us again examine the experience of loss. The experience of]oss
not only interferes with concerns of love, friendship, tenderness, etc., but
also reveals the tragic destiny of human life. Throughout the experience
of loss the mourner becomes aware that contingency and finitude are
basic characteristics ofhuman existence; death is beyond human control
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and it is inescapable. At issue here are other concerns that point to the
ultimate problems of life. Tillich refers to the ultimate concern of hu-
manity, which he describes as: "Our ultimate concern is that which
determines our being or non-being" (Tillich 1978z, I, 14). That is to say,
humanity's ultimate concern regards the wholeness and uniqueness of
our existence. Tillich continues: "(...) the term `being' means the whole
of human reality, the structure, the meaning and the aim of existence.
All this is threatened; it can be lost or saved. Man is ultimately
concerned about his being and meaning" (Tillich 1978`, I, 14).
Existential questions, then, arise because an emotional event interferes
with the individual's ultimate concerns. The death of a beloved person
elicits an emotional response not only because of the interference with
concerns about financial support, sexuality, tenderness, and so forth, but
also because this event threatens the totality of one's human existence.
With regard to the function of religion in the coping process, we ar-
gue that religion deals particularly with problems of ultimate concern.
Religion is part of the cognitive scheme that the individual uses in order
to deal with the experience of contingency and finitude. It is important
to note, however, that problems of ultimate concern do not necessarily
call for a religious answer. We disagree with this inference from both a
functional and material understanding of religion. Sociologists often
distinguish between functional and substantive definitions of religion.
The question regarding the functionality of religion for human social and
individual life is emphasised by the adherents of a functional approach,
whereas the adherents of a substantive approach try to deiine the very
essence of religion (Berger 1973, 178-179). The distinction between a
formal and a material understanding of religion has theological roots.
From a formal point of view every reference to reality as a meaningful
whole is marked as religious, whereas the explicit commitment to a
certain religious tradition is, from a material point of view, decisive
(Pannenberg 1973, 303-329). Both distinctions are relevant to our view
on the function of religion in the coping process. First, religion is a
system of ineaning. That is to say, religion is part of a person's cognitive
dispositions and especially becomes activated when coping with the
ultimate problems of life (Van Uden 1985, 184-185). This view clearly
reflects a functional understanding of religion. However, we do not
argue that every system of ineaning or every worldview is of a religious
nature; for this would again imply a substantive understanding of
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religion. Therefore, we specify our functional approach by referring to
theodicy as the Christian way of coping with suffering. This reflects our
material understanding of religion. The function of religion in the coping
process thus refers to theodicy as the Christian way of coping with the
experiences of contingency and finitude induced by suffering.
Religion facilitates the development of coping behaviour with regard
to experiences of contingency and finitude. This is the primary function
of religion, and of theodicy, in the coping process. The German word
Kontingenzbewdltigung can refer to this function. From a sociological
point ofview, Luhmann (1977, 20) describes this function of religion as
follows: "In der Religion geht es um die Transformation
umbestimmbarer in bestimmbare Komplexit~t." (Luhmann, 1977, 20).
This description also applies to the personal level with which we deal
here. Suffering is an anomic experience. It reveals the tragic destiny of
human existence and threatens the uniqueness and wholeness of life. The
experience of disorder, chaos and despair is implied in the experience of
suffering. Religion may help to overcome this chaos by offering a new
nomos, over and against the anomic and chaotic aspects oflife, religion,
or theodicy (Berger 1973, 62-63). With the help of religious symbols
and metaphors relating to suffering, we are able to reinterpret suffering
and to consider it as part of the totality of life (Van Uden 1985, 185).
We attribute a religious meaning to suffering, which tends to diminish
the experience of contingency. For the religious meaning attributed to
suffering in a way `explains' suffering. That is to say, suffering is seen
as a part of the meaningful whole of human existence. This is what
Luhmann means by Kontingenzbew~ltigung. When suffering is
understood to have religious significance, it does not disappear, but the
anomic experience of chaos and disorder may diminish.
However, there is the theological criticism that emphasis on the func-
tion of Kontingenzbew~ltigung threatens to empty the concept of God.
As Van Harskamp ( 1991, 236-239) points out, within Luhmann's discus-
sion of the function of Kontingenzbew~ltigung, God evolves into a
meaningless and abstract symbol. Here, the specific Christian under-
standing of God is no longer of importance; God is a necessary yet an
empty and meaningless transcendental condition in the human search for
meaning. Van Harskamp is right in this respect, but his criticism does
not apply to our approach. First, we do not claim the function of
Kontingenzbewáltigung to be the only function of religion. We only
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consider this function of importance when it comes to coping with suffe-
ring, although one can still think of other functions. For instance, re-
ligion also functions in an individual's encounter with the transcendent
(Van der Ven 1991, 167). And second, because of our material
understanding of religion, our emphasis on the function of kontingenz-
bew~ltigung does not entail a concept of a God who is stripped of
content. Instead, we are dealing with several symbols of theodicy which
exemplify specific Christian ways of dealing with suffering. Even
though we acknowledge the theological objections attached to the word
Kontingenzbewáltigung, we still feel that it offers a good description of
the function of religion in the coping process. An example may illustrate
this function of Kontingenzbew~ltigung.
Let us consider the religious symbol of the Fall. Within this symbol,
suffering can be considered a divine punishment for sin. Consequent]y,
suffering is in a way `explained', which may diminish the experience of
contingency induced by it. Chaos is transformed into order, for the sym-
bol of the Fall reveals the righteousness of suffering as a divine punish-
ment. The contingent nature of suffering then disappears, for it is in-
duced by God as a severe but a just deity. Questions such as, "Why
me?", and "Why this?", may thus be answered. This is only an example
meant to illustrate how religious symbols serve to meet the experience
of contingency. Naturally, there are other religious symbols that can also
be of help to us in our coping with suffering, as we intend to show
below. The symbol of the Fall does not necessarily render comfort and
support. It may very well elicit resistance and anger.
An individual's religious frame ofreference will determine which re-
ligious symbols will be helpful in the coping process. Furthermore, as
mentioned earlier, the function of Kontingenzbew~ltigung is not
restricted to religion. Other secular world-views may be of help. In this
respect the individual's overall attitude towards religion is decisive; the
more religion is considered an important aspect of life the more likely
is the usage ofreligious symbols in the coping process (Van Uden 1985,
206). That is how religion functions in the coping process. To conclude
this first section, we summarise the most important insights.
Drawing upon theories ofcognitive psychology, we have emphasised
the importance of cognitive dispositions in the coping process. Coping
with suffering, or emotional processing, is a cognitive actívity meant to
overcome the mismatch between the stimulus event, i.e. innocent suf-
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fering, and the individual's concerns. As we learned from Frijda, this
involves the emotion processes referred to as extinction, habituation,
competence gain and change in concern. Religion may also function in
the coping process, especially with regard to ultimate concerns. For,
companions to suffering are the experiences ofcontingency and finitude,
which may require religious answers. In relation to the coping process
then, we specified the function of religion as Kontingenzbew~ltigung.
This is not the overall function of religion; we argue only that this is a
specific function related to the coping process. The religious symbols
surrounding suffering are referred to as theodicy symbols. These belong
to the individual's religious frame of reference, which in turn are part of
humanity's cognitive dispositions
Amibuting a religious meaning to suffering is also a cognitive ac-
tivity that is meant to overcome the mismatch between suffering and the
individual's ultimate concerns. This restores the wholeness of human
existence by viewing suffering as part of the totality of life.
Subsequently, extinction and habituation are facilitated, for the attri-
bution of a religious meaning to suffering reflects a cognitive adjust-
ment, which decreases the emotional significance ofthe stimulus event.
In turn this enhances the individual's control over the harmful situation
leading to competence gain and change in concern. In spite of the
presence of suffering, theodicy symbols safeguard humanity's ultimate
concern. This puts human existence in a new perspective.
Although our above description of the coping process is perhaps
somewhat optimistic and mechanical, we are well aware that coping
with suffering is a difficult process of long duration. Although this
consideration is beyond the scope of this project, there are many factors
that can turn the work of grief into a pathological process.
1.2 THEODICY: A SYSTEMATIC SURVEY
In dealing with the psychological aspects of theodicy our frame of refe-
rence is the function of Kontingenzbew~ltigung. When people are
willing to attribute a religious meaning to suffering, they use theodicy
symbols in order to cope with the experiences of contingency and
finitude induced by suffering. The emphasis in this section is on what
these symbols look like. This concerns the theological contents of the
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various theodicy symbols people may refer to in the coping process.
After dealing with the psychological aspects of theodícy we now explore
the theological aspects of theodicy.
Following our practical theological approach to the problem of theo-
dicy, we are mainly interested in implicit theodicy. As we already stated
in the introduction to this chapter, implicit theodicy deals with the reli-
gious symbols that are present in the religious consciousness of ordinary
people.
How do we discover these religious symbols? Analogous to Berger's
distinction between the implicit and the explicit theodicy, Schillebeeckx
(19828, 449) refers to first order and second order assertions. According
to Schillebeeckx, first order assertions refer to the experiential basis of
theological statements, although these theological statements themselves
are second order assertions which are meant to defend and to clarify the
first order assertions. This view, however, is too optimistic. Very often
there is no relationship between first order and second order assertions.
These second order assertions are often theological statements that lack
a clear experiential basis. Consequently, one cannot analyse or
systematise implicit theodicy by studying explicit theodicy, for one
cannot be sure that the second order theological statements about
theodicy do indeed reflect and clarify the religious experiences of
ordinary people. Since we are lacking in sufficient empirical data
regarding the way ordinary people attribute a religious meaning to
suffering, we are compelled to confine ourselves to a systematic survey
of explicit theodicy. Such a detailed analysis of several theoretical
answers to the problem of theodicy elaborated by theologians, appears
below. This analysis is meant to clarify the religious consciousness of
ordinary people, although we are aware ofthe difficulties attached to the
relationship between implicit and explicit theodicy. But to begin with,
we call attention for some preliminary, methodological remarks.
1.2.1 Theological Aspects of the Problem of Theodicy
Our analysis of the explicit theodicy pertains to three theodicy models:
the retaliation model, the plan model and the compassion model. Ac-
cording to the retaliation model, human suffering is a divine punishment
for sin. In contrast, the plan model stresses that humans suffer according
to a divine plan. The compassion model focuses on the notion that God
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is compassionate with suffering people. These models will be described
at length below. And in order to organise this description, we will focus
on the two theological aspects that all three models have in common.
The theodicy symbols we are about to discuss are ideal types in the
Weberian sense (Weber 19725, 9-10). T'here are manifold answers to the
problem oftheodicy that have been elaborated throughout the history of
Christian theology. It is simply impossible to deal with them all in this
context. Therefore, we present three ideal-typical theodicy models that
each combine several aspects of the problem of theodicy which are es-
sential to Christian theology. Thus it is more appropriate to use the term
theodicy model than theodicy symbol, since we are dealing with abstract,
distinct theoretical constructs or theoretical models, which are not as
clearly distinguished in the theological literature as they are presented
here. Nor are these theodicy models, as such, present in the religious
consciousness of common people. Still it is important to use ideal-
typical theodicy models to analyse or systematise the religious
consciousness of ordinary people. For only well defined, distinct
theodicy models may serve as heuristic models suited to classify the
different, explicit theodicies elaborated by theologians, as well as the
implicit theodicies present in the religious consciousness of human
beings.
The three ideal-typical theodicy models mentioned above are con-
structed with the help of a twofold rationale. This rationale refers to the
theological aspects basic to the problem of theodicy. From a theological
viewpoint, the problem of theodicy regards the theological dilemma:
How may human suffering be reconciled with both God's goodness and
omnipotence? These two aspects in particular, God's goodness and om-
nipotence, are used in this discussion to categorise the different answers
to the problem of theodicy that have been elaborated throughout the hi-
story of Christian theology. This results in a systematic survey of the
explicit theodicy and, in addition, the three ideal-typical theodicy
models. Before actually discussing these models in detail, we will
examine this twofold rationale.
Both aspects ofour rationale apply to the theological dilemma itself
and thus concern the doctrine of God. Hick refers to this dilemma as
follows: "For the problem of evil does not attach itselfas a threat to any
and every concept of deity. It arises only for a religion that insists that
the object of its worship is at once perfectly good and unlimitedly
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powerful. The challenge is thus inescapable for Christianity, which has
always steadfastly adhered to the pure monotheism of its Judaic source
in attributing both omnipotence and infinite goodness to God" (Hick
1985, 4). The theological dilemma fully emerges in this quotation. This
dilemma constitutes the core problem of every theological approach to
the problem of theodicy. When theologians deal with the problem of
theodicy their main interest is to solve this dilemma. Although numerous
theodicies have been elaborated throughout the history of Christian
theology, they are all different answers to the same question: If God is
omnipotent and perfectly good, why do human beings suffer? The reality
of human suffering, however, does not cause the theological problems.
The problems arise as soon as God is said to be omnipotent and
perfectly good. Griffin (1976, 17-18) refers to the doctrine of divine
omnipotence and the doctrine that god is perfectly good, as the two key
premises for the problem of theodicy. Following both Hick and Griffin,
we infer that as far as Christianity is concerned the problem of theodicy
is essentially a`theo'-logical problem in the true sense of the word; it
immediately applies to the doctrine of God. This insight makes a
systematisation of various answers to the problem oftheodicy possible.
If the doctrine of the goodness of God and the doctrine of divine
omnipotence constitute the basic theological aspects of the problem of
theodicy, it is possible to distinguish among different theodicy models
with reference to the various ways both doctrines are conceived. Each
theodicy model contains a different view on divine omnipotence as well
as on divine goodness. Moreover, these different views determine the
specific way in which each theodicy model `solves' the theological
dilemma. These two aspects of the doctrine of God enable us to
categorise explicit theodicies from a theological perspective.
The different views pertaining to these two divine attributes, divine
goodness and divine omnipotence, form the basis ofthe ideal-typical di-
stinctions among the retaliation model, the plan model and the compas-
sion model. In our discussion of these ideal-typical models, we also con-
sider a third aspect: the nature of the relationship between God and the
world. The way this relationship is conceived depends strongly on the
way both God's goodness and omnipotence are conceived. It is very
useful, therefore, to elaborate the ideal-typical features of a theodicy
model by also examining the view on the nature of the relationship
between God and the world that the model contains. This latter view is
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not a constituent element of a theodicy model, only the two theological
aspects are, but it serves to determine the ideal-typical features of a
theodicy model.
Traditionally, theologians have been very cautious in admitting that
God and the world are related. Even when they did so, the relationship
between God and the world was viewed as only external. For God was
thought of as absolute and thus non relative, since relationships make
God dependant which contradicts his absoluteness (Hartshorne 1948, 6,
18-19). Griffin (1976, 73-77) amibutes all this to the influence of tradi-
tional theism, according to which God is said to be:
1 Eternal: This means that God exists independent of time, God is non
temporal and, therefore, cannot change.
2 Impassible: This divine amibute is implied by the previous one. It
says God cannot be affected by other realities, for this would imply a
change in God.
3 Pure act: T~is attribute refers to the notion that God is fully realised,
there is no unrealised potentiality in God. Again this refers to the first
divine attribute, for every unrealised potentiality would imply that God
could change.
4 Simple: According to Griffin, the meaning of this divine attribute is
threefold: God's essence is fully actualised in his existence; there is no
difference between God's essence and God's attributes and God's at-
tributes are the same since they are God's essence.
5 Necessary: This amibute also follows logically from the first one,
since whatever is eternal is necessary.
6 Omniscient: This means that God knows everything there is to know.
That is to say, God does not know in advance (preascientia), but God's
knowledge ofthe world is all-embracing or comprehensive (praesentium
scientia). This amibute also follows from the previous ones. There can
be no difference between God's potentiality and actually know all things
(a pure act), therefore the content of the divine lrnowledge cannot
change (eternal; impassible).
7 Omnipotent: This attribute refers to the notion that God is the unique
cause of all things. God knows all things and since there is no difference
between the divine attributes, due to divine simplicity, God knowing all
things and his causing all things are the same.
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Now, influenced by traditional theism many theologians considered and
still consider, the relationship between God and the world, and between
God and humanity, to be extemal. That is to say, they admit that God is
related to the world, but this relationship does not contribute to God's
actual existence; it is only a nominal relationship. God's actual existence
stays the same with or without such a relationship. Consequently, the
human predicament does not affect God, there is no change in God and
thus God is eternal and impassible. We may elucidate this with the help
of the internal-external dichotomy devised by Charles Hartshorne, al-
though we are not adhering to the paradigm of process theology. As
Hartshorne points out, it is also possible to think ofGod as internally re-
lated to human beings and to the world. In fact, as Hartshorne continues,
such an internal relationship is logically implied in divine attributes such
as omnipotence and omniscience. If God has perfect knowledge of the
world, the world as such is a constituent of the divine knowledge; the
divine knowledge depends upon the world (Hartshorne 1948, 75, 120-
124). In this way, the world does in fact conh-ibute to God's actual exi-
stence, any change in the world results in a change in God. This is what
Hartshorne (1948, 65-67) means by an internal relationship. Hartshorne
does not criticise the traditional doctrine of God, but he considers this
doctrine to be solely a description of the abstract, divine essence. Om-
niscience is the abstract, divine ability to be all-knowing, but the actual
divine knowing is not absolute but relative. Hartshorne, then, posits two
divine modalities: God in His absolute, divine essence, and God in His
actual relatedness to the world (Hartshorne 1948, 143; McWilliams
1985, 129). Following Hartshorne, the nature of the relationship between
God and the world may thus be considered in two ways: God is
`externally' related to the world or `internally' related to the world. We
shall apply this internal-external dichotomy in order to elaborate the
ideal-typical features of the three theodicy models.
In summary, the ideal-typical theodicy models we are about to dis-
cuss, are constructed with the help of a twofold rationale. Each model
contains a different understanding of divine omnipotence and of divine
goodness. These differences constitute the ideal-typical features of our
theodicy models, which we elaborate further with the help of the inter-
nal-external dichotomy.
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1.2.2 Three Ideal-Typical Theodicy Models
In the previous section we already referred to three theodicy models: the
retaliation model, the plan model and the compassion model. Each
model contains a specific answer to the problem of theodicy. The re-
taliation model refers to human suffering as a divine punishment for sin.
The plan model considers human suffering to be part of a divine plan.
And the compassion model, in contrast, argues that human suffering is
inimical to a caring and compassionate God.
The Retaliation Model
People may amibute a religious meaning to suffering by referring to
their evil predicament as a divine punishment for sin. In this way, their
suffering is in a sense ` explained', which eventually may cause the
anomic experiences of chaos and despair to diminish. The retaliation
model contains a possible answer to the existential questions: "Why
me?" and "Why this?" But, what then is the exact `theological
explanation' for human suffering offered by the retaliation model? To
answer this question, it is useful to go back to the early Church Fathers,
especially to St. Augustine (354-430). According to Hick ( 1985, 59;
172-173), Augustine may be regarded as the fountainhead of the
retaliation model, since Augustine teaches that all suffering is either sin
or punishment for sin. Although we focus on Augustine's reasoning,
we do not consider him to be the overall representative of the retaliation
model. Throughout the history of Christian theology numerous
theologians have stressed human guilt and sin when accounting for
human suffering, Augustine mainly deals with this topic in his well-
known treatise De libero arbitrio (On free will) in which he develops his
so-called `free-will defence'. With the help of his free-will defence
Augustine attributes all human suffering to the human misuse of free-
will and thus may solve the theological dilemma: If God is omnipotent
and perfectly good, why do human beings suffer? Below, we shall look
into Augustine's answer in more detail and conclude this discussion with
an ideal-typical description of the retaliation model.
Essential to Augustine's approach to the problem oftheodicy is his view
on divine omnipotence. This view on divine omnipotence, which
Augustine shares with other adherents to traditional theism, is straight-
forward. The central premise here is that God is the unique cause of all
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things (De libero arbitrio, III. 126). This premise is meant to criticise
Manichaeism. For Augustine and other champions of traditional theism
Manichaeism constitutes a serious threat. To account for the origin of
suffering the Manichaeistic doctrine upholds a dualism between a good
power, as the source of all good things, and an evil power, as the source
of all suffering and evil things, which are both primordial and stand in
genuine opposition (Griffin 1976, 42). Naturally, the supporters oftradi-
tional theism have to reject this dualism. It is not compatible with God's
omnipotence, impassibility or eternal being. If an evil power opposes
God, the good power, the omnipotence of God is limited by this evil
power. In addition, this evil power causes things to happen that are in
opposition to the divine will. Therefore God cannot be eternal or impas-
sible (Jolivet, 1936, 9-15). Accordingly, Augustine and the other adhe-
rents of traditional theism strongly reject Manichaeism.
But the above premise immediately makes one wonder: Does this
mean that God is the unique cause of all human suffering? Obviously,
this premise causes `theo'-logical problems, for it looks as if it seriously
questions the divine goodness. Within the framework of the retaliation
model this problem is tackled by dealing with the nature and the origin
of suffering (Jolivet 1936, 19). The nature of suffering is defined as the
deprivation of the good (privatio boni). This means that suffering has no
being, it only exists as non-being. This is Augustine's view, but it is also
present in contemporary Thomistic thought. The French Thomist, Char-
les Journet, refers to the `paradox' of suffering, or the `paradox' of evil.
As Journet says, "Le paradoxe du mal, c'est, nous venons de le dire qu'il
"est" sans "être". Il "est" à la manière d'une privation; il "n'est pas" à la
manière d'une réalité positive" (Journet 1961, 49) This definition of the
nature of suffering renders any reference to the doctrine of Manichaeism
superfluous. If suffering is only non-being, one no longer needs an evil
power to account for the existence or origin of suffering (Jolivet 1936,
22-43; Hick 1985, 37-58). In this way, the question regarding the origin
of suffering becomes the question regarding the cause of this deprivation
of goodness. Traditionally, Augustine answers that the misuse ofhuman
free will, i.e. sin, is the cause of this deprivation ofgoodness. Human sin
therefore, is the unique cause ofall human suffering (De libero arbitrio,
I. 1-3). This reference to the privative nature of all suffering enables one
to uphold the divine omnipotence by stating that God is the unique cause
of all things without this threatening divine goodness.
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This clarifies the main theological roots of the retaliation model. But íf
we are to fully understand this approach, we have to consider the con-
cept of `sin' more carefully. Again, we follow the reasoning of
Augustine. He refers to sin as concupiscence, that human lust is the
cause of all suffering. God has revealed the divine, eternal law to huma-
nity, but due to our lust we neglect the eternal law and follow our pas-
sion. In this way, human reason, which Augustine believes to be of a
higher order, is determined by human passion, which Augustine believes
is of a lower order (De libero arbitrio, I. 20, 61-65). This is human sin
as it results from the misuse ofthe free will, which makes humans guilty
and therefore punishable (Journet 1961, 55). When people follow their
passion instead of the divine, eternal law, they no longer strive for
virtues such as: wisdom, courage, frugality and justice (De libero
arbitrio, I. 89-90). Accordingly, sin is also of a privative character. It
refers to the divine, eternal law and the moral virtues ofwhich humanity
has lost sight. In this respect, sin is the only basic evil in the world, a
view that entails denying of the existence of physica] evil. Augustine
and other, present-day adherents of traditional theism, such as Jolivet
and Journet, clearly teach that physical evil does not exist. Physical pain,
for instance, is not evil since it is protective. It functions as a warning
against all kinds ofbodily threats. Pain in this sense is an essential part
of human existence. Because of sin, pain is experienced by human
beings as suffering. Only sin, therefore, makes someone experience
injustice (moral evil) and pain (physical evil) as suffering, the core of
the divine punishment (Jolivet 1936, 39-41, 49; Journet, 1961, 58-59).
Within theology these ideas are elaborated in many different ways.
Elements of the retaliation model are not only present in the works of
Augustine, but also in the works of Luther and Calvin as well as in con-
temporary Thomistic thought (cf. Griffin 1976). However, despite mu-
tual differences the supporters of the retaliation model all agree that
there is a causal relationship between human actions and human
suffering. The mutual differences surround the nature of this causal
relationship. The retaliation model is rooted in the `law of cause and
effect'. That is to say, the retaliation model rests on the notion that a
good life will be rewarded and a bad life invokes punishment. Hick
(1985, 87-89) calls this the `principle of moral balance' which the
supporters ofthe retaliation model believe is at work in the universe. But
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this principle of moral balance seriously questions the divine justice and
consequently the divine goodness.
How, for instance, may this principle account for the suffering of in-
nocent children? Augustine teaches that human suffering is caused by
God as a divine punishment for sin. However, in order to safeguard the
divine justice, Augustine immediately adds that the divine punishment
is only justified íf a person freely sins (De libero arbitrio, I. 1-3, 76).
This is Augustine's free-will defence. But are children already able to
sin; is the newborn child able to sin? These are serious objections
against the goodness and justice of God, which cannot be met by
referring to the privative nature of suffering. It is in this respect not
surprising that Augustine is silent about the suffering of innocent
children. But other objections against this principle of moral balance can
also be raised. Is it not, for instance, our common experience that good
people are afflicted by evil, and people who have committed several
faults seem to prosper? Throughout the history of Christian theology,
these difficulties have caused the relationship between human action and
human suffering as a divine punishment for sin to be reconsidered. Yet
the retaliation model has not been abandoned. Theologians could do this
by the lengthening the time perspective in two ways.
The lengthening ofthe time perspective refers, first of all, to the doc-
trine of original sin. Difficulties with the retaliation model arise as soon
as the suffering of innocent children is at issue. Are children already
guilty and punishable? Theologians can approach this problem through
the doctrine of original sin. Augustine refers to humanity's original sin
when he is asked why some people misuse their free will and others do
not. According to Augustine, because of original sin, all people sin.
With the Fall, humans lost the ability to perform the good, and inherited
as free beings, the necessity of sin (non posse non peccare; De libero
arbitrio, III. 161-181). This solves the problem of the suffering of
innocent children by asserting that humanity is born into this state of
guilt. Sin becomes an inter generative category. In the work by other
supporters of traditional theism, concerning the problem of theodicy, the
doctrine of original sin also prevails. Calvin closely follows the
reasoning of Augustine with regard to the origin of human suffering.
According to Calvin, people possess free will and thus are responsible
agents. Since Adam's Fall, human nature has been perverted and people
necessarily will to do wrong (Hick 1985, 117-121; Griffin 1976, 119-
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120). Every human being participates in Adam's Fall. No one is
innocent, and everyone deserves to be punished. With the help of the
doctrine of original sin, the adherents of traditional theism are able to
reconcile an individual's guilt with the perverted nature of humankind
as a whole. This upholds the retaliation model framework without
questioning the goodness and justice of God (Hedinger 1972, 44-46).
Second, the lengthening ofthe time perspective refers to eschatology.
This is described by Weber. According to Weber (1963, 242-247), the
problem of theodicy is closely related to the human need for salvation.
Especially when misfortune strikes, one not only seeks to explain the
harmful situation, but also to know how and when this situation might
be abolished. This leads to the development of inessianic eschatological
ideas, teaching that the moral balance will be restored in the near future,
in a world beyond or on judgment day (Weber 19725, 315-316). Al-
though Augustine supposes a direct, causal relationship between human
sin and divine punishment on the basis of the doctrine of original sin, it
appears that for other theologians this relationship is of a more indirect
nature. This is apparent in the Calvinistic strand of the retaliation model.
Calvin's doctrine of predestination refers to an indirect, causal relation-
ship between human actions and divine punishment, since Calvin
teaches that human destiny solely depends on God's absolutely free
decrees instead of human merit. However, this doctrine does not imply
a denial of any causal relationship between human actions and the
human predicament. Calvin also teaches that whenever a person serves
to increase the glory of God, this conduct may be a sign of possible
election. Though mysterious, for Calvin, the human predicament still
reveals the divine interference with the world (Weber 198515, 98-125)
Some of the objections against the retaliation model can be addressed
from an eschatological perspective. When theologians consider the rela-
tionship between human sin and the divine punishment to be of a more
indírect nature, the framework of the retaliation model may again be
upheld without the justice and goodness of God being questioned.
This clarifies some common features of the retaliation model, our
first approach to the theological dilemma: IfGod is omnipotent and per-
fectly good, why do human beings suffer? The answer it provides is that
suffering is a divine punishment for sin. In order to categorise the re-
taliation mode] we use the two aspects of our rationale. The first aspect
regards the doctrine of divine omnipotence. Within the framework of the
THEODICY MODELS 27
retaliation model God is all-powerful; God eventually determines every
event. As we have seen, the central premise constituting the retaliation
model is that God is the unique cause of all things. The second aspect
regards the doctrine ofdivine goodness. In order to uphold the divine
goodness human suffering is attributed to human sin. In addition, the
reasoning about human free will and humanity's sinful state is meant to
elucidate the righteousness of the divine punishment. That is to say,
within the framework of the retaliation model the divine goodness
regards the divine justice, which is grounded on the principle: `Everyone
gets what they deserve' And God, subsequently, is regarded as the
ultimate wan-ant of this principle ofjustice, for God sees to it that no one
escapes their fate, in this world or in a world beyond (Schluchter 1979,
72-77).
The idea that suffering is a divine punishment for sin, becomes even
more clear when we consider the nature of the relationship between God
and the world in this model. Due to the influence of traditional theism
this relationship is principally thought of as external in nature. This
model stresses the absoluteness of God. God cannot be affected by the
human predicament. Human suffering, then, does not contribute to the
actual existence of God (Hartshorne 1948, 62-63). Instead, within the
framework of the retaliation model God is a kind oftranscendent Ruler
who ordains the law of cause and effect and the principle of moral
balance to prevent human sin from disturbing the universal and moral
order of God's creation (Jolivet 1936, 100; Journet 1961, 222-223; Hick
1985, 87-89). Together with the notion that God is all-powerful and that
God's goodness relates to justice, this view about the nature of the
relationship between God and the world reveals the ideal-typical
features of the retaliation model.
We now turn to the plan model, which will in part deal with ques-
tions that the retaliation model leaves unanswered.
The Plan Model
Another way of attributing a religious meaning to suffering is exhibited
by the plan model. At the heart of the plan model a teleological orienta-
tion prevails. In this model human suffering is part of a divine plan. This
reference to a divine plan or to the good purpose that is served by human
suffering provides a different answer to the existential questions: "Why
me?" and "Why this?" And subsequently it offers another `solution' to
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the theological dilemma: If God is omnipotent and perfectly good, why
do human beings suffer? Similar to the idea that suffering is a divine
punishment for sin, the idea of a divine plan has been fairly widespread
throughout the history of Christian theology. In order to illustrate this,
we shall discuss two theological answers to the problem of theodicy
which both exhibit a teleological orientation. The first answer arose in
the early eighteenth century, has been elaborated by Leibniz, and is
closely related to the retaliation model. The second answer is elaborated
by the present-day theologian John Hick. These answers shall be
discussed and compared to one another with the help of our twofold
rationale, which will result in an ideal-typical description of the plan
model.
As we have seen above, within the retaliation model there is a causal
relationship between human actions and human suffering. The plan
model, on the other hand, is framed by a teleological orientation. Now,
although the causal and the teleological orientation seem to differ, they
are nevertheless related to each other. In Augustine's reasoning, for in-
stance, there is also a teleological orientation present. Confronted with
the question, "Why does God permit sinful souls to misuse their free-
dom?", Augustine replies that sinful souls necessarily exist for the per-
fection of the universe (De libero arbitrio, III. 92-93). According to
Augustine, God's creation is comprehensive; it contains everything from
the highest to the lowest and all this in turn contributes to the perfection
of creation. If God had decided not to create sinful souls in order to pre-
vent human sin, then His creation would fail such souls and thus would
be less perfect and less good (De libero arbitrio, III. 47, 83). Again, the
issue here is the goodness of God. We have already referred to the cen-
tral premise Augustine and the other adherents of traditional theism hold
in common that God is the unique cause of all things. A logical
inference from this premise would be that God is also responsible for
human suffering. Augustine does not deny this inference, for he holds
that God is responsible for human suffering as a divine punishment for
sin. However, since God could prevent this suffering, does it not
threaten the divine goodness for God to create sinful souls and actually
permit people to sin? Augustine is well aware of these difiiculties and
so he introduces a teleological orientation into his line of thought. This
safeguards the goodness of God's creation; everything created
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contributes to the perfection of the whole (Jolivet 1936, 93-94; Hick
1985, 82).
The plan model addresses theological difficulties that cannot be
solved within the framework of the retaliation model. For instance, how
can the goodness of God be upheld, when the divine omnipotence ren-
ders God responsible for human suffering? Theology is unable to deal
with this question adequately unless it exceeds the boundaries of the re-
taliation model. Accordingly, a teleological orientation is introduced
into theological thought. This is why Augustine does not restrict himself
to positing a causal relationship between human actions and suffering.
He also adopts a teleological approach to the problem of theodicy to
render his reasoning more sound. This is how the retaliation model and
the plan model are related to one another. It looks as if the theological
difficulties attached to the retaliation model compel theologians to
consider suffering from a more teleological perspective.
Augustine, however, is not the only one who holds a teleological
view. Several other theologians refer to the perfection of the universe
whenever they intend to account for human suffering as part of God's
creation. First, we deal with the way Leibniz has elaborated this view in
his treatise.
Leibniz, like Augustine and other adherents of traditional theism, up-
holds the central premise that God is the unique cause of all things
("Dieu est la premiére raison des choses", Théodicée, para. 7). Natu-
rally, this premise again makes one wonder whether God is responsible
for the existence of human suffering. Leibniz's approach to this problem
differs from Augustine's. Whereas Augustine principally regards
suffering as a just punishment for sin, Leibniz considers suffering from
a strictly teleological point of view. This does not mean that Leibniz
denies the existence of human sin. According to Leibniz, the misuse of
human free will causes moral evil and is therefore guilty and
punishable. However, this is not the main cause of all evil! Leibniz
distinguishes among moral evil, physical evil and metaphysical evil. The
latter he regards as basic to all other evils (Théodicée, para. 21).
Leibniz refers to this metaphysical evil as the original imperfection
of God's creation. That is to say, although the world is created by God
it does not share in the divine nature. The world is contingent. It does
not necessarily have to exist the way it actually exists; one can imagine
the existence of various other possible worlds. In contrast, the divine
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nature is a necessity. Although the reason for God's existence is God
himself, the reason for the existence ofthe world lies beyond the world.
In this respect the world is limited and thus imperfect. This original
imperfection of the world, metaphysical evil, also affects human beings'
physical and moral states. With respect to moral evil for instance
Leibniz refers to the original imperfection of humans as created beings
who are subject to failure. Due to this original imperfection human
beings have a predisposition towards sin, which causes them to suffer
physical evil and to experience it as a divine punishment for sin. As
Leibniz says, "Car il faut considérer qu'il y a une imperfection originale
dans la créature avant le péché, parceque la créature est limitée
essentiellement: d'ou vient qu'elle ne saurait tout savoir, et qu'elle se
peut tromper et faire d'autres fautes" (Théodicée, para. 20, cf. also para.
31).
However, Leibniz's reference to a metaphysical cause of all evil and
suffering does not solve the problem of theodicy. One may still ask, is
it not possible for an overall good and omnipotent God to create a better
world without suffering? This question constitutes the core problem in
Leibniz's theodicy. Throughout his Essais de théodicée Leibniz is
anxious to show that the existence of evi] and human suffering in no way
affects the goodness of God because of the far greater good that is
served by it. Therefore, God is right in permitting humanity to suffer all
sorts of evil.
Leibniz, being a true, traditional theist, elucidates his answer with the
help of the concept of divine `omniscience' or `providence'. He argues
that the world is contingent, which allows one to imagine the existence
of other possible worlds. Consequently, the creation of the actual world
implies a divine choice; from all possible worlds God chose to call this
actual world into existence. By way of God's divine omniscience or
providence God does not know things in advance, but simply foresees
all possibilities. Tfiis we have to take literally. According to Leibniz,
God considered every event and every human action in a state of inere
potentiality before finally choosing to create the state of affairs that God
thought to be the best (Théodicée, para. 42, 78, 84). This is why Leibniz
answers the question negatively: God cannot create a better world, since
he has already created the best of all possible worlds
This concept of `the best of all possible worids' constitutes the core
of Leibniz's theodicy. Furthermore, the inference that the actual world
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is the best of all possible worlds is also inevitable with regard to another
theological premise Leibniz upholds, that God is infinite goodness and
only creates what pleases God (Théodicée, para. 109-110). God's crea-
tion in itself has to be good. Otherwise, God would not be pleased by it.
But what about the human suffering that occurs in God's creation? Leib-
niz admits that God could have created a world without human
suffering; or could abolish suffering in our actual world (Théodicée,
Préface, p. 37-38). But this would result in the existence of a different
and inferior world, since the actual world, despite suffering, is the best
of all possible worlds (Théodicée, para. 9). This is how Leibniz's line of
reasoning reveals a teleological orientation. When suffering occurs in
the best of all possible worlds, suffering in itself is a constituent part of
this world. Suffering contributes to the existence of the best possible
world and thus serves a greater good.
Leibniz, therefore attributes a positive function to the occurrence of
human suffering in our actual world. God did not intend to create a
world in which suffering exists. However, compelled by divine goodness
to create the best of all possible worlds, God simply permits human suf-
fering. T'herefore, God permits suffering by accident (par concomitance)
to bring about the best possible world (Théodicée, para. 119). The exi-
stence of the best possible world is the greater good that is served by
human suffering. Without the presence of human suffering the world
would be less good. Following this line ofthought, Leibniz infers, "Per-
mettre le mal, comme Dieu le permet, c'est la plus grande bonté"
(Théodicée, para. 121)
Just like Augustine, Leibniz acknowledges the existence of human
sin and the righteousness ofthe divine punishment. However, Leibniz's
thought is much more strictly dominated by a teleological orientation
than Augustines'. It's possible to regard Leibniz's theodicy as a
completion of Augustine's answer. Whereas Augustine refers to the
human misuse of free will as the main cause of all suffering, Leibniz is
occupied with the question, "Why has God endowed humanity with a
fallible free will?" And his final answer bears an undeniable teleological
character. According to Leibniz, God was right to endow humanity with
a free will, for human free will, and the moral evils originating from its
misuse, are constituent parts of the best possible world (Théodicée, para.
282-285).
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The way Hick addresses the problem of theodicy differs strongly from
Leibniz's attempt. Hick's final answer, however, also reveals a
teleological orientation. His reasoning, therefore, is also consistent with
the plan model. Reviewing the different answers to the problem of theo-
dicy elaborated throughout the history of Christian theology, Hick
distinguishes between two types of theodicy: the Augustinian type and
the Irenaean type.
According to Hick (1985, 193-198), the Augustinian type of theodicy
fails to give a satisfying answer to the problem of theodicy because of
the impersonal way the relationship between God and humanity is con-
ceived. Consequently, Hick rejects the cosmological and metaphysical
approach to the problem of theodicy elaborated by the descendants of
the Augustinian tradition, such as for example Thomas Aquinas, Calvin
and Leibniz, and stresses the more personal way in which God relates to
humanity as revealed in the works and person of Jesus Christ.
Following Irenaeus (130-202), Hick distinguishes between the `ima-
ge' of God and the `likeness' of God as the main starting-point of his
theodicy. He refers to this distinction as follows, "T'he `imago', which
resides in man's bodily form, apparently represents his nature as an
intelligent creature capable of fellowship with his Maker, whilst the
`likeness' represents man's final perfection by the Holy Spirit" (Hick
1985, 211). This quotation immediately reveals a developmental or
teleological view, since it is the human's task to develop from the image
of God into the likeness of God. Initially, the gap between God and
human beings is very wide. This is not because of a Fall, but simply
because human beings are creatures and God is their creator. A creature
and its creator are never alike (Hick 1985, 214). However, human beings
have the ability, as intelligent creatures, to overcome this gap by coming
into the likeness of God.
Why would a person do this? Why would one want to come into the
likeness of God? Referring to Schleiermacher's `slechthinniges Ab-
h~ngigkeitsgefiihl', Hick answers that all kinds of worldly experiences
and especially the experience of evil human beings lead to the deve-
lopment of a God-consciousness. Hick continues, a"(...) God-con-
sciousness occurs in man always in connection with his consciousness of
an environing world" (Hick 1985, 220). The experience of evil awakens
human awareness to our absolute dependence on God.
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Initially humans stand aloof from their Creator. Hick refers to this pri-
mordial human predicament as sin (no God-consciousness). When human
beings want to come into the likeness of God, they are in need of a God-
consciousness that is developed through the experience of evil. In this
way human suffering serves the good purposes of God. And Hick (1985,
233) infers, "(...) this brings us back, however reluctantly, to some kind
of instrumental view of evil." In brief, Hick's answer to the problem of
theodicy is that the world, and all the suffering contained in it, is meant
to be a place ofreligious soul-making (Hick 1985, 259). Just as Leibniz
does, Hick attributes a positive meaning to the evil situations that afflict
humankind. To examine Hick's position in greater detail, there are still
two questions to be answered. First, why did God, being omnipotent, not
create humanity in the likeness of God in the first place? Second, does all
human suffering serve the good purposes of God?
With regard to the first question Hick develops a kind of free-will de-
fence. According to Hick, the divine purpose for humanity is twofold,
it consists of an ethical as well as a religious dimension. As he puts it,
"(...) the divine purpose for men is not only that they shall freely act
rightly towards one another but that they shall also freely enter into a
filial relationship with God Himself'(Hick 1985, 272). Here we
encounter the core of Hick's theodicy. For he claims that it is logically
possible for God to create human beings in such a way that they shall
always freely act rightly, but it is logically impossible for God to create
them in such a way that they shall freely enter into a faithful relationship
with God's self. Had God manipulated humanity in this way, the divine-
human relationship would be inauthentic (Hick 1985, 273). Therefore,
Hick infers, whenever humans are to come into the likeness of their
Creator, i.e. enter into a filial relationship with God, they must be in
possession of authentic freedom. Hick (1985, 276) refers to this
authentic freedom as `limited creativity'. This enables him to deal with
human suffering without making God responsible for its existence.
Limited creativity allows human beings to sin, yet also enables them to
enter into a filial relationship with God. Human beings therefore, must
be in possession of this limited creativity, even though this grants them
the ability ofmisusing their freedom; something which humans actually
do!
Suffering exists, therefore, because ofhuman free will. Although it
seems to be inimical to God, in the end, human suffering turns out to be
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part ofthe divine plan. Only when humans suffer in genuinely evil situa-
tions, do they become aware of the great distance between God and
themselves. And only this awareness makes them long for a relationship
with God. This, for Hicks is the ultimate destiny of human existence.
Human suffering is not intended by God, but suffering does fit in with
the contemplated, divine plan.
This brings us to the second question: Does all human suffering serve
the good purposes of God? Faced with this question, Hick (1985, 258)
states that, "(...) God created the world as a place for soul-making, not
as a hedonistic paradise for a maximum amount of pleasure." But gran-
ting this to be true, one may still wonder why God does not at least pre-
vent the worst or most profound human suffering? (Griffin 1976, 188)
In other words, do Auschwitz and the floods in Bangladesh also fit in
with the divine plan? Hick answers this question positively, and to safe-
guard the divine goodness, he elucidates his position in the following
way. First, Hick (1985, 327) argues that the notion `worst' suffering, or
`profound' suffering, is a comparative term, that is, had Auschwitz not
occurred something else would have caused the most profound suffering
and so on. This answer, however, is not satisfactory.
Hick is aware of this difficulty, and refers to the mystery of `dys-
teleological suffering' as well as to the eschatological solution the Chris-
tian faith offers. "We must thus affirm in faith that there will in the final
accounting be no personal life that is unperfected and no suffering that
has not eventually become a phase in the fulfilment of God's good pur-
pose. Only so, I suggest, is it possible to believe both in the perfect
goodness of God and in His unlimited capacity to perform His will"
(Hick 1985, 340). Hick's final answer to the problem of theodicy thus
is open-ended. In the end, all human suffering will prove itself
instrumentally good, as it becomes an element in the human
reconciliation with God. But this remains an eschatological promise,
which in turn calls for trust and faith that God eventually transforms
humanity's evil predicament into good. It calls for faith in the good
eschaton, "(...) that would render worthwhile any finite suffering
endured in the cause of attaining to it" (Hick 1985, 341).
To summarise the ideal-typical aspects of the plan model, we first
consider the doctrine of divine omnipotence. Both Leibniz and Hick
strongly emphasise the omnipotence of God without neglecting the
goodness of God. Leibniz agrees with the supporters of the retaliation
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model that God has to be considered the unique cause of all things, a
view to which Hick (1985, 15; Griffin 1976, 178) also adheres. More-
over, Leibniz and Hick also agree on a logical inference grounded in the
notion that God is all-powerful; God is able to create a world devoid of
human suffering.
Naturally, such an inference seriously questions the divine goodness.
This is why they introduce a teleological orientation. Both Leibniz and
Hick attribute a positive meaning to human suffering in order to account
for the goodness ofGod, which is the second aspect of our rationale. In
the plan model the goodness of God is upheld with reference to the
goodness of creation. According to Leibniz, God has created the best of
all possible worlds in which suffering is a constituent part. And accor-
ding to Hick (1985, 259), God has created the actual world, which is
most suited to serve its purpose as a place of soul-making. In this way,
both Leibniz and Hick argue that human suffering serves the good pur-
poses of God and thus God is right in permitting human suffering to oc-
cur. The actual state of affairs the world is in is the best possible. This
is how the goodness of God is safeguarded within the framework of the
plan model.
However, considered from the point of view of the internal-external
dichotomy, the theodicies of Leibniz and Hick differ. According to Leib-
niz, the relationship between God and the world is external in nature.
God created the best of all possible worlds not for the sake of humanity,
but out of a moral constraint to perform the good (Théodicée, par. 58,
168, 201). There ís no divine constraint to creation, but if God decides
freely to create he is forced to create the best possible world (Théodicée,
par. 109). Subsequently, there is no additional purpose for the world nor
does the world attribute any value to the divine life; God's glory is
eternal and thus cannot increase (Théodicée, par. 110; Hartshorne 1948,
132-133). In contrast, it seems that Hick regards the relationship
between God and the world to be of an internal nature. For he explicitly
states that God is actually "(...) seeking man's free response to Himself
in faith, trust and obedience" (Hick 1985, 274). That is to say, just as
human beings long for a relationship with God, God longs for the human
response; a response which may then contribute to the actual divine life.
Whereas the retaliation model refers to the divine punishment for sin to
account for human suffering, in the plan model, suffering is part of a
divine plan. This second way of dealing with the theological dilemma,
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If God is omnipotent and perfectly good, why do humans suffer?,
implies that God is all-powerful. In contrast to the retaliation model,
God's goodness is safeguarded with reference to the goodness of
creation. And according to Hick, whose arguments fully represent the
plan model, the relationship between God and the world is of an internal
nature.
The Compassion Model
Apart from the retaliation model and the plan model we also distinguish
the compassion model, which contains another answer to the problem of
theodicy. Once more, the theological dilemma is `resolved' in a totally
different fashion. The main theme in this model is the idea that God is
compassionate towards suffering human beings. But unlike the notion
that human suffering is a divine punishment for sin or is part of a divine
plan, Christian theology has again and again rejected and criticised this
idea of a compassionate and caring God. This idea has only received
more general theological support since the beginning of the twentieth
century.
However, the notion of a compassionate and caring God was not ab-
sent during previous centuries. As Van Egmond (1986, 16-34) clearly
shows, before twentieth century British and German theology the notion
of a compassionate and caring God was present in the early church as
well as in the works of Luther. Although it was an ancient and wide-
spread idea throughout the history of Christian theology it was never
incorporated into the official teachings of the church. For a moment we
will examine some of the theological objections to this idea of a com-
passionate God.
With regard to the compassion model the main theological question
is, "Is God passible or impassible?" Theology has usually answered this
question negatively, since traditional theism teaches that God is eternal,
impassible and pure act (cf. section 2.1.). Here we are faced with the
legacy of Greek philosophy, which used the concepts of apatheia and
autarkeia in order to define the divine nature (Moltmann 1972, 256-258;
Lee 1974, 28-32). Apatheia refers to the absence of feeling or passion
in the divine nature. The Greek philosophers, such as Plato (427-347
BC), regarded humanity's emotional aspect as an irrational faculty and
associated this aspect with an animal nature. Since the Greeks saw God
as the Supreme Reason or as the Logos, for them it was illogical to at-
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tribute real feelings or passions to the divine nature, This disdain for
emotions and feelings is closely related to the concept of autarkeia.
From a Greek perspective, the ultimate perfection is extreme self-
sufficiency, to the point that one cannot be moved from the outside. God
represents the ultimate perfection. God is self-sufficient and cannot be
affected by any human desire or emotion. This Greek attitude towards
the divine nature has deeply influenced the early and medieval Christian
scholars. From the outset this caused Christian theology to uphold the
impassibility of God (Pollard 1955, 353-356).
Nevertheless, the dispute about the (im-)passibility of God remained
virulent especially during the early Christian period. There were two
reasons for this. First, the proponents of divine impassibility were faced
with a great number of biblical texts that used an anthropomorphic lan-
guage to describe God, that is, texts attributing real human feelings and
emotions to God (McWilliams 1985, 6). Kuyper (1969) refers to nume-
rous passages about the repentence of God including Genesis 6, 6-7;
Exodus 32, 12-14; Jeremiah 18, 1-10; 1 Samuel 15,11; and Jonah 3,
10,4, 2. It is obvious that such biblical passages were regarded as con-
tradictory to the understanding of the divine nature that had been derived
from Greek philosophy. This encouraged the dispute over the (im-)passi-
bility of God from the very outset of Christianity.
Aside from the anthropomorphic language of several biblical texts,
the passibility-impassibility debate was fuelled by texts related to the
sufferings of Christ, which may be regarded as constituting "(...)
probably the key evidence for divine suffering in the New Testament"
(McWilliams 1985, 10). This caused the Fathers of the early Church
adhere to a paradox. Pollard states, "That is, we see, side by side, the
Greek philosophical idea placed in paradoxical juxtaposition with the
Apostolic faith that God was in Christ in His sufferings and death
reconciling the world to himself'(Pollard 1955, 357). Consequently, a
kind ofpatripassianism developed during early Christianity, suggesting
that the Father (pater) suffered (passio) in the crucifixion and death of
the Son. This view resulted from the development of modalism or
sabellianism, which strongly emphasised the unity ofGod, at the cost of
making a clear distinction among the persons of the trinity, in order to
safeguard the divine nature of Christ. This modalistic patripassianism
was nevertheless rejected by the church, because the emphasis on the
unity of God only led to the inference that God Himself suffered and
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died on the cross. In contrast, the church adhered to the concept of the
impassibility of God as well as to the passion of Christ by finally stating
that only the human nature of Christ suffered but not his divine nature.
This view is lrnown as relative theopaschitism against the absolute
theopaschitism favoured by the modalistic patnpassianists (McWilliams
1985, 12-13; Van Egmond 1986, 16-19).
Although the passibility of God was an important topic within the
theological disputes of the early church, it was not until the beginning
of the nineteenth century that theologians again paid attention to it.
There were several reasons for this renewed interest in the concept of
divine passibility. McWilliams (1985, 15-16) refers to developments in
contemporary metaphysics; especially the development of process
philosophy, which emphasised the active involvement of God in human
history; the rediscovery of the Hebraic-Christian God who is entangled
in time and human history; and a new understanding of the doctrine of
atonement in which the cross is the decisive factor. Van Egmond (1986,
27, 29, 229-231) also regards these theological developments as
essential for the renewed interest in the passibility-impassibility debate.
In addition to these developments he explicitly refers to the need for
twentieth century theologians to reconsider traditional answers to the
problem of theodicy in order to provide a theological account for the
great evils oftheir century; World War I, World War II and the growing
social inequity
Most important, this twentieth century continuation of the early pas-
sibility-impassibility debate led to a shift in the theological questions re-
garding the problem of theodicy. Whereas the proponents of the retalia-
tion model and the plan model wonder why God permits human suffe-
ring in order to resolve the problem of theodicy, the adherents ofdivine
passibility raise the question: "How does God respond to human
misery?" (McWilliams 1985, 4). This shift reflects the fundamental
importance of the passibility-impassibility debate to the problem of
theodicy. Consequently, this shift also affects the way both the doctrine
of divine omnipotence and the doctrine of divine goodness are
conceived and again affects the ideas concerning the relationship
between God and the world. Thus, underlying the compassion model
there is an entirely new approach to the problem of theodicy.
How does God respond to human misery? This is one of the basic
questions the adherents of the compassion model try to answer. But let
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us first raise the prior question: Why would God respond to human mi-
sery? Although the approaches of theologians who favour the concept
ofdivine passibility differ, nevertheless they all agree that God responds
to human misery because God is love! This understanding of the divine
goodness as love, based on 1 John 4, 8-16, constitutes the core of the
compassion model. Moreover, according to the proponents of divine
passibility, love is not an attribute but the very nature of God. This is,
for instance, stressed by Lee (1974, 7) and Moltmann (1972, 180; 1980,
72-76).
Jung Young Lee refers to the love of God as agape, which implies
that God is passionately involved in the human life. This latter involve-
ment Lee calls the empathy of God, which is a way of agape (1974, 7-8).
In order to elucidate the concept of divine empathy, Lee compares
empathy to sympathy. Whereas sympathy refers to an emotiona]
identification with the feeling of others, empathy is "(...) a living
participation in life as a whole in order to manifest a new creation" (Lee
1974, 11). According to Lee, this understanding of divine empathy is
compatible with the biblical notion of the divine-human relationship,
that is, the `I-Thou' relationship. This relationship is conceived
primarily in terms of participation instead of identification. The I-Thou
relationship between Jesus and the Father already illustrates this. Jesus
does not identify himself with the Father, but Jesus as the Son unites
himselfwith the Father and thus participates in the Godhead. And so Lee
infers that this I-Thou relationship between the Father and the Son is a
prototype of the divine-human relationship. As he puts it, "This
prototype of participation in the inner life of God conesponds to the
participation between God and man" (Lee 1974, 12). This participation
between God and human beings is an `emphatic participation', which
means that God participates in the human predicament by a complete
unity of experience in empathy.
But, as Lee continues, sin causes humans to turn away from God and
deny the divine participation in human life. Human beings do not answer
to the divine participation. The love between God and human beings is
not reciprocal, and this causes God to suffer. God suffers because human
beings deny God's love (Lee 1974, 14). Consequently, Lee (1974, 20-
21), points to the concept of the `servant of the Lord' in Deutero-Isaiah
(Isaiah 52, 13-53, 12), and characterises the suffering of God as a
humiliation. God's rejection by humanity is the hardest and greatest suf-
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fering. God's unconditional love for the world is neglected as vicarious
and self-giving. And God's suffering for the sake of human sin and guilt
is redemptive.
Just like Lee's arguments, the theological considerations of Jurgen
Moltmann are also centred round the divine-human relationship. Again
this grows from the understanding of God as love. Taking the dictum
`God is love' as his main point of departure, Moltrnann reflects that God
is love.means that God is in need of someone else to whom God can
give love. God, therefore, is in need of God's Son who is given God's
love by way of the Holy Spirit. God, therefore, is a trinity (Moltmann
1980, 73).
This is love amongst equals, which raises the following question: "In
der Dreieinigkeit liebt der Vater ewig den Son. Das ist eine Liebe zum
Gleichen und zum Eigenen, nicht zum Anderen. Ist aber mit der Liebe
zum Gleichen nicht immer schon sein Anderes mitgesetzt? Und ist dann
die Liebe zum Gleichen und zu seinem Anderen nicht mehr als die Liebe
nur zum Gleichen?" (Moltmann 1980, 62) According to Moltmann, God
is love and thus God must reveal God's divine love to something which
is not like God, that is, to humanity! Because of God's love, God needs
humanity, an inner-trinitarian necessity that results in the creation ofthe
world. As Moltmann puts it, "In diesem Sinne `braucht' Gott die Welt
und den Menschen. Ist Gott Liebe, dann will und kann er nicht ohne die
von ihm Geliebten sein" (Moltmann 1980, 74). God, compelled by love,
sends the Son to reveal God's love to humankind. It is at the cross that
the love of God is revealed, for here God takes part in the suffering of
humankind. Human suffering becomes the suffering of God, for here
God suffers the death of the Son (Moltmann 1980, 177).
This trinitarian understanding of God makes it possible to recognise
God in the midst of human suffering and, in addition, to see suffering
from a hopeful perspective. God does not only suffer at the cross.
Through the resurrection, God shows love and mercy to God's Son and
to all of humanity (Moltmann 1972, 163). Still, the resurrection of Christ
is an eschatological occurrence; it is not yet a universal occurrence. It is
a promising occurrence, for it shows how life in relationship with God
can be: reciprocal love. To put this in theological terms, the immanent
trinity becomes the economical trinity, but as yet they are not the same.
At the cross and in the resurrection of Christ God reveals divine love.
God accepts the suffering ofhumankind, which thus becomes part ofthe
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economica]-trinitarian history of God (panentheism). But the eco-
nomical trinity will become the immanent trinity and, therefore,
humanity is sure that one day salvation will come (1 Kor. 13, 12;
Moltmann 1980, 178).
Naturally, there are differences between Lee and Moltmann's argu-
ments. Yet they both consider God to be internally related to the world.
This latter aspect is crucial to their theological reasoning and is a logical
consequence of their emphasis on the love of God. Love is reciprocal in
nature and if love thus constitutes the very essence of God, God is in
need of humanity as much as humanity is in need of God. That is to say,
whenever human beings participate in the love of God, they contribute
to the actual existence of God. Consequently the relationship between
God and human beings is of an internal nature.
Several other theologians, who reject traditional theism and affirm
divine passibility, also hold this view. Kuyper argues that God is both
changeable and unchangeable. The unchangeability of God "(...) assures
us that we are not in the hands of a capricious or irresponsible power
which often characterises the conduct of man", while the changeability
of God `(...) manifests God in vital relationship with his people"
(Kuyper 1969, 269). Pollard refers again and again to the living God of
the Hebrews and the Old Testament, "(...) Who must always be
conceived in persona] terms" (Pollard 1955, 360). And our final example
is Woollcombe, who argues that the basic question involved in the
passibility-impassibility debate is, ""What do we imply by the term
God?" Favouring the concept of divine passibility, Woollcombe
answers, "He is a Creator, and a Creator of persons with whom He
enters into relations" (Woollcombe 1967, 138-139). All these examples,
then, indicate that it is justified to consider this understanding of the
divine goodness as love, which implies that God is internally related to
the world, as an important, distinct feature ofthe compassion model.
Thus far, in regard to the supporters of divine passibility, we have
dealt only with the question, "Why would God, respond to human mi-
sery?" By asking the next question, "How does God respond to human
misery?", we turn our attention towards the construction of the problem
of theodicy within the framework of the compassion model. With regard
to Moltmann's theology, Pr~pper wonders how the idea that God takes
part in the suffering of humankind may be of help to those who actually
suffer. Prdpper (1985, 82-83) fears a glorification of human suffering.
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Within the framework of the compassion model this objection is met in
two ways.
First, the adherents of the compassion model refer to the support
God's companionship may render towards suffering people. They all
feel that this divine companionship makes human suffering more
bearable (McWilliams 1985, 176). Lee refers to the fellowship of divine
and human suffering, which enables humanity to bear suffering in a right
way. That is to say, due to the fellowship of divine and human suffering
human beings may overcome their suffering in a threefold manner. First,
the fellowship of divine and human suffering gives human suffering a
positive meaning; suffering that is meaningful can be endured. Second,
this fellowship of suffering, originating from God's love and agape, can
be a source of strength to endure suffering. Third, this fellowship of
suffering gives human beings hope to anticipate the joy of eternal glory
(Lee 1974, 84-90; Woollcombe 1967, 140-141).
Pr~pper's objection is also met is through the strong emphasis on
human beings' political responsibility to alleviate human suffering. Such
an ethical appeal to humanity especially predominates Moltmann's theo-
logy. The very fact that God revealed God's love to humankind on the
cross compels us to be aware of and sensitive to the suffering of our
fellow humans. God's passion criticises the human attitude of apathy
and forces us to take up political action and to be in solidarity with all
those who suffer (Moltmann 1972, 291). Or as McWilliams puts it: "(...)
Moltmann's understanding of the passion of Christ and the passion of
God leads him to insist on a passionate Christian lifestyle in which
Christians oppose the apathy of contemporary life" (McWilliams 1980,
39). Moltmann's understanding of the theodicy issue is, therefore,
clearly political. Moltmann does not hold God responsible for the
suffering in our world nor does Moltmann seek to justify the world's
actual state of affairs in order to safeguard the divine goodness and
omnipotence. Human beings are responsible for the suffering in the
world; a responsibility we are able to assume because of the divine
pathos. In summary, according to the adherents of the compassion
model, God above all responds to human misery by way of God's love.
God takes part in the suffering of humanity so that we may be
strengthened to endure suffering and find the courage to oppose to
suffering. This is how the champions of divine passibility deal with the
question: How does God respond to human misery?
THEODICY MOUFLS 43
Accordingly, the proponents of divine passibility all agree that God does
not want humanity to suffer and that evil is inimical to God. But what
about the origin of evil? This question is neglected by the theologians
who favour the concept of divine passibility (McWilliams 1985, 177),
which again illustrates the different approach to the problem of theodicy
underlying the compassion model. The main concern of the adherents of
the compassion model is to show that God is not absent in human agony,
but instead takes part in it as a compassionate and caring God.
Consequently, hardly any attention is paid to the doctrine of divine
omnipotence. Van Egmond considers this to be a serious shortcoming,
for the passibility of God still does not solve the problem of salvation.
According to Van Egmond (1986, 235-236), God's passibility cannot
imply a denial of God's omnipotence, since both are genuine, divine
attributes. The supporters of divine passibility are compelled, therefore,
to reconsider the doctrine of divine omnipotence.
Some ofthem actually try to understand divine omnipotence in such
a way that it does not contradict divine passibility or the existence ofhu-
man suffering. This is apparent in Moltmann's work, for example.
Through the doctrine of the trinity Moltmann attributes both power and
passibility to God. The Son suffers and dies on the cross, but the Father
gives the Son away and thus suffers the death of the Son. The death of
the Son is not the death of the Father. God suffers as the Son, but pos-
sesses real power as the Father (Moltmann 1972, 230). Moltmann's
concept of God thus bears a double meaning and, according to Van
Bavel (1974, 145; Schillebeeckx 1975, 14), this renders his discussion
of the theodicy issue dubious. If God as the Father is in possession of
real power, then God could prevent human suffering. This means that
God is responsible for the existence of suffering.
Hartshorne, who also promotes to the concept of divine passibility,
deals with this difficulty in a totally different fashion. He still considers
God to be omnipotent, but he adds that omnipotence does not imply a
monopoly on power. As he states, "His (God's PV) power is absolutely
maximal, the greatest possible, but even the greatest possible power is
still one power amongst others, is not the only power" (Hartshome 1948,
138). According to Hartshorne, human beings are in possession of
genuine power and freedom, so God, in spite of divine omnipotence,
cannot prevent the human misuse of power and freedom from which
suffering originates. However, this view enables Hartshorne to account
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only for suffering due to moral evil. It still presents difficulties with re-
gard to suffering that results from natural evil.
Griffin confronts these difficulties by also amibuting real power to
Nature. Following Whitehead, Griffin (1976, 275-310) argues that aside
from the divine and human powers, there is also a real creative freedom
that is exercising its power through the world's creative process. Seen
from this perspective, all suffering, whether due to moral or natural evil,
originates from the misuse of authentic freedom. This does not contra-
dict the divine omnipotence. For, according to Hartshorne and Griffin,
omnipotence refers to the greatest power conceivable but not the only
power conceivable.
This view, however, entails another serious difficulty. When it comes
to the origin of human suffering both Griffin and Hartshorne seem to
safeguard the divine omnipotence by introducing alternative power(s)
from which suffering originates. Does this strategy not result in a re-
newal ofthe old Manichaestic doctrine? We will not explore this matter
any further. The above references to Moltmann, Hartshorne and Griffin
serve only to illustrate how necessary it is to reconsider the traditional
doctrine of divine omnipotence when human suffering is seen within the
framework of the compassion model. This theological enterprise is full
of difficulties and within the compassion model the doctrine of divine
omnipotence remains an unsettled issue.
We have elucidated the basic distinctive features of the compassion
model. This model represents a third orientation towards the problem of
theodicy, which we have abridged as the theological dilemma: If God is
omnipotent and perfectly good, why do human beings suffer? The com-
passion model states in response that God is compassionate and takes
part in the suffering of human beings.
To present an ideal-typical description of the compassion model, we
once again refer to our twofold rationale. First, however, we consider the
nature of the relationship between God and the world. Within the
framework of the compassion model this relationship is said to be inter-
nal in nature. The emphasis upon the nature of God as love renders this
view virtually inevitable. For, If God is love, God is involved in the hu-
man predicament and takes part in the suffering of humanity. This also
concerns the second aspect of our rationale, the doctrine ofdivine good-
ness. Within the framework of the compassion model, God's compa-
nionship with suffering human beings and God's involvement in the hu-
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man predicament are especially conceived as modes of the divine good-
ness. Van Egmond (1986, 234) refers to the compassion of God as the
ultimate confumation of God's goodness. Here, God opposes and rejects
suffering, whereas both the retaliation model and the plan model teach
that God not only permits human suffering but is responsible for its exi-
stence.
As mentioned earlier, this confronts us with the problem of salvation.
If God is omnipotent and opposes human suffering, why does God not
abolish it? Within the framework of the compassion model, the only
logical answer to this question is that God is not all-powerful. God can-
not be the unique cause of all things and thus cannot abolish human suf-
fering. Some supporters of divine passibility actually reach an
alternative understanding of divine omnipotence. The matter, however,
remains unsettled. Consequently, this altered understanding of divine
omnipotence is an ideal-typical feature of the compassion model.
This concludes the description of the three proposed theodicy models,
which are ideal-types constructed in reference to the work of theologians
from various religious confessions and different historical epochs. It has
not been a historical review of the development of Christian thought on
theodicy. We have not meant to label certain models as old-fashioned
or modern. All three models are equally prevalent throughout the history
of Christian theology. These models represent three fundamentally
distinctive Christian approaches to the problem of theodicy.
The retaliation models and the plan mode] share the same view on
divine omnipotence. In each model, God is the unique cause of all
things; God is all-powerful. But when it comes to the doctrine of divine
goodness, these models differ. In the retaliation model, the specific
understanding ofjustice, that `everyone gets what serves them right', is
basic to the doctrine of divine goodness. In the plan model, the goodness
of God is related to the goodness of creation. The goodness of God is
understood in a totally different fashion in the compassion model. Here,
God's goodness relates to the love of God. And the love of God consti-
tutes the very essence ofGod. Although the doctrine of divine omnipo-
tence remains an unsettled issue within the framework of the compas-
sion model, God is at the very least no longer thought to be all-powerful.
This implies an altered understanding of divine omnipotence in the com-
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passion model. God is not the unique cause of all things; there are alter-
native powers at work in the universe.
This systematic survey clearly illustrates that within Christian theo-
logy there are three distinct ways to deal with the problem of theodicy.
Suffering may be regarded as a divine punishment for sin, as part of a
divine plan serving God's good purposes, or as inimical to a caring and
compassionate God.
1.3 SUMMARY: THEODICY AND PRACTICAL THEOLOGY
Despite the somewhat theoretical character of the foregoing, theodicy
basically applies to a practical problem. What does that mean? From the
viewpoint of systematic theology the problem of theodicy applies to the
theological dilemma: If God is omnipotent and perfectly good, why do
humans suffer? Systematic theologians conceive the problem of
theodicy mainly as a theoretical problem. This raises several questions.
For instance, can suffering in itself be rendered intelligible? Or, is the
existence of God, as an overall good and omnipotent deity, logically
compatible with the existence of suffering? Throughout the history of
Christian theology, as we have shown, these questions have been
addressed and answered in many different ways. But these questions do
not touch upon the practical aspects of theodicy. Nor does the call for
the abolition and alleviation of suffering, stressed by contemporary,
systematic theologians as Metz (1977) and Janf3en (1982).
Very often theologians fail to see that the problem of theodicy is also
an existential problem. Confronted with suffering, human beings raise
questions such as: "Why me?" and "Why this?" (section 1.1.3). Subse-
quently, people may try to answer these questions with the help of reli-
gious symbols and metaphors. This is how religion may function as a
system of ineaning in the coping process. Our practical theological inte-
rest in the problem of theodicy particularly concerns this function of
religion. To conclude this chapter we will discuss how our practical
theological interest relates to the theoretical exposition of the theodicy
issue presented earlier. Then we will finally answer the question, "What
does God mean to human beings as they cope with suffering?".
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1.3.1 Sonze Empirical Data Concerning Theodicy
Considering our practical theological interest in the problem of theodicy,
we are mainly occupied with implicit theodicy. We are interested in the
religious symbols concerning evil that are present in the religious con-
sciousness of ordinary people. This interest has already been delineated
with the help of Berger's (1973, 61-87) distinction between the implicit
and the explicit theodicy. In spite of this practical theological interest,
due to the lack of sufficient empirical data conceming the way ordinary
people attribute religious meaning to suffering, we were forced to
confine ourselves in the preceding survey to a study of the explicit
theodicy. These were theoretical answers to the problem of theodicy
drawn from the history ofChristian theology. Never[heless, we feel that
the overall conclusion of the previous section, that there are basically
three distinct ways to approach the problem of theodicy, applies equally
well to implicit theodicy. In order to make this clear, we briefly discuss
some alternative, empirical studies about the problem of theodicy.
During the past fifteen years the theological faculty ofthe University
of Nijmegen and the Theological Faculty Tilburg have conducted
empirical research into the theodicy issue. The results support our claim
that the three theodicy models we present do exist in the religious frame
of reference of ordinary people. For instance, factor analysis confirms
that all three models are present in the religious consciousness of
pastoral volunteers and the pastors, in research conducted among three
different research populations, 404 pupils of Catholic schools, 102
pastoral volunteers and 48 pastors, (Van der Ven 1988a; 1988b). The
pupils of Catholic schools, however, only distinguish between the
retaliation model and the compassion model; the plan model is not
recognised as a distinct, religious answer to the problem of theodicy.
The data seems to suggest that the religious frame of reference re-
lates to church membership Non church members only recognise two
theodicy models, whereas church members, such as pastors and pastoral
volunteers, clearly distinguish among three ways of approaching the
theodicy issue, that is, among the three theodicy models. Furthertnore,
the acceptance and evaluation of the theodicy models also relate to
church membership. Church members agree with the compassion model,
are ambivalent with regard to the plan model and disagree with the
retaliation model. Non church members, in contrast, disagree with both
48 LEARNING THEODICY
the retaliation model and the compassion model. Among the pupils,
church members are ambivalent with regard to the compassion model.
These results support our claims that the three theodicy models do
indeed represent three distinct approaches to the problem of theodicy
and are present in the religious consciousness of ordinary people, espe-
cially church members. The data is represented in table 1.1.
Table 1.1: Theodicy Mean Factor Scores
retaliation plan compassion
Pupils Catholic schools (N-404)
non church members (N-268) 3.85 3.85
church members (N-136) 3.49 2.67
Pastoral volunteers (N-102) 3.51 2.88 1.85
Pastors (N-48) 3.71 3.09 1.71
Scale runs from 1(very much agree) to 4(disagree)
Additional empirical support for our claim may also be derived from
research conducted among 158 catholic, core church members (Van der
Ven 1989; 1990, 180-255). This study is of particular interest to us, be-
cause here the respondents were questioned about seven (!) theodicy
models. Apart from the retaliation model, the plan model and the com-
passion model, Apathetic, Therapeutic, Vicarious and Mystic models
were distinguished. The Apathetic model purports that God has nothing
to do with suffering that it does not affect God and that God remains
unmoved by human suffering. The Therapeutic model suggests suffering
is a means to personal growth; suffering purifies human beings. Central
to the Vicarious model is the idea that innocent suffering has redemptive
significance for others; God inspires sacrifice and martyrdom. And, fi-
nally, within the Mystic model suffering is regarded as an experience
that intensifies the mystical unity between God and human beings.Factor
analysis showed, however, that this sevenfold distinction has no empiri-
cal basis. Within the religious consciousness of ordinary people, 158
core church members in this case, this sevenfold distinction is not
present. Instead, factor analysis only identified four factors: apathy,
retaliation, plan-pedagogy and solidarity. Figure 1.1, which comprises
three levels, displays the structure of the four factors.
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Figure 1.1: Structure of Four Theodicy Models
apathy retaliation pedagogy solidarity
apl thy retallation pedalogy comp~vic complmyst viclmys
~ I I I
~ ~ ~Í ~
apathy retaliation plan therapeutic compassion vicarious mystic
Naturally, these results fit in fairly well with our claim. Figure 1.1
illustrates that the three theodicy models we have distinguished here are
a part of the religious frame of reference of ordinary people. It also
demonstrates that ordinary people distinguish among three overall
approaches to the problem of theodicy. That is to say, the core church
members do not recognise seven theodicy models. Instead, they consider
suffering from a causal perspective (retaliation), a teleological
perspective (pedagogy), or from the perspective ofGod's solidarity with
suffering human beings. Although the apathetic model is also recognised
as a distinct approach to the problem of theodicy, whether it is a theo-
dicy model in the true sense of the word, can be questioned. After all, it
does not contain a religious answer to the dilemma: If God is omnipotent
and perfectly good, why do humans suffer? And to offer a religious so-
lution to this dilemma, we propose, is theodicy's true task (section
1.2.1). Consequently, the religious consciousness of ordinary people
only reveal three distinct approaches to the problem of theodicy; and
these approaches fairly well resemble the theodicy models we
distinguish: the retaliation model, exhibiting a causal approach; the plan
model, exhibiting a teleological approach; and the compassion model,
which stresses God's solidarity with suffering humanity
In summary, the distinctions among these three models are not only
legitimate from the perspective of systematic theology; these
distinctions also have empirical roots. Empirical theological research
demonstrates that ordinary people, or at least core church members,
likewise distinguish among a retaliation model, a plan mode] and a
compassion model. Within the religious consciousness of ordinary
people three theodicy models, and only three, prevail. To a certain extent
it is justified, therefore, to consider our systematic survey of theodicy as
also pertaining to implicit theodicy, even though we only examined the
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theoretical answers to the problem of theodicy elaborated by
theologians. This is how our theoretical exposition of the theodicy issue
relates to our practical theological interest in the problem of theodicy.
Although the relationship between the implícit theodicy and the explicit
theodicy is at the least dialectic, we feel that our categorisation of the
explicit theodicy still reveals some basic characteristics of the implicit
theodicy, that is, of the religious consciousness of ordinary people.
1.3.2 Theodicy and Emotiona! Processing
What does God mean for people as they cope with suffering? Now this
question may be answered. The three theodicy models we described are
part of the religious frame ofreference of ordinary people. These models
illustrate three ways in which God can be meaningful to human beings.
To make this clear, we recapitulate the basic insights of this chapter.
To begin with, we once again examine the coping process. Basically
the coping process, or emotional processing, is a cognitive activity. It
has to do with the processing of information pertaining to the
individual's values, goals, motives, expectations and individual con-
cerns. When a stimulus event is relevant to these concerns, i.e. when
there is a match or mismatch between events and concerns, an emotion
is elicited. This we learned from Frijda (1986).
Suffering occurs when an individual experiences a harmful situation
that interferes with the individual's concerns. It is an expression of a
mismatch between events and concerns. Consequently, the aim of emo-
tional processing is to overcome this mismatch. And with regard to this
task the individual's cognitive dispositions are very important. When
this harrnful situation cannot be abolished, only a reinterpretation of
concerns can overcome the mismatch. Religious insights are part of the
individual's cognitive dispositions. These religious insights refer to the
individual's religious frame of reference, which includes all kinds of
religious symbols and metaphors that also function in the coping
process. This is especially the case when ultimate concems are involved,
when a stimulus event affects the whole of human existence, or as
Tillich (19782), said, when a person's being or non-being is at stake. We
argue that religious answers are especially called for in dealing with the
ultimate problems of life, problems relating to the experience of
contingency and finitude. Religion, therefore, can be of importance in
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the development of coping behaviour with regard to experiences of
contingency and finitude. This is the primary function of religion in the
coping process. In accordance with Luhmann's (1977) reasoning, we
refer to this function as Kontingenzbew~ltigung (section 1.1.3).
However, to this functional understanding ofreligion, we also added a
material understanding, by distinguishing theodicy as a specifically
Christian way of dealing with the experiences of contingency and fi-
nitude.
As mentioned earlier, suffering is an anomic experience. It refers to
chaos, disorder and despair and threatens the wholeness of life. To over-
come this chaos, it is necessary to reinterpret suffering and to consider
it as part of life. This is what theodicy actually does. Theodicy
transforms the initial chaotic aspects of suffering into a new meaningful
order. It offers a new nomos. Theodicy attributes a religious meaning to
suffering. This is what we mean by Kontingenzbew~ltigung.
We are now familiar with three distinct ways in which theodicy may
fulfil this task. First, it is possible to account for human suffering as a
divine punishment for sin. References to the divine justice or to the prin-
ciple of moral balance enable human beings to resign themselves to a
fate of coping with chaos and despair. Knowing that God does not want
human sin to disturb the universal and moral order of creation, human
beings become aware of the righteousness of their suffering, which in
turn may cause the experience of contingency to diminish. The
theological aspects of this approach have been discussed in the section
on the retaliation model.
There is also the idea of the ultimate goodness of creation in which
every event serves the good putposes of God. This idea calls for trust
and faith that God eventually transforms suffering into good. It calls for
trust and faith in both the ultimate goodness of God and God's unlimited
power to perform the good. Seen from this perspective the contingent
nature of human suffering also disappears, for suffering is willed and
planned by God as part of a contemplated, divine plan. The theological
aspects of this approach were elaborated in the discussion of the plan
model.
Finally, it is possible to consider human suffering as inimical to a
caring and compassionate God. This idea enables human beings to expe-
rience the love of God in the midst of suffering. Subsequently, this fel-
lowship of divine and human suffering enables people to endure
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suffering, to oppose suffering and to anticipate a better future or new
aeon. This was elaborated in the section on the compassion model.
These are the three ways of attributing a religious meaning to suffe-
ring, or ofreligious Kontingenzbew~ltigung. The divine justice; the con-
templated, divine plan; and the divine compassion, are three ways of
coping with the anomic experiences of suffering with the help of a new
religious nomos. In this threefold manner God can be meaningful to peo-
ple as they cope with suffering
From a practical theological viewpoint coping with suffering applies
to religious praxis, or as we prefer to say, to religious, communicative
action. That is to say, coping with suffering applies to meaningful, hu-
man conduct. Here, the notion of intentionality is of importance. Human
conduct, or human, communicative action, is intentional; it is always
guided by certain motives, ideas, values, attitudes, expectations of life,
etc. It is, therefore, impossible to understand human conduct without
studying the motives and ideas by which it is governed (Weber 19725,
1-4; Widdershoven 1984, 124). Above, we studied the religious ideas
that determine the religious, communicative praxis of coping with
suffering. We studied the religious symbols that are of importance
whenever people deal with existential questions such as: "Why me?"
and "Why this?" Clearly, our systematic survey of theodicy fits in with
the practical theological interest we pursued throughout this chapter;
since this survey is a systematisation of the religious insights that govern
the religious coping behaviour of ordinary people.
This ends our discussion about the specific way people attribute a re-
ligious meaning to suffering. We reviewed the psychological aspects of
suffering and presented a systematic survey of three religious answers
to the problem of theodicy that are commonly referred to by ordinary
people. This resulted in the construction of three ideal-typical theodicy
models. What is the value of these models? Are they theologically
sound? Are they each in their own way theologically right? T'he
following chapter attempts to answer these questions by comparing the
three ideal-typical theodicy models with each other through an
examination of their degree of rationality.
CHAPTER TWO
THEODICY LOGIC
In the previous chapter we made an ideal-typical distinction between
three ways of attributing a religious meaning to innocent human
suffering, which led to the construction of three ideal-typical theodicy
models, each exhibiting a different answer to the theological
dilemma: If God is omnipotent and perfectly good, why do human
beings suffer? In this second chapter we consider these theodicy
models more closely and have a look at the specific way these models
relate to each other. For, not only do we argue that the religious
consciousness of ordinary people basically consists of three distinct
answers to the problem of human suffering, we also argue that these
answers differ with regard to their degree of rationality. It is possible,
we believe, to distinguish between more traditional and more modern
answers to the problem of theodicy depending on the degree of
rationality these answers exhibit. But this conjecture is very hypo-
thetical. So, the main objective of this chapter is to present some
theoretical support for it and to establish an ordinal relationship
between these models. In order to achieve this, we undertake a
conceptual analysis of the retaliation model, the plan model and the
compassion model. But before we are able to do this, we have to
elucidate what rationality means with regard to theodicy.
2.1 TWO FEATURES OF A RATIONAL THEODICY' MODEL
For a correct understanding of the following, we have to specify our
understanding of theodicy a bit more. This is very important, because
the standard of rationality we apply to theodicy is partly derived from
our understanding of theodicy itself. This standard of rationality does
not reveal the features of rationality as such. It is not a universal
standard of rationality; it is only applicable to theodicy! Now, in our
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view, a theodicy model represents a rational way of religious coping
with suffering, whenever it exhibits a sufficiently logical and a suffi-
ciently abstract answer to the problem of human suffering. Therefore,
the two features of a rational theodicy model we shall account for are:
the degree of logical consistency and the degree of abstraction. But,
as mentioned above, to begin with we further specify our understan-
ding of theodicy in order to explain how these features relate to the
problem of theodicy itself.
2.1.1 Theodicy as a Religious Judgment on Suffering
In the previous chapter we argued that in the coping process religion
functions as Kontingenzbew~ltigung (section 1.1.3). And that
theodicy in this respect is the specific Christian way of coping with
the experiences of contingency and finitude induced by a harmful
situation. But, in order to specify our understanding of theodicy a bit
further, we now argue that theodicy is primarily a religious judgment
on suffering. However, this latter understanding of theodicy, which
we partly borrow from Oser, does not imply a denial of the function
of Kontingenzbew~ltigung, it only explains this function in more
detail. Following Oser ( 19882, 27-28; 1985, 175-177), we consider a
religious judgment to be a mental activity by which subjects deal with
contingency situations; i.e. by which subjects amibute a religious
meaning to such situations in order to cope with them by other than
objective means. So, in our opinion, with regard to theodicy a
religious judgment on suffering is involved. That is to say, coping
with suffering is to evaluate the evil situations one faces with the help
of religious principles. At the core of religious coping a religious
judgment on suffering thus prevails.
This view on religious coping, as involving a religious judgment
on suffering, also makes our investigation into the degree of
rationality of theodicy models more plausible. Rationality deals with
judgments. According to Habermas (19853, I, 44), rationality has to
do with the reasons or grounds people refer to while accounting for
the validity of their statements and judgments. And with regard to
theodicy, rationality thus deals with the question: Is a religious
judgment on suffering valid or not? So, due to the fact that theodicy
involves a religious judgment on suffering, it is both justified and
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possible to inquire after the degree of rationality of theodicy models.
We now account for the features of rationality we already men-
tioned above: logical consistency and abstraction. How do these
features relate to theodicy itself? Both features we derive from our
understanding of theodicy as involving a religious judgment on suffe-
ring. This religious judgment, first of all, regards the evaluation of
suffering with the use of religious principles, which are embodied in
several theodicy models. But, second, there is also the theological
dilemma: If God is omnipotent and perfectly good, why do human
beings suffer? It is impossible in this regard to attribute a religious
meaning to suffering without solving the theological dilemma; it is an
integral part of the religious judgment on suffering as such. Our
understanding of theodicy therefore twofold. Theodicy may be regar-
ded as a religious judgment on suffering with a theological dilemma
implied in it. From this understanding of theodicy the features of a
rational theodicy model, i.e. of a valid judgment on suffering, may be
derived.
First, there is the demand for logical consistency. This demand has
to do with the theological dilemma implied in the religious judgment
on suffering. Human suffering confronts theology with a logical
problem: How to reconcile the existence of human suffering to both
God's goodness and omnipotence? And this logical problem has to be
solved in a logically satisfying way if this religious judgment on
suffering is to be valid and acceptable, that is, is to be called
`rational'.
Second, there is the degree of abstraction. This demand regards the
constituent elements of the religious judgment on suffering. Analo-
gous to the formal understanding of the act ofjudging, we understand
a religious judgment on suffering, or religious coping, as follows:
Within religious coping suffering is being evaluated by man with the
help of a religious principle (Schluchter 1979, 62). Here, three
aspects prevail, as indicated by the words in italics, which reveal the
perspective from which suffering is looked upon. And the degree of
abstraction of this perspective decides on the validity and acceptabi-
lity of the religious judgment on suffering exhibited by a theodicy
model, that is, it determines its degree of `rationality'. This perspecti-
ve is abstract when the religious principle contained in the religious
judgment on suffering is a universal principle; when suffering itself,
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that is, the object of a religious judgment on suffering, is being
referred to as a complex situation; and when man, that is, the subject
of the religious judgment on suffering is related to intersubjectivity.
Logical consistency and abstraction in this respect are the features of
a rational theodicy model.
In the following section we shall undertake a conceptual analysis
of the theodicy models we distinguished earlier applying our two
features of rationality. Before that, however, we still have to account
for these features in another sense. That is to say, we still have to
answer the question: Why are logical consistency and abstraction
features of rationality?
2.1.2 The Degree of Logical Consistency
One of the features of a rational theodicy model is logical con-
sistency. That is to say, in a rational theodicy model the theological
dilemma has to be solved in a logically satisfying way. So now we
ask: Why is only a logically consistent, theological answer to the
problem of human suffering a rational answer? The following
consideration seems of importance here. Let us, for a moment, em-
phasize the general interest of scientific research as such. This general
interest may be understood as trying to elucidate reality in its broadest
sense, which compels scientists to formulate objective statements
about this reality. Hence, scientific statements have to be acceptable
to a certain number of people, otherwise these statements merely
reflect the scientist's own, individual experience. Now, if one intends
to formulate a scientific statement, this statement, first of all, needs to
be logically consistent, otherwise it is not acceptable to other people!
Hence, logical consistency is the first step towards common know-
ledge; and to strive for common knowledge is, according to the Dutch
philosopher of religion Brummer (1988, 41-43), to strive for ratio-
nality. In this respect we feel it is justified to call a theological answer
to the problem of human suffering `rational', if it lacks immanent
contradictions.
Apart from Brummer, other authors also stress the demand for
logical consistency. This is mainly being done by philosophers of
religion stemming from the Anglo-Saxon, philosophical tradition
such as: Wiles, Smith, Griffin, et al. These philosophers above all are
THEODICY LOGIC 57
occupied with questions concerning the logical status of theological
statements, since they feel it is the main task of the philosophy of
religion to determine which theological concepts are free from
immanent contradictions (Brummer 1988, 45). So, they too stress the
demand for logical consistency, for they feel that logical consistency
contributes to the credibility and clarity of these theological concepts
and statements. By doing so, they do not hand religion over to a
standard of rationality originating from an outer-religious sphere. For
instance, Wiles admits that religious language is not the same as
`ordinary' language, but in turn he also admits that this fact does not
exclude theology from the demand for logical consistency. If
theological statements lack consistency and conceptual clarity, they
are in danger of being meaningless (Wiles 1987, 48-49). The German
theologian Pannenberg, stemming from a more continental, philoso-
phical tradition, also holds this view. According to Pannenberg (1973,
299-348), it is very hard to see whether a theological statement is
true, since empirical verification is impossible in the field of
theology. The only way, therefore, to verify theological statements is
to see whether they are logically consistent. And so, theological
statements devoid of logical consistency do not make sense and have
to be rejected as being false in advance.
The demand for logical consistency thus is no `Fremdkbrper' in
the field of theology; it is a justifiable demand. The above examples
clearly illustrate this. With regard to theodicy this means that a
logically satisfying answer to the problem of human suffering
reconciles both God's goodness and omnipotence to human suffering
without inner contradictions. It is in this respect that the degree of
]ogical consistency may indicate the degree of rationality of a
theodicy model.
2.1.3 The Degree ofAbstraction
Why is a theodicy model which reveals an abstract perspective on
human suffering a more rationa] theodicy model? Or to put it
differently, what is the specific link between abstraction and ratio-
nality? Although this sounds like a very plain and straightforward
question, it is very difficult to answer. The reason for this difficulty is
twofold.
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First of all, we are lacking in a precise and narrow definition of the
word `rationality'. For instance, the work of such a great scholar as
Max Weber is almost entirely dedicated to the process of rationa-
lization. But Weber does not provide us with a narrow definition of
rationality. On the contrary, according to Habermas (19853, I, 225-
226), in the works of Weber the words `rationality' and `rationalizati-
on' refer to all kinds of different developments and phenomena; a fine
example of which can be found in the `Introduction' of Weber's
Protestant Ethic (198515, 13-31). And also the attempt undertaken by
Habermas (19853, I, 239-252) to systematize Weber for that matter
does not help us any further; diversity still remains. Hence, it seems
almost impossible to derive a narrow definition of the word `ra-
tionality' from sociological or philosophical literature, which in turn
makes it very difficult to elaborate the special link between abstrac-
tion and rationality.
But there is also a second difficulty. Even if we were in possession
of a fairly narrow definition of rationality, we still have to ask
ourselves: Is it justified to apply such a definition to religion? Several
philosophers of religion occupied with the question about rationality
and religious belief answer this question negatively. According to
them, there is no reason to suppose that rationality means the same in
science, in the moral sphere or in the religious sphere (Wiles 1987,
41; Smith 1979, 47-48, 57). So, not only are we lacking in a com-
monly accepted definition of rationality, every sphere of reality also
seems in need of its own standard of rationality.
Because of these difficulties we do not attribute a universal signi-
ficance to this second feature of a rational theodicy model. And so we
do not argue that abstraction is a feature of rationality as such; we
only claim this to be a feature of a rational theodicy model. Whereas
logical consistency may be considered to be a feature of rationality as
such, abstraction only applies to theodicy! But we still have to
account for this feature. This can be done by referring to develop-
ments in other spheres of reality that also tend towards abstraction.
Hence we refer to analogies in order to make this second feature of a
rational theodicy model more plausible.
During the process of rationalization a development towards
abstraction is present, first of all, in the moral sphere. According to
Schluchter (1979, 59-103), during the process of rationalization the
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ethical system turns into a dialogical ethic of responsibility. Within
this modern, ethical system, moral prescríptions may now be
criticized by the moral actor in the light of universal, ethical
principles. With regard to the sphere of law a development towards
abstraction is also present. According to Habermas (19823, 265),
modern law is universal in the sense that it contains prescriptions
which serve the common interests of all people. In the political
sphere the development towards abstraction is embodied in the rise of
the modern state. Economic and political privileges of the different
estates have vanished and thus the modern state establishes a formal
and collective identity on the basis of the equality of rights (Poggi
1983, 102-113). In the sphere of art developments also tend towards
abstraction. Karl Popper (1977;, 55-60) illustrates this by referring to
the history of music. Here, a tendency towards abstraction is also
present, as apparent in the developments of polyphony, counterpoint
and the composition of the fugue. And even in the religious sphere in
general a development towards abstraction comes forward. According
to Weber, during the process of rationalization a disenchantment of
religion takes place, causing the abolition of magic. In the religious
sphere magic as a concrete and direct way to influence the divine
disappears. Following Weber, this process culminates in the `secular',
Calvinistic ethic based on the doctrine of predestination. Here, the
human need of salvation is met without any magical or sacramental
mediation (Weber 19725, 325-339; 198515, 104-117).
In the spheres of moralíty, law, politics, art and religion the degree
of abstraction thus indicates to what extent these spheres have been
influenced by the process of rationalization. And, if we, for a
moment, take the supposed parallelism between ontogenesis and
phylogenesis for granted, we may also refer to man's cognitive and
moral development as exhibiting a development towards abstraction.
Man's cognitive development tends towards hypothetico-deductive or
formal reasoning, consisting of thought operations disconnected from
concrete representations (Piaget 8z Inhelder 1969, 132-133). And, in
addition, man's moral development tends towards moral reasoning on
a postconventional level, which refers to an orientation towards
universal, ethical principles instead of concrete moral prescriptions
(Kohlberg 1981, 409-412).
Hence, in both phylogenesis and ontogenesis we are faced with an
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ongoing development towards abstraction. So, in general, it is
justified to regard the degree of abstraction as an indication of the
degree of rationality of a theodicy model. But again we emphasize,
that the above is not meant to submit theodicy to a standard of
rationality originating from outer-religious spheres. As mentioned
already, the references to the above anologies are only meant to
render this second feature of a rational theodicy model, that is
abstraction, more plausible.
Our standard of rationality applicable to theodicy has thus been
explained. A rational theodicy model exhibits two important features:
human suffering is reconciled with both God's goodness and
omnipotence in a logically satisfying way, and suffering here is
looked upon from an abstract perspective. Both features decide on the
validity of the religious judgment involved and thus on the degree of
rationality of the theodicy model at issue. Let us now apply our
standard of rationality to the three theodicy models we distinguished
and see which model exhibits the highest degree of rationality.
2.2 A CONCEPTUEL ANALYSIS OF TrIREE IDEAL-T`YPICAL
TrIEOD[CY MODELS
In the previous chapter we distinguished between the retaliation
model, the plan model and the compassion model. Each model
reveals a different religious judgment on suffering. Within the
retaliation model the idea that man suffers due to a divine punishment
for sin is elaborated, whilst the plan model refers to the notion that
human suffering is part of a divine plan and serves the good purposes
of God. And the idea that human suffering is inimical to a caring and
compassionate God constitutes the core of the compassion model. But
which of these answers to the problem of human suffering is most
valid, according to our standard of rationality? In order to answer this
question, we undertake a conceptual analysis of the retaliation model,
the plan model and the compassion model. This conceptual analysis
points out, first of all, that the compassion model exhibits the highest
degree of logical consistency and, in second place, it reveals that the
compassion model also exhibits the highest degree of abstraction.
Hence, in both respects the compassion model turns out to be the
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most rational theodicy model. Consequently, the compassion model
contains the most valid and the most modern, religious answer to the
problem of innocent human suffering.
2.2.1 A Logical Answer to the Problem of Human Suffering:
Compassion
As we have already said above, we understand theodicy as a religious
judgment on suffering with a theological dilemma implied in it.
Hence, to attribute a religious meaning to suffering at the same time
means to solve this dilemma in a logically satisfying way. For a
theodicy model is not acceptable if it lacks logical consistency. If it
fails to reconcile the existence of human suffering to both God's
goodness and omnipotence. Below, we shall now show why the
compassion model, in our opinion, offers the most logical answer to
the problem of human suffering. But, if we are to make this clear,
more needs to be said about this theo-`logical' problem. Therefore,
we refer first of all to the formal statement of the problem of evil as
elaborated by Griffin (1976, 19). This statement is as follows:
1 God is a perfect reality. (Definition)
2 A perfect reality is an omnipotent being. (By definition)
3 An omnipotent being could unilaterally bring about an actual
world without any genuine evil. (By definition)
4 A perfect reality is a morally perfect being. (By definition)
5 A morally perfect being would want to bring about an actual world
without any genuine evil. (By definition)
6 If there is genuine evil in the world, then there is no God. (Logical
conclusion from 1 through 5)
7 There is genuine evil in the world. (Factual statement)
8 Therefore, there is no God. (Logical conclusion from 6 and 7)
This formal statement of the problem of human suffering, as we
prefer to say, represents the classical understanding of theodicy. It
resembles fairly well the definition of Leibniz in who's phrase
theodicy regards the question: "(...) comment un Principe unique, tout
bon, tout sage et tout puissant a pu admettre le mal, et sur-tout
comment il a pu permettre le péché, et comment il a pu résoudre à
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rendre souvant les méchans heureux et les bons malheureux"
(Discours préliminaire, para. 43). Within this formal understanding of
the problem of human suffering the core question is: How may this
conclusion (8) be denied? Within theodicy, the existence of God as a
perfect reality (1) must be upheld without making God responsible for
the existence of suffering. Hence, also the existence of evil (7) may
not be denied, otherwise theology does not solve the theological
dilemma; that is, it does not reconcile the existence of God, as a
perfect reality, with the existence of genuine evil. In what way, then,
may the existence of God, as a perfect reality, be reconciled with the
existence of genuine evil? Let us now take a]ook at the different
answers present in the three theodicy models.
Due to the fact that Augustine teaches that all suffering is either
sin or punishment for sin, Hick (1985, 59, 172-173; Jolivet 1936, 73-
76) regards Augustine as the fountainhead of the retaliation model. At
the heart of Augustine's answer the `free-will defence' prevails,
which Augustine, as we have seen above, unfolds in his most impor-
tant treatise on the problem of evil called De libero arbitrio. In this
treatise Augustine strongly rejects the Manichaean, dualistic
interpretation of the origin of evil; suffering is only due to the human
misuse of free will. For this human misuse of free will invokes divine
punishment since, according to Augustine, God is just, that is to say,
He punishes the sinners and remunerates the good (De libero arbitrio,
L 1-3). Hence, within the framework of the retaliation model a causal
relationship between human actions and suffering is present.
In contrast, a teleological orientation is the central feature of the
plan model. Suffering here is being regarded as part of a divine plan
serving God's good purposes. Within Christian theology, this
teleological orientation is fairly widespread. In the works of Augu-
stine, for instance, apart from the causal orientation a teleological
orientation is also present. In fact, as we showed earlier, both
orientations or theodicy models are related to one another. Augu-
stine's reference to the free-will defence again confronts him with
questions such as: Why has God endowed man with a free will if this
will lead to failure? Did God not foresee man once created would sin?
etc. The answer Augustine gives to these questions reveals a teleolo-
gical orientation. Augustine, first of all, states that everything God
has created is good and necessarily exists the way it actually does
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exist. Why? Because, according to Augustine, everything from the
highest to the lowest of all things contributes to the perfection of
God's creation (De libero arbitrio, III. 47, 85). In this way, also
sinners, that is men in possession of a sinful soul, are necessary; they
also contribute to the perfection of the whole (De libero arbitrio, III.
91). Hence, although the free will enables man to sin, it contributes to
the perfection of the whole and, therefore, God was right in creating
man this way.
But also in other theological studies concerning theodicy this
teleological orientation prevails. In the previous chapter we elabora-
ted the plan model with references to the reasonings of Leibniz and
Hick. There we saw that Leibniz considers suffering to be part of the
best possible world. Hence, human suffering contributes to the
existence of the best possible world and thus serves a far greater
good. In this way, Leibniz (Théodicée, para. 119) accounts for the
actual state of affairs the world is in by stating that God, compelled
by His goodness, chooses to create the best possible world; a world
that contains suffering by accident. Leibniz thus approaches the
problem of human suffering from a teleological, or from a functional,
perspective. Hick's solution to the problem of human suffering, we
saw, is purely teleological, because he clearly amibutes a positive
function to suffering. According to Hick (1985, 253-261), suffering
makes man aware of his estrangement from God and thus makes man
long for a relationship with God. In this way, suffering serves in the
divine purpose of soul-making. Both Leibniz and Hick thus are
anxious to show that the existence of human suffering does not imply
a denial of the divine goodness. But in order to achieve this, instead
of referring to the causes of suffering they emphasize the positive
functions of suffering.
Before we take a look at the third answer, present in the compas-
sion model, let us first check whether or not the above answers are
logically satisfying. As such the free-will defence is sound. For it is
one of the central notions of the Christian faith that God wants man to
enter into a filial relationship with Himself which demands human
freedom. Without genuine, human freedom a filia] relationship
between God and man can never be established. Man, therefore, must
be free and hence he necessarily has the ability to sin (Brummer 1988,
162-163). The free-will defence as such may be sound, but this does
64 LEAEL'VING THEODICY
not mean that the retaliation-model is logically consistent.
Two logical problems arise here. The retaliation-model, fírst of all,
does not account for human suffering due to natural evil. Only part of
all the evils that afflict humanity are caused by human beings
themselves. To attribute all human suffering to the human misuse of
free will is, therefore, logically impossible. For instance, Ricoeur
(1986, 21, 26) considers it a major shortcoming of Augustine's
answer to the problem of human suffering that this answer is only
addressed to moral evil. Second, there is also the problem of justice.
Is it not our common experience that especially the innocent suffer?
Why is the suffering of for instance innocent children necessary?
Why do so many people suffer whilst so few prosper? Confronted
with these questions a defender of the retaliation-model may only
refer to the doctrine of hereditary sin. Augustine actually does exactly
that. According to Augustine, due to Adam's original sin the nature of
every human being is perverted. Therefore, the descendants of Adam
cannot help but sin! That is to say, they are lacking in strength and
knowledge to perform the good (De libero arbitrio, III. 178-179). But
the descendants of Adam are not punished for this matter. They are
only punished because they fail to seek after the knowledge to
perform the good (De libero arbitrio, III. 181-182). This argument,
however, causes logical problems. For, how may one seek after the
knowledge to perform the good if one is unaware of it? Augustine
answers this question in his Retractationes. Here, Augustine, against
Pelagianism, emphasizes the importance ofthe divine grace. This lack
of strength and knowledge to perform the good may only be abolished
due to the work of the divine grace. Only the divine grace may set
free the human will to perform the good (cf. Retractationes, Caput
VIII. 4). But this argument is incompatible with the free-will defence.
For the fact that not all people suffer but that some of them prosper is
not due to the misuse of free will! On the contrary, this is due to the
fact that God is merciful to only a limited number of people. The
retaliation model thus contains a problem of justice which seriously
questions the divine goodness. In the end, only God is responsible for
the existence of moral and natural evil and thus for the suffering
originating from it.
The answer given within the framework of the plan model also
contains logical problems. The solution to the problem of human
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suffering here is: all suffering ultimately serves a good purpose. Now,
the following objection may be raised to this solution: this is a denial
of the problem! Whatever the good purpose that is served by human
suffering: the perfection of the universe, the come about of the best
possible world or the establisment of the God-man relationship, one
has to raise the following question: May one still call human suffering
`evil' if it serves a good purpose? Is it still suffering? With Griffin we
feel the answer to this question is "no"! If human suffering serves a
good purpose it is only apparent evil and no `genuine' evil, the latter
Griffin understands as: "(...) some event is genuinely evil if its
occurrence prevents the occurrence of some other event which would
have made the universe better, all things considered, i.e. from an all-
inclusive, impartial perspective" (Griffin 1976, 22). The answer of
Hick to the problem of human suffering may be regarded as a fine
example of this line of reasoning. According to Hick (1985, 327-331),
all (!) suffering is instrumentally good, i.e. all suffering serves the
good purpose of soul-making, even the suffering due to Auschwitz or
the most horrifying earthquake. Only throughout the experience of
such excessive suffering does man develop a God-consciousness. And
to the question why there needs to be so much excessive suffering,
Hick (1985, 335) refers to "(...) the positive value of mystery." In this
way, within the plan model the problem of human suffering is simply
denied.
Above, we have pointed out that theology has to solve the theolo-
gical dilemma by reconciling the existence of God with the existence
of genuine evil. Now, it is clear that this theological dilemma cannot
be solved by simply denying the existence of one of both elements.
Besides, this line of reasoning strongly conflicts with our common
experience, which shows that a vast amount of human suffering is
purely negative without which the world would be a far better place.
For instance, Karl Rahner (1980, 460-461) rejects this teleological
line of reasoning by referring to the suffering of innocent children.
Let us again take a brief look at the formal statement of the pro-
blem of human suffering. In the retaliation model the conclusion (8)
is denied partly by rejecting the factual statement: there is genuine
evil in the world (7), and partly by rejecting the goodness of God (4
and 5). Augustine, first of all, only refers to moral evil, whilst
denying the existence of natural evil (Jolivet 1936, 63-72), and,
66 LEARNING THEOD(CY
second, he makes the human ability to perform the good to depend
upon the divine grace, thus making God responsible for the existence
of moral evil. In the plan model the conclusion (8) is denied by also
rejecting the factual statement (7). It is thus impossible, within the
framework of both the retaliation model and the plan model, to fully
account for human suffering and this because the defenders of both
models are not prepared to reject premises 2 and 3, i.e. they do not
wish to alter the doctrine of divine omnipotence. That is to say, they
do not wish to alter their view that God is the unique cause of all
things; that He eventually determines every event. In a way, they
cannot do this for they are in need of a omnipotent God; who else,
within the framework of the plan model, has the power of actually
producing good out of suffering? For, as Brummer (1988, 150-151)
correctly emphasizes, it is not at all a logical necessity for good to
come out of evil. Evil may as well bring about more severe evil.
Hence, if the defenders of the plan model are certain that good will
come out of evil, they are supposing that an omnipotent God can
actually do just this. But, this also makes their answer less intelligible.
For why did not God, having the power to actually create good out of
evil, do this in the first place? And why is God merciful to only a
limited number of people? Questions remain. Both theodicy models
thus fail to give a logically satisfying answer to the problem of human
suffering. The latter, we believe, can only be obtained if premise 3 is
rejected; this is done in the compassion model.
In order to account for our claim that the compassion model exhi-
bits the most logical answer to the problem of human suffering, two
central features of this model are important here. First, there is an
altered understanding of divine omnipotence. The adherents of both
the retaliation model and the plan model consider God to be the
unique cause of all things. Consequently, they admit God could bring
about an actual world without any genuine evil. Now, the compassion
model offers the possibility to deny this latter inference and thus to
solve the problem of human suffering in a more logically satisfying
way. However, the denial of this inference does not entail a denial of
the divine omnipotence; for this too would imply a denial of the
problem. Within the framework of the compassion model God still is
considered to be omnipotent, but here omnipotence does not mean
that God actually controls every event taking place in the universe.
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Although the proponents of divine passibility do not pay much
attention to the doctrine of divine omnipotence, we nevertheless
believe that their reasonings result in an altered understanding of the
power of God.
According to McWilliams (1985, 48), it is a serious shortcoming
of Moltmann's dealings with the theodicy issue that he fails to
reconsider the doctrine of divine omnipotence more clearly. McWi]-
liams is right in this respect, but this does not rule out the very fact
that something of a revised understanding of divine omnipotence is
still present in Moltmann's theology. Moltmann's emphasis on the
biblical notion "God is love" (1 John. 4, 8-16), which makes him to
identify the cross as the core of God's revelation, of His love, for here
God takes part in the suffering of humanity, also reveals an altered
understanding of the divine omnipotence. For, as we saw in the
previous chapter, whenever God is love, He is in need of man in order
to reveal His love to something which is not like Him (Moltmann
1980, 74). Consequently, Moltmann (1980, 76) stresses that God and
man are involved in a loving, reciprocal relationship.
Now, following Moltmann's main line of thought, a logical infe-
rence would be that man is in possession of genuine, human freedom
otherwise this human, reciprocal love would be inauthentic! Hence,
instead of being opposite to one another, the divine and human power
have to be complementary and so God cannot said to be omnipotent at
the cost of human power. And with the help of Hartshorne we are able
to show that this view does not contradict the doctrine of divine
omnipotence. According to Hartshorne (1948, 134-142), omnipotence
refers to the greatest power conceivable, but this does not rule out the
existence of inferior, human power. Omnipotence does not imply a
monopoly on power.
And in another sense too, some clues of an altered understanding
of divine omnipotence come forward. Moltmann's reference to the
resurrection of Christ as revealing a hopeful perspective in the midst
of suffering, makes him to understand the divine omnipotence as
eschatological (Moltmann 1972, 162-163; 1980, 178). Apart from
Moltmann other proponents of divine passibility, such as Lee (1974)
and Woollcombe (1967), also stress the importance of eschatology; a
transcendent, omnipotent God is not at work in the universe yet but
this remains an eschatological promise. With regard to both issues,
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divine omnipotence as limited by human power and conceived as an
eschatological promise, modern theology often refers to the divine
omnipotence as `defenceless potency' (Berkhof 19855, 136-142).
Now, it may look as if something of a free-will defence is also
prevailing here, i.e. attributing the existence of human suffering to the
misuse of human freedom. This, however, is not the case, due to a
second feature of the compassion model. In the compassion model no
causal or teleological answers are given for the existence evil. Evil in
its broadest sense is recognized as a universal mystery (Schillebeeckx
1975, 16; Rahner 1980, 462-466). Within the framework of the plan
model evil is also referred to as a mystery, but this mysterious
character only regards the amount evil not its origin. For instance,
Hick (1985, 333-336) in this respect refers to `the mystery of dys-
teleological suffering'. A mystery which only regards the amount of
the excessive evil that afflicts humanity not the origin, for all evil
eventually is planned and willed by God in His inscrutable wisdom.
Therefore, this second feature is very important. It is this specific
combination of both features, referring to evil as a universal mystery
and calling God's omnipotence defenceless potency, which results in
the most consistent and intelligible answer to the problem of human
suffering.
With regard to theodicy, logica] problems arise as soon as causal
or teleological explanations are given for the existence of human
evilsuffering, because these explanations all imply the existence of an
omnipotent God in control of it. There has to be a transcendent,
omnipotent God at work in the universe permitting sinful acts to bring
about their own negative consequences; or an omnipotent God Who
causes good to come out of evil. The answer offered by the compas-
sion model is, therefore, the most logical answer. Due to the fact that
the compassion model does no longer refer to human suffering in
causal or teleological terms but regards it as a mystery, a different
understanding of the traditional doctrine of divine omnipotence may
come forward. Instead of rejecting the factual statement (7) of the
formal statement of human suffering, premise 3 is rejected in the
compassion model. God's omnipotence is spoken of in eschatological
terms and His omnipotence does not exclude human power: His
omnipotence is defenceless potency. And so we may conclude that
God is not able to create an actual world without human suffering.
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The latter is only recognized in the compassion modeL Hence, only
the compassion model succeeds in reconciling God's goodness and
omnipotence with the existence of human suffering in a logically
satisfying way.
2.2.2 An Abstract Answer to the Problem ofHuman Suffering:
Compassion
Besides the highest degree of logical consistency the compassion
model also exhibits the highest degree of abstraction. The latter
applies to our understanding of theodicy as involving a religious
judgment on suffering, which we defined as follows: Within theodicy
suffering is being evaluated by man with the help of a religious
principle (section 2.1.1). This understanding of theodicy as a religious
judgment on suffering enables us to elaborate the main perspective
hidden behind every theodicy model. As indicated by the words in
italics, this main perspective regards three aspects: a view on
suffering, a view on man or humanity and a religious principle. These
aspects reveal the perspective from which suffering is looked upon
within every theodicy model. And, as our conceptual analysis will
point out, this perspective is most abstract within the compassion
model.
However, this latter claim does not regard the theological reaso-
nings of the adherents of the different theodicy models. All theologi-
cal reasoning can be called abstract. The previous chapter illustrates
this. In order to present an intelligible answer to the problem of
human suffering, every theologian is compelled to enter into highly
abstract and often metaphysical reasoning. In this respect there is no
difference between the reasonings of Augustine, Leibniz, Hick,
Moltmann, Hartshorne and others occupied with the theodicy issue.
Hence, theology as such is not becoming more abstract. We only
claim that the main premises hidden behind the three theodicy models
differ with respect to their degree of abstraction. That is to say, we
claim that the adherents of the compassion model make use of the
most abstract, that is, universal, religious principle; that they conceive
suffering as an abstract, that is, very complex, situation; and that they
think of human beings as related to intersubjectivity. Only in this
latter sense do we believe that the compassion model exhibits the
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most abstract perspective on human suffering. Let us now account for
this claim and have a look at the different premises underlying and
determining the retaliation model, the plan model and the compassion
model.
Augustine we regard as a representative of the retaliation model.
The religious principle he uses can be briefly described as: God
punishes sinners and remunerates the good as a token of his divine
justice (De libero arbitrio, I. 1-2; II. 1-2; III. 105). This, we believe, is
the central premise of De libero arbitrio, which does not result from
his theological reasonings, but his theological reasonings instead are
guided by it. Augustine accepts this principle as an article of faith not
to be denied by reason. In a way, we may regard this principle as
Augustine's implicit theodicy (section 1.2). Throughout De libero
arbitrio Augustine elaborates a kind of explicit theodicy in order to
clarify and to defend this religious principle. This is the reason why
he is occupied with questions such as: Does man indeed have a free
will? Does the divine providence imply a denial of the free will? etc.
These are important questions in order to defend the divine goodness
and justice. But, nowhere does Augustine question his religious prin-
ciple; he simply accepts it as a religious truth (De libero arbitrio, I.
10-13).
Hick we recognize as a representative of the plan model. The
religious principle he uses in order to evaluate suffering can be
described as: God leads human beings to their ultimate destination
(Hick 1985, 253-26]). Again, this central insight Hick does not derive
from his theological reasonings, but instead his theological resonings
are guided by it. Confronted on the one hand with a vast amount of
suffering, whilst on the other hand upholding God's goodness and
omnipotence, Hick attributes a positive function to humanity's
suffering. Hence, this principle we regard as Hick's first implicit
answer to the problem of human suffering. Hick's explicit,
theological defense of this principle makes him to identify all (!) evil
as serving man's moral and spritual growth (Hick 1985, 256, 327-
333); and to regard a personal relationship with God as the ultimate
destination of human beings (Hick 1985, 272). These are all features
of Hick's explicit theodicy. But underlying these explicit features
there is Hick's notion that all that occurs, including suffering, is part
of God's plan.
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Finally, the religious principle used by Moltmann, in whose work the
compassion model is present can be described as: God is
compassionate towards humanity's suffering (Moltmann 1968, 36-41;
1980, 63-69). We consider this to be the central premise of Molt-
mann's theology; it is his implicit answer given to the problem of
theodicy. Throughout his entire theology Moltmann upholds this
principle, which determines his specific understanding of the cross
and the resurrection of Christ. Confronted with a vast amount of
suffering throughout the history of humanity, Moltmann makes the
cross of Christ the core of his theology. The cross is the most pro-
found protest against suffering, for the cross reveals the image of a
suffering and compassionate God (Moltmann 1972, 30-33, 189-192,
263-267). In this way, the cross makes man aware of humanity's
suffering and compels him to fight it politically. In no way does God
want evil to exist, instead He wants it to be abolished. This is, we
believe, Moltmann's first answer to the problem of human suffering
underlying his entire theology.
The religious principle of every theodicy model is herewith elabo-
rated. The religious principle present in the compassion model reveals
the highest degree of abstraction. That is to say, God's love is
becoming a universal category in the compassion model. In the
retaliation model God addresses His love to only a limited number of
people; those who do not sin. In the plan model God addresses His
love to every individually living person, whilst in the compassion
model humankind as a whole is affected by God's love. The two
remaining aspects of the religious judgment on suffering make this
even more clear. These remaining aspects refer to the subject and the
object of theodicy. The subject of theodicy regards the way humanity
is conceived within every theodicy model, whilst the object of
theodicy refers to the view on suffering present in every model; both
aspects are closely related to the religious principle involved.
If the principle of the retaliation model is used in order to evaluate
suffering, suffering is regarded as an event which is caused by sin.
But in the retaliation model sin is a moral category, because it refers
to man voluntary rejecting the divine, moral virtues (De libero
arbitrio, I. 89-90; II. 2, 113). In addition, human beings are considered
to be part of religious, moral communities submitted to these virtues.
This latter feature of the retaliation model is for instance stressed by
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Journet (1961, 222-223).
A totally different concept of humanity as well as a different view
on suffering prevails, if the principle of the plan model is used in
order to evaluate suffering. The principle of the plan model reveals a
more existential understanding of the concept of sin as distinct from a
moral understanding of sin. This distinction between a moral and an
existential understanding of sin goes way back to the debate between
the Latin and the Greek Fathers. The Latin Fathers, such as St.
Augustine, emphasize the moral understanding of sin, whilst
according to the Greek Fathers, such as Irenaeus, sin is much more a
metaphysical necessity (Labourdette 1985, 357-360). Hence, within
Hick's Irenaean type of theodicy sin refers to the human state of
imperfection which is an ontological necessity since man is a created
being (Hick 1985, 212; Tillich 1978Z, II, 44). Therefore, within the
plan model human suffering is regarded as a necessary part of
individual life along which God leads human beings to their ultimate
destination. Consequently, man is considered to be an individually
living person. Here, suffering does not refer to the divine, moral
virtues to which man as a member of a religious community is
submitted, instead it refers to man's individual predicament; his own
individual perfection is at stake (Hick 1985, 256).
When the principle of the compassion model is used the object and
the subject of theodicy again are conceived differently. This principle
reveals a kind of universal or social orientation, for God is said to be
compassionate with humanity as a whole. Hence, man is considered
to be a member of the universal fellowship of humankind; a notion
some adherents of divine passibility elaborate with reference to the
call for universal solidarity ( Peukert 1984, 74-77). And so the object
of theodicy, i.e. suffering, relates to the history of humanity which is
full of suffering.
The different perspectives from which suffering is being looked
upon are herewith elucidated. Now, does the main perspective hidden
behind the compassion model indeed exhibit the highest degree of
abstraction? For easy reference, the different perspectives from which
suffering is looked upon are represented in fugure 2.1.
THEODICY LOGIC
Figure 2.1: Cottstituent Elements of Three Theodicy Models
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central elements principle subject object
theodicv models
retaliation God punishes human beings are suffering is an
sinners and members of event which is
remenurates the religious caused by sin
good communities
plan God leads human human beings are suffering is a
beings to their individually living necessary part of an
ultimate destination persons individual's life
compassion God is compas- human beings are suffering is part of




Again we emphasize that this scheme does not represent the
theological reasonings of the different theodicy models as such.
Referring to Schillebeeckx' (19828, 449; section 1.2) distinction
between first order and second order assertions, we argue that instead
first order assertions about suffering are contained in this scheme.
That is to say, this scheme represents the different experiential
foundations of the three theodicy models; it represents the implicit
theodicy. Hence, as we have already mentioned above, we do not
argue that the three theodicy models as such differ in their degree of
abstraction. Our investigation into the degree of abstraction of the
three theodicy models does not apply to the different theological
reasonings of these models. All theological reasoning can be called
highly abstract as the previous section shows. So, our claim is that
only the different perspectives hidden behind every theodicy model
are becoming abstract. That is to say, the implicit theodicy is
becoming more abstract, but not the explicit theodicy models.
Now, if we look at the above scheme it becomes clear that the
perspective present in the compassion model exhibits the highest
degree of abstraction. If we compare the three perspectives with one
another a tendency towards universality is apparent. With regard to
theodicy a tendency towards abstraction we understand as a tendency
towards universality; just as the developments regarding the spheres
of law, morality, politics and art also tend towards universality
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(section 2.1.3). Understanding abstraction, as we do, as referring to
the degree of universality, we argue that the compassion model is the
most abstract model because ofthe universal perspective contained in
it. The religious principle of the compassion model most resembles a
universal principle and the subject and object of theodicy too are
universal categories. Using the religious principle embodied in the
compassion model, suffering is conceived as a very complex situation
induced by the whole range of both natural and moral evils that afflict
humanity. Suffering not just involves the individua]'s own predica-
ment. This broadening of perspective also comes forward in the way
human beings are conceived. They are considered to be part of the
universal fellowship of humankind, and this in turn renders them
responsible for the welfare of their fellow-men. Hence, we may now
conclude that the perspective on suffering hidden behind the
compassion model does indeed exhibit the highest degree of ab-
straction, for it is a universal perspective. In this respect too the
compassion model is the most rational theodicy model.
2.2.3 Summary: Religious Coping and Rationalization
Together with the previous chapter this chapter constitutes the main
theological part of this study. We believe it is very useful, therefore,
to summarize our most important, theological insights, before
entering into the different topic of learning theodicy in the subsequent
chapters. To begin with, we once again stress our practical theological
interest in the problem of theodicy, which we expressed several times
with reference to the question: What does God mean to human beings
as they cope with suffering?
Following this interest, we identified the primary function of
theodicy in the coping process as Kontingenzbew~ltígung. Religion,
i.e. theodicy, serves in the development of coping behavior with
regard to the experiences of contingency and finitude induced by
situations of innocent suffering. Especially the experience of innocent
suffering compels man to attribute some sort of ineaning to his
predicament and to answer the existential questions "Why me?" and
"Why this?" And in order to do so, the Christian faith primarily
provides him with three distinct answers based on primordial
experiences such as: the experience of God's retaliation in the midst
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of suffering, the experience that one suffers according to a divine plan
or the experience of God's compassion with suffering humanity
Within Christian theology these basic experiences are elaborated in
many different ways, but it is nevertheless possible to make an ideal-
typical distinction between the retaliation model, the plan model and
the compassion model. An ideal-typical distinction between three
theodicy models, and thus between three basic ways of religious
coping, we presented and accounted for in the first chapter.
In addition to the insights of the first chapter, this second chapter
dealt with the relationship between theodicy and rationalization. A
further examination of religious coping revealed that coping with
suffering involves a religious judgment. Whenever human beings
attribute a religious meaning to suffering, they evaluate suffering with
the use of a religious principle. Consequently, contained in every
theodicy model is a specific religious judgment on suffering. This
latter insight made it possible to inquire after the validity, or
rationality, of the religious judgment on suffering contained in a
theodicy model and thus to determine the degree of rationality of this
model.
But before we were able to determine the degree of rationality of
the retaliation model, the plan model and the compassion model in
this way, we had to develop a standard of rationality applicable to
theodicy. This led to a standard of rationality containing the following
two demands: a rational theodicy model reconciles both God's
goodness and omnipotence to the existence of human suffering in a
logically satisfying way; and it exhibits an abstract perspective on
human suffering. In our view, both features are decisive when it
comes to determining the degree of rationality of a theodicy model.
Subsequently, we undertook a conceptual analysis of the three
theodicy models, which pointed out that the compassion model offers
the most rational, theological answer to the problem of human
suffering. For the compassion model not only offers the most logical
answer to the problem of human suffering, it also reveals the most
abstract perspective on human suffering. Hence, only the religious
judgment contained in the compassion model is valid, which may be
regarded as the overall conclusion of this second chapter.
When it comes to theodicy, it seems possible to distinguish be-
tween more modern and more traditional, religious answers to the
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problem of human suffering. Consequently, there seem to be rational
and more or less non-rational ways of religious coping with suffering.
This is the major inference we are able to draw from the theological
insights of the first and second chapter. But this inference again
confronts us with another question: Which factors decide on the use
of modern or more tradional, religious answers in the coping process?
Coping with suffering is to evaluate suffering with the use of a
religious principle; it thus involves a religious judgment. Hence, the
issue is: What factors exert their influence on the degree of rationality
of the religious judgment involved in the coping process? Naturally, it
ís possible to think of a wide variety of factors influencing religious
judgment. We would like to emphasize, however, the influence of but
one important factor: comprehension! We presume that the religious
judgment especially depends upon the subject's comprehension of




The previous chapters were dedicated primarily to a detailed analysis of
the theodicy issue. In the first chapter we distinguished and described at
length three theodicy models: the retaliation model, the plan model and
the compassion model. And in the second chapter we studied the ordinal
relationship between these models by examining the degree of
abstraction and logical consistency of each model. This resulted in a
theological theory on the relationship between theodicy and
rationalization; a theological theory which ultimately led to the
conjecture that the degree of rationality of the religious judgment
involved in the coping process is influenced especially by the subject's
understanding or comprehension oftheodicy models. In this chapter, we
shall look at one part of this conjecture more closely by focusing on the
religious judgment as such. That is to say, the aim of this chapter is to
present a detailed analysis of the religious judgment on suffering
involved in the coping process. This third chapter constitutes a necessary
link between the previous chapters and the following chapter dealing
with the comprehension of theodicy models. Ifwe claim that a subject's
understanding or comprehension of theodicy models influences his
religious judgment on suffering, then more needs to be said about this
religious judgment itself and the role theodicy models play in it. To do
this, the present chapter consists of two parts. We first determine the
different aspects involved in the act of passing a religious judgment on
suffering. This act ofjudging results in religious answers, of which the
theodicy models are a part. Then we consider religious judgment as a
problem-solving activity and explain the role theodicy models play in
this process.
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3.1 ANALYSIS OF THEODICY 1UDGMENT
In the previous chapter we referred to theodicy as a religious judgment
on suffering. Coping with suffering, we argued, involves the evaluation
of suffering with the help of a religious principle and therefore entails
a religious judgment (section 2.1.1). However, this description of
theodicy as a religious judgment on suffering is put into strictly
theological-anthropological terms which do not fit our purpose. If we
intend to determine the different aspects involved in the act of passing
a religious judgment on suffering, of a theodicy judgment as we prefer
to say, our understanding of this theodicy judgment still needs further
specification. In this section we present and explain the following more
narrow definition of theodicy judgment: Theodicy judgment regards the
production of a religious answer to a dilemma concerning a situation of
contingency. Thís definition of theodicy judgment is explained by
considering the words `dilemma' and `religious answer' in more detail.
We explain theodicy judgment as an act of judging regarding a
contingency dilemma, which results in a religious answer put in terms
of theodicy models.
3.1.1 Theodicy Judgment and Di[emma
According to our definition a theodicy judgment pertains to a dilemma
concerning a situation of contingency. But what is the relationship be-
tween a theodicy judgment and a dilemma? To answer this question we
emphasize, first of all, that judgment may refer to two different things:
to the act of judging, the actual process of decision-making or to the
result of this process, to the content of the judgment itself This is in the
same manner as religious belief, that may refer to the act of believing
(fides qua) or to the content offaith (fides quae) (Gale 1967, 495). When
we focus on the first meaning of judgment, that is, the act ofjudging,
we, in accordance with Schluchter (1979, 62), may differentiate between
three dimensions: the subject, the object and the standard of the act of
judging. This threefold distinction already renders our understanding of
judgment more specific. A judgment always involves a certain subject:
a person who actually passes the judgment. Furthermore a judgment
always applies to some problem, event or situation: the object. And the
object is judged or compared to a certain measure or principle: the
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standard. Consequently, whenever we bear Schluchter's distinction in
mind, we may say that a dilemma conceming a situation of contingency
is the object of theodicy judgment.
What, then, is a dilemma? According to Harding (1985, 43-47), there
are four characteristics of events that come to be interpreted as dilem-
mas. First, a dilemma demands a choice between two equal alternatives.
It pertains to an `either-or' decision. Second, a dilemma is inescapable,
choosing one of the alternatives cannot be avoided. There is no other
way of solving the dilemma. Third, the truth, rightness or adequacy of
both alternatives cannot be demonstrated a priori. Negative
consequences are equally attached to both alternatives. And fourth, a
dilemma always calls for a resolution in the course of daily life. It
affects life on a personal level. In short, a dilemma confronts a person
with the question: What should be done in this situation? As an example
we consider the decision regarding abortion. Abortion meets our first
criterion in that it calls for an either-or decision: To have the baby or not
have the baby. It is impossible to get around this either-or decision in
another way; there are only two alternatives are available, which is our
second criterion. T'he third measure is that negative consequences are
equally attached to both alternatives. Having the baby, for instance, may
cause financial problems, and not having the baby may invoke a sense
of guilt. And finally, in fourth place, it is clear that abortion affects life
at a personal level. The person involved is compelled to make a
decision, or to pass a judgment; the situation simply urges a decision.
These four characteristics listed by Harding are more or less general
features of dilemmas. However, they apply equally wel] to theodicy. In
order to make this clear, we discuss these characteristics at greater
length below. We especially focus on how theodicy demands an either-
or decision and how it refers to a situation of contingency.
An either-ordecision
Following the insights of Harding, a real dilemma always pertains to an
`either-or decision'. A dilemma confronts a person with the question:
What should be done in this situation? And in order to answer this
question a choice has to be made between two conflicting alternatives.
But what are the conflicting alternatives with regard to theodicy? Within
theodicy a subject's faith is at stake; suffering induces doubt regarding
one's faith (section 1.2.1). Therefore, we feel that theodicy basically
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involves the following conflict: renouncingfaith or seeking help from
faith. In this way, with regard to theodicy the initial question attached to
the dilemma, "What should be done in this situation?", is transformed
into the question, "Should I seek help from faith or not?"
This new question addresses the core problem involved in theodicy.
The experience of evil casts doubt upon one's faith; faith itself seems to
be criticized by the experience of evil. Confronted with evil, people
wonder whether to hold on to their faith or not. This confronts the
individual believer with a genuine dilemma, since both alternatives,
renouncing faith or seeking help from faith, really are contradictory.
Choosing both altematives is logically impossible. However, since there
is not a third alternative available; choosing between the two cannot be
avoided. T'his choice is a difficult one, and yet the problem remains
unsolved whatever the choice may be. If an individual decides to
renounce faith, some sort of ineaning still has to be attributed to the
predicament. But secular meanings often fall short in this respect.
Situations of contingency and finitude more or less call for a religious
answer; that is,. an answer refemng to transcendency (section 1.1.3). A
religious answer, however, is not is not completely satisfactory either.
It does not alleviate pain. Even if an individual decides to seek help from
faith, doubts concerning his predicament remain. Neither a religious-
transcendent-nor a secular-immanent-answer is completely satisfactory.
This is the dilemma a sufferer faces.
At the very core of theodicy, then, we encounter the tension between
`immanence' and `transcendence'. This is a genuine tension since imma-
nence and transcendence are both correlative concepts. If immanence
refers to the existing, present reality, transcendence refers to a reality
beyond; a reality that exceeds, or `transcends', the present reality. Often
such a transcendent reality is referred to as a personal `God', but that is
not necessary. Other more neutral terms like `the ultimate' may also be
adopted (Oser 1985, 189; 1988Z, 34-35). However, it is important to note
in this respect that within modern theology often a third dimension is
distinguished: immanent transcendence as distinct from absolute tran-
scendence (Van der Ven 1990, 250). That is to say, theology may stress
the intimate relationship between God and human beings (immanent
transcendence) or the distance between God and human beings (absolute
transcendence). But this theological nuance does not affect our argu-
ment. Whether transcendence is perceived as absolute or not, there is
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always a reference to a transcendent reality. For the sake of conceptual
clarity, we consider transcendence to ínclude both dimensions, the ab-
solute and the immanent. At the core of theodicy, therefore, we feel that
an immanence-transcendence dichotomy prevails, which leaves the suf-
ferer with the choice to either refer to a transcendent reality or to an
immanent one. To attribute meaning to his predicament a sufferer may,
for example, refer to `the wrath of God' (transcendence) or to the exact,
objective cause of his car crash (immanence). Neither answer is fully
satisfactory. A reference to the wrath of God once again raises the
problem of theodicy: If God is omnipotent and perfectly good, why do
human beings suffer? (section 1.2.1). And a causal explanation of this
predicament still does not answer the existentia] questions: "Why me?"
and "Why this?"
In this way, theodicy demands an either-or decision. It reflects an ar-
gument of the following form which logic defines as a dilemma
(Harding 1985, 45):
1 Either p or q (but not both).
2 Ifp, then r.
3 If q, then s.
4 Therefore, either r or s.
To theodicy the premises are applied in this way:
1 Either a subject renouncesfaith (immanence) or seeks helpfrom faith
(transcendence).
2 If one chooses to renounce faith, the existential questions, "Why
me?" and "Why this?" still have to be answered.
3 If one seeks helpfrom faith, these existential questions still have to
be addressed in a religious way by solving the problem of theodicy: If
God is omnipotent and perfectly good, why do human beings suffer?
4 Therefore, one must either attribute a secular meaning to the pre-
dicament or face the problem of theodicy.
This is the either-or decision involved in theodicy When considered
closely, it may be clear that the other three characteristics listed by
Harding also apply to theodicy. Aside from renouncing or seeking help
from faith, there are no other alternatives available. Furthermore,
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negative consequences are equally attached to both options. The re-
nouncement of faith leaves several existential questions unanswered,
while a decision in favor ofreligious commitment presents the problem
of theodicy itself. And, finally, it is also obvious that theodicy affects
life at a personal ]evel; which is the fourth characteristic Harding
mentions.
A situation of contingency
In the first chapter of this study we referred to the German word Kon-
tingenzbewciltigung in order to designate an important function of reli-
gion, although we neglected to deal with this word in its full extent. If,
however, we are to explain our understanding of theodicy judgment,
then the word contingency also has to be examined. Although theodicy
pertains to an either-or decision concerning situations of contingency,
not every situation of contingency must elicit a theodicy judgment. In
order to make this clear we more carefully consider the word
contingency.
The word contingency originates from the Aristotelean logic con-
cerning the potentiality and actuality of things. Aristotle differentiates
between potentiality and actuality in order to clarify that the being of a
thing need not be a necessity but may also be a possibility. As Aristotle
said in his Metaphysics (IX, 3, 1047a 20-25): "Therefore it is possible
that a thing may be capable of being and not be, and capable of not
being and yet be, and similarly with the other kinds of predicate; it may
be capable of walking and yet not walk, or capable of not walking and
yet walk. And a thing is capable of doing something if there is nothing
impossible in its having the actuality of that of which it is said to have
the capacity." In short, contingency has to do with the actuality of a
thing so far as this is neither necessary nor impossible. Or to put this
another way, contingency has to do with chance or fortuity; it has to do
with situations that do not necessarily exist the way they actually exist
(Peukert 1982, 82). When applied to human existence, for example, con-
tingency refers to harmful situations that occur to people by accident.
The word contingency, then, points out that the human condition is, after
all, just a matter of accident.
But, as Van der Ven (1991b, 169-170) points out, this basic insight,
that human existence is a matter of accident, may apply to other aspects
of life, not only to its drawbacks. Situations of contingency may be
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situations of fortune and luck, because fortune is also a matter of acci-
dent. The development of friendships and ]ove for instance also occur
by accident; love cannot be planned or compelled. Yet contingency may
also refer to situations of misfortune. To suffer a severe illness or to
loose one's job are also situations which involve a certain amount of
fortuity. Becoming ill for example is not a necessity, but it might happen
since human beings are capable of becoming ill. And contingency
applies to yet another aspect of life. Consider the unintended outcomes
of our actions. For instance, the way other people will respond to our
actions is always uncertain. No one knows the overall consequences of
his or her actions in advance.
Situations of contingency, therefore, are situations involving a certain
amount of chance; they need not exist the way they actually exist. Fur-
thermore, situations of contingency are not restricted to situations of
misfortune alone. A certain amount of chance is also involved in situa-
tions of fortune and luck and even in the unintended outcomes of our
own actions. This insight is very important. It enables us to specify our
understanding of theodicy judgment. Since we regard theodicy as per-
taining only to situations of innocent human suffering (section 1.1.1),
theodicy judgment, we believe, only concerns contingency situations of
a specific nature, that is, contingency situations regarding innocent
human suffering. Consequently, theodicy judgment always concerns a
situation of contingency, but not every situation of contingency
necessarily elicits a theodicy judgment.
In summary, the object of a decision-making process regarding theo-
dicy is a dilemma concerning a situation of innocent human suffering.
That is to say, a theodicy judgment results in a religious answer to the
conflict invoked by suffering, either renouncing faith or seeking help
from faith. Only a solution to this conflict in favor of religious commit-
ment pertains to theodicy judgment. Consequently, a solution favouring
the renouncement of faith does not pertain to theodicy, because it ]acks
any reference to transcendence, which is essential for a religious answer.
3.3.1 Theodicy Models as Partofa Religious Answer
Theodicy judgment results in a religious answer, but what exactly is a
religious answer in this respect? This is the question we are about to
answer. Above we argued that theodicy judgment results in a solution
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to a contingency dilemma in favor of religious commitment. Confronted
with a situation of innocent human suffering, a subject passes a theodicy
judgment when providing a positive answer to the following question:
Should I seek help from faith? Consequently, whenever this question is
answered in the negative a subject does not pass a theodicy judgment,
but, in one way or another, passes a secular judgment instead. We agree
in this respect with Fritz Oser, who argues that a religiousjudgment, and
thus also a theodicy judgment, necessarily contains some sort of refe-
rence to transcendency or to `an ultimate'. As Oser states in one of his
articles on religious judgment: "It becomes clear that religious judgment
in this sense has nothing to do with a judgment about religion, but with
the reconstruction of ineaning given the concept of an ultimate" (Oser
1985, 190). The ultimate, therefore is the major reference point of a
theodicy judgment. It characterizes a theodicy judgment as religious in
nature. But there is more to it than Oser suggests.
As already mentioned, a contingency dilemma cannot be solved by
simply referring to transcendency or to the ultimate. When an individual
decides to maintain religious commitment, the problem of theodicy fully
emerges. Consequently, the conflict induced by a contingency dilemma,
renouncing faith or seeking help from faith, can only be solved in reli-
gious terms if the problem oftheodicy is also addressed. When a subject,
despite his predicament, chooses to seek help from faith, the question,
"If God is omnipotent and perfectly good, why do human beings (I)
suffer?", is immediately raised. This means that theodicy judgment in-
evitably results in a religious answer, for this decision-making process
should also produce an answer to the problem of theodicy itself. Com-
pared with Oser's understanding of religious judgment, our understan-
ding of theodicy judgment, as involving a religious judgment on suffe-
ring, is more specific. Whereas Oser argues that the ultimate is the major
reference point of religious judgment, in the field of theodicy it is not
enough. Surely the ultimate is an important reference point, but when it
comes to theodicy, the problem of theodicy itself must also be ad-
dressed. This means specifying the abstract notion ofthe ultimate with
the help of religious symbols and concepts the Christian faith offers.
Thus theodicy judgment results in a religious answer to a contingency
dilemma, because, first, it favors religious belief in the face ofsuffering
and, second, it refers to elements of theodicy models. In our case, theo-
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dicy judgment refers to elements of the retaliation model, the plan model
and the compassion model.
The objections raised against Oser's too formal definition of religion
and the religious judgment, in which `the ultimate' and `contingency'
are the key-words (Fetz 8i Bucher 1987, 217-221), do not apply to our
understanding oftheodicy judgment. Our argument that a theodicy judg-
ment should also contain clear references to elements of theodicy mo-
dels, in order to deal with the problem of theodicy itself, makes it per-
fectly clear that our understanding ofreligion instead is material (section
1.1.3). In our opinion, therefore, theodicy judgment results in a religious
answer to a contingency dilemma put in terms of theodicy concepts; that
is, in terms of the ideal-typical theodicy models we distinguished.
This view also agrees with Harding's reasoning, when she argues that
dealing with dilemmas always involves intentional choice. Harding
states, "(...) the interpretation of dilemmas is another act which implies
the assumption of intention. Conflicting choices and outcomes have no
meaning unless intentional choice is assumed" (Harding 1985, 48). An
either-or decision thus pertains to intentional choice. Such a decision is
always governed by certain goals, motives, expectations or ideas.
Intention is about the why of human behaviour. Therefore, with regard
to theodicy, intention is concerned with the following question: Why
should one seek help from faith? A question which obviously assumes
that contingency dilemmas cannot be adequately dealt with religiously
unless one has also solved the problem of theodicy. Only when a subject
is convinced that suffering does not threaten the existence of an overall
good and omnipotent deity, does it make sense to maintain religious
commitment and to seek help from faith. Hence, the decision-making
process regarding theodicy in one way or another activates the subject's
religious frame of reference. Religious symbols and concepts are
necessarily involved in this process. Consequently, whether or not a
subject is fully aware of several theodicy models, when a subject passes
a meaningful theodicy judgment, the religious answer will always reveal
some elements of the ideal-typical theodicy models we have
distinguished.
Accordingly, theodicy models play an important role in the decision-
making process regarding theodicy. To deal with a contingency dilemma
in religious terms is to pass a theodicy judgment in terms of elements of
the theodicy models we have distinguished. This important insight con-
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cludes this section. We now summarize the major insights ofthis section
by presenting a final, more detailed definition of theodicy judgment:
Theodicy judgment is a decision-making process that results in a religious answer,
which is articulated in terms of the retaliation model, the plan model or the com-
passion model, to the conflict invoked by innocent human suffering: renouncing
faith or seeking help from faith.
And such a decision-making process regarding theodicy involves the
following aspects:
1 A subject is faced with a situation of innocent human suffering.
2 If the subject is a religious believer the dilemma arises: to renounce
faith or seek help from faith.
3 If the subject subsequently decides to renounce faith, the subject does
not pass a theodicy judgment, but if the subject decides to seek help
from faith, then the problem of theodicy surfaces.
4 The subject must then tackle the problem of theodicy itself in order
to pass a meaningful theodicy judgment in terms of the retaliation
model, the plan model or the compassion model.
3.2 T'HEODICY 1UDGMENT AS PROBLEM SOLVING
The aim ofthis chapter is to present a detailed analysis of theodicy judg-
ment as part of the coping process and to pay special attention to the role
theodicy models play in it. To do this, we determined the different as-
pects involved in the act of passing a theodicy judgment and referred to
theodicy models as part ofthe religious answer that results from such a
decision-making process. A religious answer to a contingency dilemma,
we argue, always refers to elements of the ideal-typical theodicy models.
This does not necessarily mean that a subject is fully aware of the diffe-
rences between these models or ofthe theological implications attached
to them. Most of the time the religious consciousness of ordinary people
is a diffuse aggregate of religious symbols and concepts that refer to
primordial notions such as the wrath of God, God's hidden plan or the
compassion ofGod. Still this insight leaves unhindered the very fact that
theodicy models are nevertheless important in passing a theodicy judg-
ment. To make this clear, we again examine theodicy judgment, this
time considering the decision-making process as a problem-solving
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activity that results in an evaluative process of comparing several
theodicy models with one another. To begin with, we explain our
understanding of problem solving. Then we apply these insights to
theodicy and explain in more detail the role theodicy models play in
passing a theodicy judgment.
3.2.1 Problem Solving
To elucidate the problem-solving activity involved in theodicy judg-
ment, we refer, first of all, to the `Structure-of-Intellect Model' (SI
Model) devised by J.P. Guilford (1967; 1979). The SI Model is a three-
dimensional matrix representing the structure of human intelligence.
This three-dimensional matrix originates from Guilford's basic insight
that there are three dimensions or facets of intelligence. Intelligence,
according to Guilford (1979, 24), has to do with the processing of
information. Consequently, Guilford distinguishes between the kind of
operation involved in the processing of information, the content or the
kind of information that is actually processed and the product or the
form of the information that must be dealt with. Operation, content and
product then, are the three dimensions of intelligence that Guilford
subdivides into several categories. There are five operation categories:
memory, cognition, convergent production, divergent production and
evaluation; four content categories: figural, symbolic, semantic and
behavioral; and six product categories: units, classes, relations, systems,
transformations and implications (Guilford 1979, 19-23). Now, each
unique combination of one kind of operation, one kind of content and
one kind of product constitutes an intellectual ability, so that Guilford
eventually identifies 120 (5 x 4 x 6) intellectual abilities or mental
functions.
On the basis of the original SI Model Guilford designed the `Struc-
ture-of-Intellect Problem-Solving Model' (SIPS Model), which provides
a general idea of how the human brain solves problems. The SIPS Model
is shown in figure 3.1 (Guilford 1979, 115). As one can see, the content
and product categories are missing in the SIPS Model. The SIPS Model
provides only a general picture of the operations involved in problem
solving. According to Guilford (1979, 24-25), this is because there is no
specific problem-solving ability. Solving a problem involves many
different SI abilities depending upon the nature, that is the content and
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product, of the information that must be dealt with. But although the
nature of the information to be processed may differ, all five SI opera-
tions are always involved in problem solving.
Figure 3.1: The Structure-of-Intellect Problem-Solving Model
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What exactly is problem solving? Guilford offers the following de-
scription: "It is recognized that there is problem-solving activity when-
ever an individual encounters a situation for which he has no response
ready to function among his repertoire of reactions. If he tries at all to
cope with the situation, he must adapt or modify known responses or he
must invent new ones" (Guilford 1979, 113). Hence, an individual is
engaged in problem solving whenever he faces a situation for which the
best solution is not known in advance and cannot be obtained by logical
deduction alone (Boekaerts 8c Simons 1993, 63-65). In a way, problem
solving is analogous to creative thinking; the situation initiates a creative
search for a novel solution. And the SIPS Model thus is an operational
model of a creative problem-solving activity representing a sequence of
events, or mental operations, that results in an adequate and novel re-
sponse to the problem.
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Below, we apply this SIPS Model to theodicy in order to elucidate the
role theodicy models play in passing a theodicy judgment. At the same
time the SIPS Model itself is also considered in more detail.
3.2.2 The Function of Theodicy Models in Theodicy Judgment
As in any other problem-solving activity, theodicy judgment becomes
activated by some kind of input I. There are two input sources shown in
the SIPS Model. E stands for the environment and S is the soma or the
individual's body. Theodicy judgment is activated by the soma. The
individual experiences a pain or a certain emotion telling him that his
personal well-being is at stake.
Subsequently, in making a theodicy judgment, cognition I leads to
the awareness that suffering shatters one's faith and questions one's reli-
gious commitment. The individual becomes aware of the conflict
whether to renounce faith or seek help from faith. And cognition II
structures this problem in the sense that it enables the individual to see
that the only way to cope with suffering from a religious perspective is
to deal with the theodicy issue itself: IfGod is omnipotent and perfectly
good, why do human beings (I) suffer? To understand or to structure the
religious conflict induced by suffering, the individual must be aware of
the primordial, theological dilemma regarding theodicy: How to recon-
cile the existence of evil with both God's goodness and omnipotence?
However, theological information is needed not only to structure the
problem, but also to produce an answer. Following the SIPS Model,
Guilford distinguishes between two productive operations: divergent
production and convergent production. Which productive operation is
called upon when passing a theodicy judgment depends upon the degree
in which an individual is aware of various religious symbols and con-
cepts. If for instance the image of the wrath of God predominates his
religious consciousness, he may pass a theodicy judgment only in terms
of the retaliation model. In this case, the operation involved is
convergent production, since their seems to be only one suitable answer
to the problem of theodicy. In contrast, if more than one image is present
in his religious consciousness, if an individual for instance is convinced
that evil serves the good purposes of God or that God is compassionate
with those who suffer, he may find out that there is no unique answer to
the theodicy issue and that a variety of religious answers may be
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satisfactory instead. Then, divergent production takes place. But the kind
of operation involved, divergent production or convergent production,
does not affect the function of theodicy models in the act of passing a
theodicy judgment. Essentially, this function remains the same.
Theodicy models function in the production of a religious answer to the
problem. To deal adequately with the conflict of whether to renounce or
seek help from faith, an individual must have an awareness of different
theodicy models. Theodicy models in this respect constitute the
necessary theological information for the production of a religious
answer to a contingency dilemma. And to the extent that a subject is able
to retrieve different theodicy models from memory store, passing a
theodicy judgment pertains to divergent or to convergent production.
Should this problem-solving activity produce any result, the main se-
quence of events ends with one of three outputs. Output I directly is
reached through divergent production. Here, the individual is convinced
that more than one answer is satisfactory and he is unable to choose
between them. Output II results from convergent production, meaning
that the individual is convinced that there is only one suitable answer to
the problem. Finally, output III results from convergent production fol-
lowing divergent production. In this case, the individual, first considers
several alternative solutions and, subsequently, chooses the most satis-
fying one.
This explains the main sequence of events, outlined on the first row
ofFigure 3.1. The second row of Figure 3.1 is labeled evaluation, which
pertains to the continuous checking of cognitions and productions. It is
defined by Guilford as follows: "(...) evaluation is a process of compa-
ring a product of information with known information according to
logical criteria, reaching a decision concerning criterion satisfaction"
(Guilford 1967, 217). With regard to the evaluation of cognition I and
cognition II the key question is: Has the problem been structured in the
right way? That is, has the problem been structured correctly in terms of
the classical theological dilemma regarding theodicy? And with regard
to the evaluation of divergent and convergent production the question is:
Do the answers generated in this process sufficiently safeguard both
God's goodness and omnipotence? In this respect, passing a theodicy
judgment is also an evaluative process of comparing several religious
answers to one another according to the theological criteria, divine
omnipotence and divine goodness. Here again, the primordial,
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theological dilemma regarding theodicy is of importance. Apparently
this dilemma not only serves to structure the problem, but also functions
in the evaluative processes that underlie the entire problem-solving
activity.
The third row in the SIPS Model (shown in Figure 3.1) is the memory
store. During the problem-solving activity the function of inemory is
twofold. First, as indicated by the arrows pointing down, to monitor the
process and remain oriented to what is going on, a running account is
kept of the main events that occur during the entire problem-solving
activity. Secondly, as indicated by the arrows pointing up, during the
process there is a continuous retrieval from memory store of items of
information the individual needs in order to try and find an answer to the
problem. Thus the operation of inemory monitors the whole problem-
solving activity and supplies additional information during this process.
Finally, to conclude our discussion of the SIPS Model, we consider
the remaining stations which are labeled input II and input III. Both sta-
tions represent the individual's need to go back to the environment to
obtain additional information besides the information already stored in
memory. This search for additional information is triggered by the
awareness that, due to lack of sufficient information, the individual has
failed to produce an answer to the problem. This additional information
may be supplied, for instance, by a pastoral counselor or as the result of
educational processes.
This the kind of theological information a subjects needs to cope
with suffering from a religious perspective. In summary, this infor-
mation is twofold: it pertains to the primordial theological dilemma
regarding theodicy as well as to theodicy models. Theodicy models
constitute necessary information for the production of a religious answer
to the problem, while the theological dilemma is needed for the
structuring of the problem and for the evaluative processes underlying
the problem-solving activity. It looks, then, as if this description of
theodicy judgment as a problem-solving activity points out that
cognition of theodicy models and of the theological dilemma are
prerequisite for theodicy judgment. And this is not as strange a con-
jecture as it may first seem, for again Guilford offers theoretical support
for this inference by emphasizing that cognition is prerequisite for all
other SI operations! Guilford says it this way, "As for operations,
cognition is basic to all other kinds; hence it appears first. If no
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cognition, no memory; if no memory, no production, for the things
produced come largely from memory storage. If neither cognition nor
production, then no evaluation. From front to back of the model, then
there is increasing dependency of one kind of operation upon others"
(Guilford 1967, 63). Guilford's SI Model reveals a hierarchical structure
with regard to the sequence of the SI operations: cognition, memory,
divergent production, convergent production and evaluation. And this
hierarchical sequence indicates, for instance, that cognition is
prerequisite for the evaluative processes involved in theodicy judgment.
Cognition, Guilford (1979, 24, 55, 77, 104, 114) stresses several times,
is the basic operation category. Guilford's definition of cognition is also
helpful, "(...) cognition is awareness, immediate discovery or
rediscovery, or recognition of information in various forms;
comprehension or understanding" (Guilford 1967, 203). Consequently,
when engaged in problem solving the subject must be aware of, or have
cognized, sufficient information in order to canry out the problem-
solving task. And with regard to theodicy this means that when
intending to pass a theodicy judgement, one must be aware of, or have
cognized, theodicy models as well as the theological dilemma.
In summary, this view on theodicy judgment as a problem-solving
activity offers us a profound insight into the role theodicy models play
in this decision-making process. The above description not only
illustrates that cognition oftheodicy models and the theological dilemma
is prerequisite for theodicy judgment, but also that cognition stimulates
theodicy judgment! It has become very clear that the more available
information is, regarding various theodicy models, the better able one is
to pass a meaningful theodicy judgment that can best satisfy one's
personal demands. Or to put this another way, when confronted with a
situation of contingency, an individual is more able to structure the
problem and to produce a religious answer to the problem, if the
theological dilemma and various theodicy models have actually been
cognized.. Cognition of theodicy models and of the theological dilemma
means that an individual's religious frame of reference becomes more
structured, which enhances the person's problem-solving ability
regarding theodicy. This view is also compatible with the view of
Batson and Ventis (1982, 86), who argue that cognitive restructuring is
important in religious experience because it enables an individual to deal
more adequately with existential questions. This type of restructuring of
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an individual's religious frame ofreference occurs at the level of the in-
put II and input III stations of the SIPS Model; external sources offer
additional information to enhance an individual's ability to cope with
contingency situations more adequately. We have referred to the
possible influences of educational processes which can strengthen this




On the basis of the foregoing analysis oftheodicy judgment we turn our
attention to the learning process with regard to theodicy. Above we
elucidated the role theodicy models play in theodicy judgment and
claimed that cognition of theodicy models is prerequisite for theodicy
judgment. This was an elaboration of a major part of the conjecture, of
the theological theory we developed earlier in this study: The degree of
rationality of the theodicy judgment involved in the coping process is
especially influenced by the subject's understanding or comprehension
oftheodicy models. To fully elaborate this conjecture, more needs to be
said about the comprehension of theodicy models itself; something we
have neglected thus far. In this chapter we address this issue in our
consideration of the following question: How may religious education
contribute to the comprehension oftheodicy models and, subsequently,
enhance a subject's problem-solving ability regarding theodicy? Two
steps are involved in answering this question. It is important, first, to
examine whether theodicy, due to its potentially delicate nature, is a
suitable subject-matter for religious education. We begin, therefore, by
explaining what we mean by learning theodicy and we present a detailed
statement of an instructional objective regarding theodicy. We then
consider this instructional objective more closely and perform a task
analysis on it, which results in a learning hierarchy for theodicy which
can be used for curriculum development.
4.1 AN INSTRUCTIONAL OBJECTIVE REGARDING THEODICY
As mentioned already, the aim ofthis chapter is to explain how religious
education may contribute to the comprehension of theodicy models in
such a way that it enhances a subject's problem-solving ability regarding
theodicy. Learning theodicy consists of learning the theodicy models
prerequisite for theodicy judgment which can facilitate religious coping
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behaviour. The emphasis should be on learning theodicy models
whenever one intends to improve a person's problem-solving ability
regarding theodicy. Although this inference is in accordance with the
insights of the previous chapter it still needs further explanation. In this
section we account for this view and focus specifically on why the
emphasis should be on learning theodicy models. As we shall illustrate,
this has to do with the possibility that learning theodicy is limited. Next
we consider three educational measures in order to defend our view
against the serious objection of conceptualism, a consideration which,
at the end ofthis section, enables us to present a detailed statement ofan
instructional objective regarding theodicy.
4.1.1 The Desirabiliryand Possibility of Learning Theodicy
Theodicy refers to humanity's tragic destiny. It deals with the human
experiences of contingency and finitude and with the existential
questions "Why me?" and "Why this?" these experiences invoke.
Theodicy is the attempt to deal with these questions religiously in order
to attribute a religious meaning to one's predicament. Furthermore,
theodicy is open-ended. Not only are there different theodicy models to
which an individual may refer, but it is not even at all self-evident that
an individual must attribute a religious meaning to suffering. As we
discussed in the first chapter, the individual's overall attitude towards
religion is decisive in this respect (section 1.1.3; Van Uden 1985, 206).
The matter then, is: How may such a capricious and unpredictable
process of religious coping be learned? Is it even suitable as a subject-
matter for religious education? And does learning theodicy not
presuppose that the student is already a religious believer with personal
experiences regarding suffering? These questions all express serious
doubts regarding the possibility of learning theodicy. With these doubts
in mind, our answer is: Theodicy is not only a suitable but also a
desirable subject matter for religious education, and it does not
presuppose faith or personal experiences regarding suffering if the
emphasis is on learning theodicy models as prerequisite for theodicy
judgment. We now offer a detailed defence of this view..
It is not hard to demonstrate the desirability of theodicy as a subject-
matter for religious education. As early as the Old Testament, especially
in the book of Job, we encounter this dazzling question: If God is
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omnipotent and perfectly good, why do human beings suffer?
Throughout the history of Christianity and to the present day, this
question has continued to puzzle people. The problem of theodicy
continues to be both a theoretical and a practical problem for the
theologian as well as to the individual believer. It is apparently the main
reason why people abandon their faith. This was already the case before
the first World War, as research reported by Weber (19725, 315) shows,
and, according to research conducted recently in Germany by Nipkow,
this is still the case. According to Nipkow (1987, 52-69; 1988, 46-50)
four critical problems decide whether or not faith is abandoned,
especially by young people. Here, the problem of theodicy also prevails.
Young people break with the faith because they are no longer able to
reconcile their conception ofthe good and almighty God with the factual
existence of evil. These findings stress the desirability of theodicy as a
subject matter for religious education. For our inability, particularly
when young, to deal with the problem of theodicy adequately not only
threatens the future of the Christian faith, but, more importantly, it may
also hinder future processes of religious coping. Attention to the
problem of theodicy, is therefore, very important. It may facilitate future
coping behaviour and the quest for meaning that is fundamental to
everyone, whether believer or non-believer, whose life becomes afflicted
with suffering.
In this way, we argue that theodicy is a desirable subject-matter for
religious education. What about the possibility of learning theodicy? As
we stated earlier, the emphasis should be on learning theodicy models
as prerequisite for theodicy judgment. Through learning theodicy
models students develop a religious frame of reference regarding
theodicy. They comprehend theodicy models as part of Christian
thought. Developing a religious frame of reference means that a subject
develops an awareness of the central myths and symbols of a religious
tradition (Van der Lans 1983, 109). When students become familiar with
the major Christian symbols sunounding the problem of evil, or with the
three ideal-typical theodicy models, they develop a religious frame of
reference that is prerequisite for theodicy judgment. The importance of
such a religious frame of reference was recognized in the previous
chapter, a chapter we concluded by stating that several religious symbols
and metaphors must be conceptualized, before an individual is able to
deal with existential religiously
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Learning theodicy models is thus very important. It facilitates the de-
velopment of a religious frame of reference needed for theodicy
judgment. But one may still wonder whether learning theodicy models
alone is sufficient. Is learning theodicy models all that is necessary or is
there more to it than this? In order to answer this question, we refer to
the distinction between aims and objectives made by Wheeler (19778,
22). This distinction concerns the different levels at which the ends of
learning may be defined. Aims, according to Wheeler, refer to the
general ends of education or school learning as such, while objectives
regard the specific ends of a certain course. De Corte (1973, 17-23) also
discusses this twofold distinction and considers aims to be transcendent
objectives. That is to say, aims are general objectives regarding the
development of certain aspects ofthe student's personality, such as the
development of values and attitudes, formal reasoning ability, creativity,
etc. Furthermore, as De Corte (1973, 23) adds, transcendent objectives
may only be achieved by means of specific objectives. With regard to
theodicy this means that the learning of theodicy models refers only to
a specific objective in a certain course on theodicy. However, as we
learn from Wheeler and De Corte, such a specific objective should
always guide towards transcendent objectives or aims. Consequently, the
learning of theodicy models also occurs in the context of a broader aim.
In our opinion, the aim is the facilitation of future coping behaviour.
This, however, is not a specific objective that is attainable in school
learning, because of the nature of the religious coping process itself.
In summary, theodicy is an important and desirable subject-matter
for religious education even though the extent to which theodicy may be
learned is limited. Religious education should emphasize the learning of
theodicy models as prerequisite for theodicy judgment. Such an
objective is both desirable and attainable, since it does not presuppose
faith or personal experiences regarding suffering. In order to prevent the
reduction of the learning of theodicy to the learning of theological
concepts, this specific objective needs to be related to a broader aim; an
aim which constitutes the perspective from which the learning of
theodicy models should be considered. How do we do this with regard
to theodicy? We discuss this matter in the following part of this section.
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4.1.2 Three EducationalMeasures Against Conceptualism
It is easy to misinterpret our argument for an instructional objective
regarding theodicy. The learning of theodicy should not be confined to
the learning of theological concepts. And the learning of theodicy should
always occur in the light oftranscendent objectives or aims. Yet how to
do this needs further explanation. To this end, we now consider three
possible educational measures, that refer to types of learning.
Experiential leaming explains the usefulness oftheodicy models to the
student. Information learning focuses on the different levels of
information involved in the learning of theodicy models. Evaluative
learning considers the need for the students to enter into a process of
metareflection. These measures allow us to present a detailed statement
of an instructional objective regarding theodicy.
Experiential learning
One way to make sure that the learning of theodicy is not restricted to
the mere learning of theological concepts, is to explain the usefulness of
the theodicy models to the students. This principle refers to what De
Klerk (1990, 158-160) calls learning to learn `in situ'. It is important,
according to De Klerk, to explain the usefulness of what should be
learned, that is, to elucidate the situations in which the newly learned
knowledge and skills apply. This not only contributes to a student-s
motivation to assume a learning task (Van Parreren 1988, 72-73), but
also enhances the student's ability to apply new knowledge and skills in
an independent and competent way. And, in addition, a student learns to
deal with such situations adequately when confronted with them in daily
life.
With regard to theodicy this means that religious education should
pay attention to the process of religious coping. To explain the relevance
of theodicy to students, one must explore situations of innocent human
suffering, as well as ways of coping with such situations from a religious
perspective. It is important to highlight the Kontingenzbew~ltigung
function theodicy models perform in the coping process (section 1.1.3
and section 3.1.2). When confronted with suffering one becomes aware
that contingency and finitude are basic characteristics of human
existence. When coping with such anomic experiences, attributing some
sort of ineaning to the evil predicament tends to diminish the experience
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of contingency. This function of Kontingenzbew~ltigung refers to the
real-life situations in which theodicy models apply. If teachers intend to
explain the usefulness of these models to students, they can not avoid
discussing the coping process itself. In doing so, the students will
acquire a well organized set of cognitive, religious tools concerning
Kontingenzbewáltigung. The students can then organize the newly
learned information about theodicy in a meaningful way, ensuring that
they can easily retrieve this information from memory stores and
adequately apply it as needed. In short, applied to theodicy the principle
of learning to learn `in situ' urges the student to adopt a functional
approach to religion and theodicy models in particular.
Information learning
According to Boekaerts and Simons (1993, 39), one can distinguish
three levels of information: an episodical level, a semantic level and a
procedural level. At the episodical level, information regarding personal
experiences prevails. At the semantic level, information regarding the
rneaning of ideas or concepts prevail, and at the procedural level,
information regarding certain rules and principles prevail. However, as
Boekaerts and Simons add, these levels cannot be fully separated from
one another. Instead, they constitute three necessary parts of every
specific body of knowledge. This means that every learning task
involves information stored at all three levels and that the studentneeds
to be taught to relate these levels of information to one another
(Boekaerts and Simons 1993, 40-43).
When learning the theodicy models, then, it is not enough to gain
comprehension of the models. As with every other learning task, the
learning of theodicy also involves information pertaining to the pro-
cedural level and the episodical level. The theological concepts the
student must acquire involve semantic information. Procedural infor-
mation is involved, for instance, in regard to the theological dilemma
underlying theodicy or the structure of a theodicy model. And the ex-
periential basis of theodicy involves episodical information.
This episodical information is not in the form of well-defined con-
cepts, but relates to personal meaning instead. It is generated, according
to Lazarus (1991, 144-149), by a cognitive activity refen-ed to as
appraisal during which a subject addresses questions such as: What does
suffering mean to me? In what way does it affect me? In which sense
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does suffering affect my goals, my norms, my beliefs about myself? etc.
Appraisal thus refers to the personal way the individual addresses
existential questions (section 1.1.3 and section 3.2.2). As a consequence,
episodical information is about personal significance and is bound to a
personal context or setting. Or to put it differently, episodical
information regards the individua]'s biography and is of a narrative
nature. In religious education it is very important, therefore, to pay
attention to real-life coping processes and to discuss possible, personal
experiences regarding innocent suffering, in order to increase the extent
to which the learner may identify himself with the problem of theodicy.
The learning of theodicy models, therefore, cannot be confined to the
acquisition of semantic or procedural information alone. Instead,
attention has to be paid to episodical information as well.
Evaluative learning
Throughout this study we distinguish three ideal-typical theodicy models
as three different ways of amibuting a religious meaning to suffering.
And despite the fact that these theodicy models all reveal a different
degree of rationality, each model may be helpful and satisfactory to the
individual believer who attempts to cope with suffering with the help of
religion. That is to say, there is no such thing as the one and only
Christian answer to the problem ofhuman suffering. The Christian faith
instead offers a variety of religious answers. This means the problem of
theodicy is open ended; there is no final solution to the problem. One
way to help students become aware of this is to urge them to enter into
a process of ineta-reflection.
As we saw in the previous chapter (section 3.2.2), the act of ren-
dering a theodicy judgment, as part of the coping process, is evaluative
in nature. Coping with suffering from a religious perspective means that
a subject compares different religious answers to one another in order
to find an answer which is personally satisfying. This answer should be
one that best suits the subject's own predicament and personal
experiences and which safeguards both the divine omnipotence and
goodness. With regard to the learning of theodicy, meta-reflection
means that students evaluate different theodicy models, in the same way
a subject does when involved in real-life coping processes.
Consequently, learning the theodicy models implies that students
scrutinize different theodicy models from their own positions regarding
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the theodicy issue and that they are willing to abandon their own po-
sition and consider alternative positions. But metareflection does not
occur by itself. Instead, as Oser (1988, 70-71) points out, metareflection
needs to be supported by explicitly informing students ofthe differences
between several religious answers and through classroom discussions
regarding these differences. In the case of theodicy, this can be done by
teaching the twofold standard of rationality, abstraction and logical
consistency (section 2.1.1), enabling students to compare and critically
examine the theodicy models. The twofold standard of rationality
constitutes additional non-theological information the student needs to
acquire before it is even possible for him to enter into a process of
metareflection regarding theodicy.
In short, in religious education it is important not to highlight one
specific religious answer to the theodicy issue, considered to be
`modern' or `rational'. On the other hand, one must also avoid treating
the three theodicy models as being of equal importance, for these models
do differ in degree of rationality as in our conceptual analysis in the
second chapter (section 2.2). Hence, it is necessary to enable the student
to discuss these models critically, without telling him in advance which
model is most appropriate (Nipkow 1987, 57-60). And the way this may
be done best, is by informing him about a standard of rationality and,
subsequently, to urge him to enter into a process of inetareflection as a
form of evaluative learning.
These educational measures are very important when it comes to the
learning of theodicy in the field of religious education. It is possible to
derive several insights from these measures, which are useful in
preventing the leaming of theodicy from being restricted to merely
learning theological concepts. To summarize our argument, we mention
the following insights:
1 It is important to adopt a functional approach while discussing the
theodicy issue. Religious education should examine to the experience of
suffering and the coping process (experiential learning).
2 Episodica] information is involved in religious coping , which reveals
the experiential basis of theodicy. Religious education should present
theodicy models using real life reports regarding various coping pro-
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cesses. to enable students to identify to a greater extent with the theodicy
issue (information learning~episodical information).
3 Apart from episodical information religious coping also involves
semantic information. Religious education should offer narrow defi-
nitions of the concepts at issue to facilitate learning semantical infor-
mation (information learning~semantic information).
4 Furthermore, religious coping also involves procedural information
regarding the structure of the problem of theodicy itself as well as the
structure of the respective answers to the problem. Religious education
should emphasize the theological dilemma and the threefold structure of
theodicy models. Presenting additional schemes and diagrams in the
text-book, for example, facilitates the leaming of this kind of procedural
information (information learning~procedural information).
5 Religious coping is basically of an evaluative nature; at the core of
the coping process a religious judgment prevails. T'herefore, religious
education should advocate and facilitate theodicy judgment as evaluative
leaming. The students must be challenged to evaluate theodicy models
using a standard of rationality applicable to theodicy (evaluative
learning).
It may be obvious that these insights are of great use to us. They reveal
ways of dealing with theodicy in a broader perspective. They tell us how
to relate a specific objective regarding the learning of theodicy models
to the more transcendent objective of facilitating future coping
behaviour. It is important not to confine the learning process to a mere
discussion of theodicy models. Instead, as we pointed out above,
leaming the theodicy models successfully demands that attention is paid
to additional theological and non-theological information as well. This
conclusion immediately affects our instructional objective. That is, on
the basis of this conclusion, it becomes possible to reconsider our
preliminary statement regarding the learning of theodicy models and
thus to present a more detailed statement of an instructional objective.
T'his detailed statement reads as follows:
The student is able to render a meaningful theodicy judgment, which means that the
student comprehends three ideal-typical theodicy models and their underlying
structure, that the student is aware of the function of these models in the coping
process and that the student is able to structure the anomic experience of innocent
human suffering in terms of the theological dilemma. Furthermore, the student
comprehends a standard of ratíonality applicable to theodicy and is able to compare
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theodicy models to one another to explain which model exhibits the highest degree
of rationality.
As one can see, this detailed statement of an instructional objective
regarding theodicy places learning the theodicy models in a broader
perspective. Consequently, although the emphasis is still on learning the
theodicy models, the serious objection of conceptualism does not apply
to our view.
4.2 TASK ANALYSIS
Until now, we have only accounted for our view of what we think the
learning of theodicy is. This culminated in the precise statement of an
instructional objective given above. In this section, however, we go one
step further and wonder how this instructional objective may best be
achieved. This, in turn, calls for a task analysis, which involves three
different kinds of analysis to be performed on the learning task implíed
in our instructional objective. Gagné and Briggs (19792, 100) list three
types of analysis, which all serve in identifying and classifying the
components of the learning task. In their view, an information
processing analysis is needed to identify the sequence of decisions and
actions involved in the performance that makes up the learning task;
furthermore, a task classification is needed to assign the performance to
certain categories of learning outcomes; and finally, a learning task
analysis is needed to identify the prerequisites of the learning task and
to establish a sequence for instruction. Below, we perform al] three
analysis on the learning task. To do this, we, in accordance with
Boekaerts and Simons (1993, 181; Gagné 19854, 259-262), distinguish
between a description ofthe learning task and an analysis ofthe learning
task. First, we provide a detailed description of the learning task,
involving a type of analysis similar to what Gagné and Briggs call
information-processing analysis, after which we come to analyse the
learning task and establish a sequence for instruction pertaining to what
Gagné and Briggs call task classification and learning task analysis.
4.2.1 Description of the Learning Task
According to Bcekaerts and Simons (1993, 181), describing the learning
task means describing the different aspect or elements implied in the
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execution ofthe learning task (1) as well as the different ways in which
the learning task may be executed (2). A view which is very similar to
Gagné's understanding of an information-processing analysis, which is
meant to result "(...)in a step-by-step description of the performance
that the task represents" Gagné 19854, 262; Hermans 1986, 173). But
what exactly is the performance implied in the learning of theodicy?
This question is not very difficult to answer. According to the
instructional objective stated above, the student learns to make a
reasoned or meaningful theodicy judgment. The performance, then, that
is implied in the leaming of theodicy, which makes up the learning task,
is making a meaningful theodicy judgment! As a consequence,
describing the learning task with regard to theodicy mean describing the
different aspects involved in theodicy judgment. Since we already did
this in the previous chapter, what follows is only a brief summary of our
most important insights regarding theodicy judgment.
Following Guilford's `Structure-of-Intellect Problem-Solving Model'
(SIPS Model), rendering a theodicy judgment basically involves five
steps (section 3.2.2):
1 The subject faces a situation of innocent human suffering and be-
comes aware of the problem; at issue is the conflict of whether to re-
nounce faith or seek help from faith.
2 The subject structures the problem; with the help of the theological
dilemma the subject notices that suffering calls into question the divine
goodness and omnipotence.
3 The subject is looking for possible answers to the problem; the
Christian faith basically offers three answers embodied in the retaliation
model, the plan model and the compassion model, which all exhibit
different religious principles and different views on people and
suffering.
4 The subject evaluates different answers; the subject wonders which
answer best safeguards both the divine omnipotence and goodness.
5 The subject produces a personally satisfying answer to the problem;
an answer in terms of the retaliation model, the plan model or the
compassion model.
These are the five steps involved in rendering a theodicy judgment. It is
possible, however, to present an even more detailed picture of theodicy
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judgment by providing a flow-chart of the different steps or operations
which make up the performance. This flow-chart, shown in Figure 4.1,
differentiates between choices and actions and thus displays the act of
making a theodicy judgment in more detail. This flow-chart obviously
offers a more profound insight into the subprocesses underlying
theodicy judgment. As the flow-chart indicates, making a theodicy
judgment involves certain choices or decisions, represented by a
diamond, as well as certain actions, represented by a rectangle, while the
trapezoid marks the input; which , in the case of this problem-solving
activity, is innocent human suffering (Gagné and Briggs 19792, 100).
The flow-chart offers a detailed picture of the performance implied
in the learning task and, in addition, is helpful also in identifying the
components of the learning task. As shown on the flow-chart, when
students are able to render meaningful theodicy judgments, they must be
aware of:
1 The distinction between evil and suffering and what is meant by
innocent human suffering.
2 The existential questions "Why me?" and "Why this?" which go
along with suffering and which must be answered if an individual
intends to attribute a religious meaning to suffering.
3 The primordial, theological dilemma which makes up the problem of
theodicy: If God is omnipotent and perfectly good, why do human
beings suffer?
4 The threefold structure of a theodicy model as a religious answer to
the theological dilemma, which consists ofa religious principle, a view
of humanity and a view on suffering.
5 The constituent elements of the retaliation model, the plan model and
the compassion model which exhibit different religious principles as
well as different views on humanity and suffering to resolve the
theological dilemma.
6 A standard of rationality that indicates which theodicy model best
safeguards the divine omnipotence and goodness.
This description of the learning task confirms that learning the theodicy
models cannot be restricted to the mere leaming of theological concepts.
Aside from the standard of rationality attention has to be paid to the
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coping process itself, to the distinction between evil and suffering and
to the theological dilemma. In this way, learning to make a theodicy
judgment involves semantic information, procedural information and
episodical information. It involves semantic information, because
learning theodicy judgment includes learning concepts such as: suf-
fering, coping process, theological dilemma, theodicy answer,retaliation
model, plan model, compassion model, abstraction and logical con-
sistency. There is procedural information involved with regard to the
learning of the theological dilemma and the threefold structure of a
theodicy model. As Figure 4.1 shows, the theological dilemma is an im-
portant tool to use in structuring the problem of theodicy. Dealing with
the problem itself involves the use of a religious principle and additional
views on humanity and suffering. Finally, there is episodical information
involved, described as `additional inputs' in the flow-chart, indicating
that theodicy judgment always takes place as part of real-life coping
processes in the context ofpersonal experiences regarding suffering.
4.2.2 Analysis of the Learning Task
Having described the different elements or components of the learning
task, we are now about to analyse the leaming task. Following Boekaerts
and Simons (1993, 181), the aim of such analysis is twofold. It is meant
to identify the type of information or knowledge the student needs to
successfully execute the learning task (1) and to determine the
conditions for accomplishing the learning task (2). This con esponds to
what Gagné and Briggs respectively call task classification and learning
task analysis.
Task classification
The aim of task classification is to assign performance objectives im-
plied in the learning task to categories of learning outcomes. As a result
ofthe information-processing analysis we identified six components of
the learning task. To make a meaningful theodicy judgment, implies that
the student is not only aware of the three theodicy models, but of
additional information as well. That additional information includes the
concepts of: suffering, the coping process, the theological dilemma, the
threefold structure of a theodicy model and a standard of rationality.
Hence, task classification seeks to assign the performance objectives
108 LEARNING THEODICY
implied in learning these specific items of information to certain
categories of human performance.
With regard to task classification, Gagné and Briggs (19792, 49-51;
Gagné 19854, 47-49), distinguish five major categories of learning
outcomes or of human performance: intellectual skills, cognitive strate-
gies, verbal information, motor skills and attitudes. And due to the
relative importance of intellectual skills in formal education, Gagné and
Briggs (19792, 61-71; 19854, 52-55) have further analysed this category
of learning outcomes into five subcategories: discriminations, concrete
concepts, defined concepts, rules and higher-order rules. Task
classification, therefore, is useful in determining which category or
subcategory of human performance is involved in learning the theodicy
models.
Learning to render a theodicy judgment chiefly pertains to leaming
concepts, which, in turn, involve an intellectual skill. This becomes
apparent from Gagné and Briggs' understanding ofintellectual skills. As
they state, "Intellectual skills are the capabilities that make the human
individual competent. They enable him to respond to conceptualizations
of his environment" (Gagné and Briggs 1979', 49). By learning concepts
the subject becomes able to communicate through symbolic language.
However, we have not yet identified the type of intellectual skill
involved in learning theodicy judgement. According to the information-
processing analysis, learning theodicy judgment pertains to two types of
intellectual skills: defined concepts and rules. It is possible to measure
the ability of students to demonstrate the meaning of verbally stated
definitions of: suffering, coping process, theological dilemma, theodicy
answer, retaliation model, plan model, compassion model, abstraction
and logical consistency. The skill involved here is learning defined
concepts (Gagné and Briggs 1979z, 66-67). It is also possible to measure
the students ability to consider the relationship between the three
theodicy models in terms of their varying degree of rationality.
Furthermore, it is possible to measure how students apply a twofold
standard ofrationality, which involves the learning ofrules (Gagné and
Briggs 1979z, 67-69). Leaming to make a meaningful theodicy
judgment, therefore, pertains to learning defined concepts and rules. To
illustrate this, we present the definitions of the items of information in
question and also describe the related capabilities or performance
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objectives. The descriptions are based on the theoretical insights of the
preceding chapters:
Suffering
. Definition: the human, emotional involvement in evil or harmful
situations. It is possible to distinguish between suffering and innocent
suffering. The latter regards the human, emotional involvement in
evil or harmful situations that happen to people by accident.
. Performance objectives: the student is able to classify verbal state-
ments, pictures and symbols as instances of innocent human suf-
fering ( intellectual skill: defined concept).
Coping Process
. Definition: the cognitive activity that processes existential questions
such as, "Why me?" and "Why this?" invoked by innocent suffering.
Answering these questions restores the wholeness of human life by
explaining that suffering is a part of the totality of life.
. Performance objectives: the student is able to classify verbal state-
ments, pictures and symbols as instances of existential questions (in-
tellectual skill: defined concept).
Theological dilemma
. Definition: if a person is a religious believer willing to attribute a re-
ligious meaning to suffering, that is, to answer existential questions
in a religious way, he or she must work out a solution to the
following question: If God is omnipotent and perfectly good, why do
human beings suffer?
. Performance objectives: the student is able to classify verbal state-
ments, pictures and symbols as instances of the theological dilemma
(intellectual skill: defined concept).
Theodicy answer
. Definition: a theodicy model, as a Christian answer to the theological
dilemma, reveals a threefold structure; it is always based on a certain
religious principle, a particular concept of humanity and a view on
suffering.
110 LEARNING THEODICY
. Performance objectives: the student is able to classify verbal state-
ments, pictures and symbols either about a religious principle, a con-
cept of humanity or a view on suffering.
Retaliation model
. Definition: a Christian answer to the theological dilemma that is
based on the religious principle: God punishes sinners and remune-
rates the good. In addition, human beings are seen as members of re-
ligious, moral communities, and suffering is viewed as an event
which is caused by sin.
. Performance objectives: the student is able to classify verbal state-
ments, pictures and symbols as instances ofthe retaliation model (in-
tellectual skill: defined concept).
Plan model
. Definition: a Christian answer to the theological dilemma that is
based on the religious principle: God leads human beings to their ul-
timate destination. In addition, human beings are seen as individually
living persons, and suffering is viewed as a necessary part of an indi-
viduals' life.
. Performance objectives: the student is able to classify verbal state-
ments, pictures and symbols as instances ofthe plan model (intellec-
tual skill: defined concept).
Compassion model
. Definition: a Christian answer to the theological dilemma that is
based on the religious principle: God is compassionate towards hu-
manity's suffering. In addition, human beings are seen as members
ofthe universal fellowship ofhumankind, and suffering is viewed as
part of the history ofhumanity.
. Performance objectives: the student is able to classify verbal state-
ments, pictures and symbols as instances of the compassion model
(intellectual skill: defined concept).
Abstraction
. Definition: a distinctive feature of a rational answer to the theological
dilemma that exhibits a perspective on suffering which tends towards
universality.
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. Performance objectives: the student is able to classify verbal state-
ments, pictures and symbols as instances of abstraction (intellectua]
skill: defined concept).
. Performance objectives: the student is able to demonstrate the way
in which the retaliation model, the plan model and the compassion
model differ in degree of abstraction (intellectual skill: rule).
Logical consistency
. Definition: a distinctive feature of a rational answer to the theological
dilemma that reconciles both God's goodness and omnipotence to the
existence of innocent human suffering without inner contradictions.
. Performance objectives: the student is able to classify verbal state-
ments, pictures and symbols as instances of logical consistency
(intellectual skill: defined concept).
. Performance objectives: the student is able to demonstrate the way
in which the retaliation model, the plan model and the compassion
model differ in degree of logical consistency (intellectual skill: rule).
Having specified definitions and performance objectives for the above
named concepts, it is now possible to establish a sequence for
instruction, which is our second aim in this section, referring to leaming
task analysis.
Learning task analysis
A learning task analysis is carried out identify the prerequisite know-
ledge and skills and to determine the necessary conditions for accom-
plishing the learning task. This results in an instructional sequence that
can serve as a guide for instructional planning. As we perform this
learning task analysis, we adopt Gagné and Briggs' hierarchical
principle of sequence.
Pivotal in Gagné and Briggs' theory on leaming and instruction is the
following theoretical view-point: Students cannot learn new intellectual
skills until they have acquired the skills which are prerequisite to these
new skills. According to Gagné and Briggs (1979Z, 61-62), the five
subcategories of intellectual skills: discriminations, concrete concepts,
defined concepts, rules and higher-order rules, can be categorized
hierarchically by complexity. Prior to the learning of complex skills,
such as rules and higher-order rules, one must learn the simpler skills,
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discriminations, concrete concepts and defined concepts. The mastery
of less complex skills represents the prerequisite behaviour for learning
more complex skills.
Learning theodicy judgement involves two types of intellectual
skills, defined concepts and rules. T'he overall instructional sequence
then, for the learning of theodicy, involves two steps, according to
Gagné and Briggs' hierarchical principle. Learning defined concepts
first, as a prerequisite for learning rules. This principle ofsequence is of
limited use, however. It states only that learning concepts precedes
learning rules. It is not very helpful regarding the sequencing of defined
concepts. A detailed instructional sequence does not emerge from this
general structure of skills and prerequisite skills. (Hermans 1986, 179).
Additional principles of sequence are needed if we are to develop an
instructional sequence that precisely describes the order in which all the
intellectual skills involved in the ]earning task should be taught. The
principle of logical interrelationships, for example, indicates that the
learning of simple concepts that are used in the definitions of more
complex concepts, is prerequisite to the acquisition of those more
complex concepts. (Romiszowksi 1984, 104). T'his principle makes it
possible to determine the logical interrelationships that exist between
various concepts and thus to establish a sequence for learning defined
concepts.
Applied to theodicy, this principle of logical interrelationships results
in the following sequence for acquiring defined concepts: suffering,
coping process, theological dilemma, retaliation model, plan model and
compassion model. Suffering is the basic concept which is included in
the definitions of all other concepts. If a student is not familiar with the
basic concept of suffering, then all the other concepts will not make
sense. The same is true for the remaining concepts Successful
comprehension of the concepts of retaliation model, plan model and
compassion model, presupposes familiarity with the concepts of
theological dilemma and theodicy answer, which, in turn, demands that
the student has acquired the concept ofcoping process.
We adopt another principle of sequence to teach the twofold rule. In
accordance with Gagné and Briggs' hierarchical principle of sequence,
this twofold rule should be taught after the defined concepts.
Comprehension of these defined concepts is the prerequisite behaviour
for learning rules. However, with regard to learning rules it is possible
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to make use of different instructional strategies. Romiszowski (1984,
107) defines an expositive, instructional strategy (rule followed by
example) as distinct from an experiential, instructional strategy
(example leading to rule). When teaching the twofold rule it is best to
combine both strategies. Since abstraction and logical consistency are
abstract concepts about the process of rendering a theodicy judgment
and do not apply to the content of theodicy models, it is helpful to teach
this twofold rule in the light of the marked differences between the theo-
dicy models. By presenting different theodicy models first, in effect,
examples of the rule are presented prior to the rule itself. This helps the
student to understand that abstraction and logical consistency are
specific ways of looking at the differences between theodicy models
(example leading to rule). To validate that the student is really able to
apply this rule, it is useful to present an additional example of the rule
(rule followed by example). Taken together, these strategies resemble
an inductive and a deductive principle of sequence (Van der Ven 1985,
226).
The student first comprehends of the concepts of retaliation model
and plan model and becomes aware of the differences between these
models. Then the student derives the twofold rule, abstraction and
logical consistency from these particular examples (inductive principle
of sequence). Finally the student acquires the concept of compassion
model and is able to consider the differences between this model and the
theodicy models encountered earlier in terms of abstraction and logical
consistency (deductive principle of sequence).
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Figure 4.2: A Learning Hierarchyfor Learning Theodicy Judgment
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In summary, to establish an instructional sequence regarding the
learning of theodicy judgment, we apply various principles of sequence.
To begin with, we adopt an overall hierarchical principle of sequence
stating that leaming defined concepts is prerequisite to learning rules.
For sequencing the introduction of defined concepts, we use the logical
interrelationships that exist between these concepts. And we combine
both an inductive and a deductive principle of sequence for introducing
rules. Applying these principles allows us to construct a learning
hierarchy for theodicy judgment that displays a sequence for instruction,
which may serve as a guide for instructional planning (Gagné and Briggs
19792, 108-109). This learning hierarchy for learning the theodicy
models is shown above in figure 4.2.
This completes our analysis of the leaming task. We have presented
a detailed description of the learning task and identified its components,
classified these components in terms of performance objectives or
learning outcomes and explored instructional sequencing to produce a
learning hierarchy for learning theodicy judgment. Based upon this, we
were able to design a course on theodicy for our field research. Without
detailing the process of course design, a brief description of the course
sequence appears in Figure 4.3.
Figure 4.3: Sequence of a Theodicy Curriculum
Chapters of the Performances or
curriculum learning outcomes





Differences in rationality VII, VIII, IX
Compassion model X, XI
The Roman numerals in Figure 4.3 con espond with the performance
objectives displayed in the learning hierarchy, Figure 4.2. The ex-
perimental theodicy course consists ofseven lessons. Most lessons have
a single objective (lesson 2, 3, 4 and S), although a few have more than
one related objective (lesson 1, 6 and 7). In the curriculum that we
developed for classroom use, these learning objectives were addressed
in the lesson plans. This curriculum included appropriate media and
116 LEARNING THEODICY
instructional materials for learning semantic information (narrow
definitions), procedural information (additional diagrams and schemes)
and episodical information (real-life stories). A prepared text on
theodicy, and an instructors manual, with notes on teacher roles and
activities as well as directions to be given to the student, were provided.
This curriculum and materials were ready to be used in the classroom.
To determine whether this cun-iculum is useful for religious education,
we conducted field research, which is discussed in the next chapter.
CHAPTER FIVE
THEODICY RESEARCH
Until now we have only examined the theoretical support for our claim
that comprehension of the theodicy models is prerequisite for a rational
theodicy judgment. We have distinguished between three ideal-typical
theodicy models, discovered an ordinal relationship between these
models, elaborated the role these models play as part of the coping
process in theodicy judgrnent and, we have shown how these models
may best be learned in the field of religious education. Although the
theoretical considerations seem quite convincing, we still have to gather
empirical support for our claim regarding the specific relationship
between theodicy comprehension and theodicy judgment. To this end,
in this chapter we discuss the field research we conducted on the effects
of an experimental theodicy curriculum. The methodology and study
design will be discussed first, followed by a discussion of our research
findings.
5.1 RESEARCH PLAN
Prior to the actual execution of field research it is necessary to carefully
design the research. This is necessary to ensure that proper measures and
research techniques are selected in accordance with the actual research
aims and questions. As a consequence, it is important to begin by clearly
stating the guiding research question, which we examine in detail.
Following this we elucidate the conceptual model implied in the
research question. Then we account for the quasi-experimental research
design we have adopted and, finally, we discuss our measurement
instruments.
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5.1.1 Research Questions and Research Aim
The domains of inquiry for this research concern the following two
questions:
1 To what extent is theodicy education about the retaliation model, the
plan model and the compassion model of influence on comprehension
of these models?
2 To what extent does theodicy education about the retaliation model,
the plan model and the compassion model indirectly influence theodicy
judgment using these three theodicy models via its influence on theodicy
comprehension, when controlling for possible direct effects of theodicy
education on theodicy judgment?
As one can see, the theoretical conjecture regarding the specific rela-
tionship between comprehension of theodicy models and theodicy
judgment that dominates our entire study, is central to the second re-
search question. Whereas the first question regards only the influence
theodicy education may exert on theodicy comprehension, the second
question also regards the indirect influence theodicy education may
exert on theodicy judgment by influencing theodicy comprehension. In
order to gain more empirical support for this theoretical conjecture, we
specifically pose this second question and submit it to field research.
This brings us to our research aim. We refer to this type ofresearch
as explorative-explanatory (Van der Ven 1990, 144-147). As we explain
below, our focus is on a twofold, causal relationship between, first, an
educational programme on theodicy and theodicy comprehension and,
second, between theodicy comprehension and theodicy judgment. This
research is more than simply descriptive, because we already have
certain theoretical expectations. On the other hand, due to the
preliminary status of our theoretical insights, performing real
hypothesis-testing research is not possible. Therefore, our aim is to
evaluate the theoretical insights we elaborated thus far in order to further
advance these insights, by way of explorative approach (De Groot 1975g,
322-324). Hence, our research aim is the advancement of an educational
theory on theodicy.
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5.1.2 Conceptual Models
A conceptual model is a scheme that displays the concepts involved in
the research question as well as the supposed relationships among these
concepts (Segers 19833, 31). And since we are dealing with two research
questions, there are also two different conceptual models.
The conceptual model implied in the first research question is dis-
played in figure 5.1. Here, apart from the so-called background characte-
ristics two concepts prevail. These concepts, which we call variables,
regard characteristics that respondents may possess to a
Figure 5.1: Conceptual Model Implied in the First Research Question
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degree of urbanisation theodicy theodicy






varying degree. Theodicycomprehension is the dependent variable, the
variable that is to be explained. We would like to explain to what extent
comprehension of theodicy models is influenced by theodicy education.
The latter is thus the independent variable. Finally, we also consider the
influence that relevant background characteristics may exert on
theodicy comprehension. As we explain below (section 5.1.3), since we
use non randomised groups, it is very important to control for these
background characteristics in order to determine the effects oftheodicy
education with greater accuracy.
Figure 5.2. shows the conceptual model implied in the second re-
search question. In this case, aside from the background characteristics
three variables prevail: theodicy judgment, theodicy comprehension and
theodicy education. In this model, theodicy judgment functions as the
dependent variable because the second research question asks to what
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extent theodicy judgment is influenced by theodicy comprehension.
Theodicy comprehension in this respect is the intervening variable. It
mediates between theodicy judgment and theodicy education.
Theodicy education is still the independent variable. According to
the conceptual model, theodicy education results in comprehension of
theodicy models and also exerts its influence, though indirectly, on
theodicy judgment. However, we do not rule out the possibility that
theodicy education also directly influences theodicy judgment, as in-
dicated in Figure 5.2 by the an ow running straight from theodicy
education to theodicy judgment. And with regard to this second re-
search question we consider the influence that relevant background
characteristics may exert on theodicy judgment either directly or in-
directly by influencing theodicy comprehension.
Figure 5.2: Conceptual Model Implied in the Second Research Question
Background Independent Intervening Dependent
charecteristics variable variable variable
degree of urbanisation theodicy theodicy theodicy
socioeconomic status education -~ comprehension ~judgment





Each research question assumes a specific, causal relationship. The first
question assumes that there is a causal relationship between an
educational programme on theodicy and comprehension of theodicy
models. The second questions' assumption is that there is a causal
relationship between this educational programme on theodicy and
theodicy judgment by way of this educational programme's influence on
theodicy comprehension. In order to account for these claims and place
them in a theoretical framework, we present a brief summary of the
theoretical insights we elaborated earlier in this study and from which
the research questions are derived (Segers 19833, 26; De Groot 1975g,
42).
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Our understanding of theodicy judgment is based on the definition we
offered in chapter three (section 3.1.2). Theodicy judgment is a decision-
making process that results in a religious answer, stated in terms ofthe
retaliation, plan or compassion model, to the dilemma invoked by
innocent human suffering: whether to renounce faith or seek help from
faith. With the help of De Corte's (1973) classification system of
educational objectives we define theodicy comprehension as the
student's ability to explain or to paraphrase the theodicy models pre-
sented, which we discuss more at length below (cf. section 5.1.3). And,
finally, theodicy education refers to an experimental theodicy
curriculum consisting ofa set of seven detailed lesson plans in which the
student learns to render a meaningful theodicy judgment and that also
implies comprehension of three ideal-typical theodicy models (section
4.1.2). Apart from these main concepts our conceptual model also
contains seven concepts concerning the background characteristics.
Degree of urbanisation regards the question of whether one is living in
more rural or more urban areas. Socioeconomic status refers to the social
class to which one belongs. Value orientation refers to the value
complexes one deems important for one's personal life. Church involve-
ment has to do with church membership, degree of church attendance
and participation in religious activities. The Religious belief variable
concerns the question of whether or not one is convinced of the
existence of an ultimate reality. Theodicy interest regards one's
willingness to respond to the theodicy issue as such. And, last but not le-
ast, formal reasoning ability refers to the student's degree of
hypothetical-deductive reasoning.
Having already defined the concepts contained in our conceptual
models, the next step is to consider the relationships between these
concepts. For this we examine the relationships that are basic to our
guiding research questions, after which we discuss the way in which the
background characteristics may relate to theodicy comprehension and
theodicy judgment.
To begin with, we consider the relationship between theodicy edu-
cation and theodicy comprehension, which is basic to the first research
question. We expect theodicy education to result in theodicy
comprehension. Now, why is that? Here, we expect the educational
measures we developed in order to facilitate learning theodicy models
to do their work. T'he experimental theodicy curriculum we designed on
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the behalf of our research not only contains semantical information
regarding three theodicy models, but contains additional information as
well. The student is also taught about a standard of rationality, to help
determine the differences in degree of rationality between theodicy
models and to help examine these models critically. This may help the
student to better understand the theodicy models. In the same way, the
theodicy curriculum considers theodicy models from the perspective of
the coping process in order to clarify the daily-life situations to which
theodicy models apply. Thus, the experiential basis of theodicy is also
explained, which may help the student identify with the learning task. In
our opinion, this is another educational measure, which may facilitate
learning theodicy models. Hence, our claim is that the theodicy
curriculum results in comprehension of theodicy models, because it
exhibits three features: it offers a narrow definition of each theodicy
model, it offers a standard of rationality applicable to theodicy and it is
attentive to the experiential basis of theodicy.
Next we consider the relationship that is basic to the second research
question, between theodicy education and theodicy judgment via
theodicy comprehension. We expect the experimental theodicy
curriculum to result in theodicy comprehension, which we expect will
subsequently influence theodicy judgment. To account for this con-
jecture we return to our reasoning from the third chapter. There, we
argued that theodicy judgment is pivotal to the religious coping with
suffering. Subsequently, we studied the role theodicy models play in
such an evaluative process. We discovered that cognitive understanding
of theodicy models is essential for the construction of a religious answer
to a situation of contingency, but we did not clarify the extent to which
it is essential. We claim that comprehension of the retaliation model
only results in a theodicy judgment in terms of the retaliation model. We
also claim that comprehension of both the retaliation model and the plan
model results in a theodicy judgment in terms of the plan model. And,
finally, we claim that comprehension of all three models results in a
theodicy judgment in terms of the compassion model. Theoretically, this
claim is based on the idea we elaborated in the first and second chapters,
that the three ideal-typical theodicy models we distinguished reveal
differences in degree of rationality. Because of its degree of abstraction
and logical consistency a rational theodicy model offers a more
satisfying answer to the problem of human suffering and thus is more
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appropriate in dealing with a situation of contingency. As a conse-
quence, to the extent theodicy judgment is constructed in terms of a
more rational theodicy model we expect the influence of theodicy
comprehension on theodicy judgment, an influence enhanced by
theodicy education, to increase accordingly.
This field research is meant to gather sufficient empirical support for
these proposed causal relationships: first, that the experimental theodicy
curriculum will result in comprehension of the three theodicy models (a
direct treatment effect relating to the first research question). And,
second, that the influence of theodicy comprehension will increase when
theodicy judgment is stated in terms of a more rational theodicy model
(an indirect treatment effect relating to the second research question).
However, causal relationships cannot be proven. A causal relationship
implies the existence of a link between cause and effect. It is only
possible to observe the absence or presence of a predicted effect, never
the cause of the effect. The cause is solely a matter of theoretical
inference or causal explanation (Popper 19863, 90-91). Our theoretical
assumptions thus predict (1) that the implementation of this specific
theodicy curriculum will result in increased comprehension of theodicy
models and (2) that theodicy comprehension thus acquired influences
theodicy judgment. If this really is the case, i.e. if the predicted effects
do occur the theoretical assumptions underlying our research question
are corroborated by empirical data. If, however, the predicted effects
remain absent, our theoretical assumptions prove to be false (Popper
19863, 18, 98; Van der Ven 1990, 94-95). Hence, what we are actually
trying to do is establish empirical support for the main theoretical
insights that have been elaborated throughout this study.
We end our discussion of the two conceptual models by discussing
how the background characteristics may relate to theodicy compre-
hension and theodicy judgment. Degree of urbanisation or town size is
relevant because town size affects church involvement. In the
Netherlands, town size does not directly affect the set of religious beliefs
a person adheres to, as it appears to in the United States (Batson 8z
Ventis 1982, 46), but it does affect church involvement. In the
Netherlands people who live in smaller communities and rural areas tend
to be more involved in church (Felling, Peters 8~ Schreuders 1986a, 88-
90), which, in turn, makes degree of urbanisation an interesting factor
to consider with regard to learning theodicy models. It is possible that
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students living in smaller communities and rural areas may have an
advantage over students living in urban centres of already being more
familiar with religious symbols and metaphors and being more used to
communicating about religious issues. Perhaps this makes them more
capable also of gaining comprehension of theodicy models and of
rendering a meaningful theodicy judgment.
In the same way, socioeconomic status seems of importance, because
it is linked to a person's educational level, which in turn, influences his
overall attitude towards religion. In the Netherlands, higher education
correlates to greater religious scepticism and willingness to accept
traditional religious beliefs (Felling et al. 1986a, 84-86). We assume that
the socioeconomic status of the students' parents may differ, which may
also affect their overall attitude towards religion. That is to say, students
of the higher and middle classes generally have parents whose educatio-
nal level is relatively high and these parents are inclined, we believe, to
raise their children towards religious scepticism. It seems useful,
therefore, to consider the socioeconomic background of the students'
parents included in our sample. If socioeconomic status really is bound
up with religious scepticism, then it is possible that students of the
higher and middle classes will have more trouble learning less rational
or traditional models, such as the retaliation and plan models, as well as
with rendering a theodicy judgment in terms of these models than
students of the lower classes may perhaps have. Students of the higher
and middle classes may even find it difficult to assume this learning task
in the field of theodicy education.
Apart from town size and socioeconomic status we also evaluated the
students' values. Value orientation is an important factor, because the
secular values held by individuals can be correlated to their religious
beliefs. We examine five value complexes: autonomy, hedonistic values,
social criticism, traditional achievement values and traditional family
values. A positive attitude towards religion correlates positively, for
instance, with traditional family values, and correlates negatively with
autonomy and hedonistic values (Felling et al. 1986a, 96-99). It is
possible then, that a positive attitude towards religion will benefit the
learning process regarding the three theodicy models, whereas a
negative attitude towards religion may hinder this process.
Another important background variable is church involvement. It has
been found that Christians who are more involved in church are not
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only more religious, but also adhere to more traditional, religious beliefs
(Halman, Heunks, De Moor 8z Zanders 1987, 33). Since our theodicy
cumculum deals with both modern and traditional theodicy models, this
factor is also of importance to us. If church involvement does actually
relate to a more traditional set of religious beliefs, then this implies that
the more involved students are in church, the more difficult it will be for
them to learn modern theodicy models such as the compassion model
and to render a theodicy judgment in terms of such a model.
Consequently, church involvement is an important factor to consider,
particularly with regard to comprehension of the compassion model and
theodicy judgment in terms of this model.
In addition to these demographic, social and cultural factors we also
look at the students' set of religious beliefs, in particular, whether or not
they are convinced of the existence ofan ultimate reality. The students'
degree of theodicy interest is also considered. These are both important
factors since one might assume that learning theodicy models and
rendering a theodicy judgment are facilitated to the extent the students
already concur with a Christian world-view and are interested in
theodicy issues.
There is one remaining factor that seems of importance to us. We
assess formal reasoning ability, because the ability to use formal modes
of reasoning is prerequisite, we believe, to the comprehension of
abstraction and logical consistency that are distinctive features of a
rational theodicy model. Application of this twofold standard of ra-
tionality (abstraction and logical consistency; section 2.1.1) adequately,
demands that students are already able to use formal modes of
reasoning. The sample in this study was drawn from the lower type of
secondary school (MAVO) in the Netherlands. It is likely that these
students vary in their formal reasoning ability. If this is the case, this
background variable could interfere with learning the compassion
model, which is the most abstract of the three models. And absence of
formal reasoning ability would then also interfere with making a
theodicy judgment in terms of the compassion model.
5.1.3 Research Design
We now account for the specific way our field research was arranged in
view of the two research questions. In order to determíne the effect of
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our experimental theodicy curriculum on theodicy comprehension as
well as its indirect effect on theodicy judgment, we created experimental
conditions in
Figure 5.3: The Untreated Control Group Design with Pretest and
Posttest
O, OZ X 03 Oq
.................................................................
~5 ~6 ~~ ~g
which this curriculum served as the `treatment', or intervention. The
experimental design is diagrammed in figure 5.3. Here, Xrepresents the
treatment, O represents an observation and the dashed line indicates that
the experimental and control groups we used were not randomly formed.
This `untreated control group design with pretest and posttests' is very
useful for testing causal assumptions (cf. Cook 8z Campbell 1979, 95,
103-112).
In this design, the experimental and control groups simultaneously
receive similar pretests regarding theodicy comprehension (O, and OS)
and theodicy judgment (OZ and O6) as well as a posttest regarding
theodicy comprehension (03 and O,) and theodicy judgment (Oa and O8).
Between the pre and post testing, the treatment (X) is implemented in
the experimental group. By implementing this design we can, with the
help of regression analysis, determine the effects of this curriculum on
theodicy comprehension and theodicy judgment.
One weakness to this design is that, as indicated by the dashed line
in figure 5.3, we used non-random existing groups in our field research.
Under these conditions it is ímpossible to control for confounding
variables to the same extent that would be possible in laboratory
research. Thus, this research design is called a quasi-experiment. The
control and experimental groups were not chosen at random, and they
were not matched to control for differences in the background variables.
This could constitute a serious threat to the internal validity of our
design ifit tums out that the groups differed significantly with regard to
the background variables.
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To control for this threat to the internal validity of our research, the
experimental and control groups were compared with respect to the
following relevant background variables we identified earlier: degree of
urbanisation, socioeconomic status, value orientation, church in-
volvement, religious beliefs, theodicy interest and formal reasoning
ability (section 5.1.2). This is called frequency matching and it is meant
to check whether there are equivalent pairs for each variable in both
groups. If this is the case, the frequency of each variable occurs at the
same rate in both groups, and the differences in the two groups' posttest
scores cannot be attributed to the influence ofthis particular background
variable (Segers 8t, Hagenaars 1980, 32-33). If, there are significant
differences between the experimental group and the control group with
regard to any of these background variables, then these particular
variables may in part determine the posttest scores. By considering the
influence of the background characteristics that differ significantly
between the control and experimental groups on posttest scores, the
threat attached to the use of non randomised, existing groups may be
assessed, thus increasing the internal validity of our research design
(Cook 8z Campbell 1979, 37-38).
5.1.4 Measurement Instruments
During our field research we made use of several instruments for
measurement of the following variables contained in the conceptual
models: theodicy judgment (dependent variable), theodicy compre-
hension (intervening variable), degree of urbanisation, socioeconomic
status, value orientation, church involvement, religious belief, theodicy
interest and formal reasoning ability (background characteristics).
Below, we consider each instrument separately.
Theodicy judgment
In accordance with the definition stated earlier in this study (section
3.1.2), we define theodicy judgment as a decision-making process that
results in a religious answer, stated in terms of the retaliation model, the
plan model or the compassion model, to the dilemma invoked by
innocent human suffering: the dilemma of whether to renounce or seek
help from faith. To measure this decision-making process, we consider
the two prevailing methods of ineasuring moral judgment.
128 LEARN[NG THEODICY
Lawrence Kohlberg, one of the leading scholars involved in moral
judgment research, defines moral judgment in terms of reasoning about
justice. According to Kohlberg (1981, 116-117, 143, 194), rendering a
moral judgment is a decision based on a certain concept of justice or
fairness with respect to a moral conflict, that is, a conflict between
competing and conflicting claims of people. In this respect, Kohlberg
(1981, 128, 409-412; Rest 1979, 22-23) identifies distinctive concepts
ofjustice that exhibit an ordinal relationship. At a preconventional level
justice or fairness is related to obedience to rules and to instrumental
exchange. At a conventional level there is an orientation to mutual
interpersonal expectations and to upholding the social order. And,
finally, at a postconventional level justice or fairness is related to
upholding basic rights and to the commitment to universal ethical
principles. With the help of these distinctive concepts Kohlberg
attempted by discovering how people account for the moral choices to
determine stages of moral development. Kohlberg's focuses mainly on
decision-making and justifying processes regarding morality. He was
less attentive to issues such as the individual's readiness to actually
apply moral values (Van Haaften 1986, 83-84).
This is a cognitive approach to morality that compliments our ap-
proach to theodicy judgment. We are also interested in the role cognition
plays in rendering a theodicy judgment. We would like to know how
students use the theodicy models they have learned to account for their
choices in favour of religious commitment, when faced with human
suffering. The similarities between Kohlberg's approach and our
understanding of theodicy judgment allow us to adopt the measurement
techniques used to elicit a moral judgment to measure theodicy
judgment. This, however, does not mean that we also accept the
theoretical implications of Kohlberg's theory. It is not our intention to
restrict theodicy judgment to cognitive processing alone (section 4.1.2),
or to raise any kind of developmental-logical claim.
When it comes to measuring moral judgment two methods prevail:
the Semi-Clinical Interview and the Defining Issues Test. The Semi-
Clinical Interview method was originally designed by Piaget and was
elaborated further by Kohlberg to facilitate his moral judgment research.
In order to elicit a moral judgment, Kohlberg confronts a respondent
with a moral dilemma and several standardised, open-ended questions.
The respondent then produces a solution to the moral dilemma as well
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as justifications for the solution (Hinder 1987, 24-29). To illustrate this
kind of Moral Judgment Interview we refer to Kohlberg's famous
Heinz-dilemma, which is represented below together with the additional,
standardised questions (Kohlberg 1984, 640-641).
HEINZ (Semi-Clinical Interview Version)
In Europe, a woman was near death from a special kind ofcancer. There was one drug
that the doctors thought might save her. It was aform of radium that a druggist in the
same town had recently discovered. The drug was expensive to make, but the druggist
was charging ten times what the drug cost him to make. He paid ~ó400 for the radium
and charged ~54.000 for a sma[I dose of the drug. The sick woman's husband, Heinz,
went to everyone he knew to borrow the money and tried every legal means, but he could
only get together about á2.000, which is halfof what it cost. He told the druggist that
his wife was dying, and asked him to sel! it cheaper or let him pay later. But the druggist
said: "No, I discovered the drug and 1'm going to make money from it. " So, having tried
every legal means, Heinz gets desperate and considers breaking into the man 's store to
steal the drugfor his wife.
1 Should Heinz steal the drug?
Why or why not?
2 Is it actually right or wrong for him to steal the drug?
Why is it right or wrong?
3 Does Heinz have a duty or obligation to steal the drug?
Why or why not?
4 If Heinz does not love his wife, should he steal the drug for her? (If subject favours
not stealing ask: Does it make a difference in what Heinz should do whether or not
he loves his wife?)
Why or why not?
5 Suppose the person dying is not his wife but a stranger. Should Heinz steal the drug
for the stranger?
Why or why not?
6 (If subject favours stealing the drugfor a stranger) Suppose it's a pet animal he
loves. Should Heinz steal to save the pet animal?
Why or why not?
7 Is it important for people to do everything they can to save another's life?
Why or why not?
8 It is against the law for Heinz to steal. Does that make it morally wrong?
Why or why not?
9 In general, should people try to do everything they can to obey the law?
Why or why not?
How does this apply to what Heinz should do?
10 In thinking back over the dilemma, what should you say is the most responsible thing
for Heinz to do?
v~,l,y?
The Defining Issues Test (DIT), in contrast, is a multiple-choice test for
assessing moral judgment designed by James Rest a research associate
of Kohlberg. The DIT also confronts a respondent with a moral
dilemma, but the way the respondent is asked to account for his or her
solution differs. Here, the respondent is asked to determine or to define
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the crucial and important issues in a moral dilemma. In this way, the
DIT reveals the moral perspective from which the respondent perceives
the moral problem (Rest 1979, 84-85), whereas the Semi-Clinical
Interview offers a more profound insight into the justifying processes
underlying moral judgment. In order to illustrate the differences between
the Semi-Clinical Interview method and the Defining Issues Test, the
DIT-version of the Heinz-dilemma is represented below (Rest 1979,
291).
HEINZ (DIT Version)
In Europe, a woman was near deathfrom a special kind of cancer. There was one drug
that the doctors thought might save her. It was aform ofradium that a druggist in the
same town had recently discovered. The drug was expensive to make, but the druggist
was charging ten times what the drug cost him to make. He paid á400for the radium
and charged ,84.000 for a small dose of the drug. The sick woman's husband, Heinz,
went to everyone he knew to borrow the money and tried every legal means, but he could
only get together about 52.000, which is halfof what it cost. He told the druggist that
his wife was dying, and asked him to sell it cheaper or let him pay later. But the druggist
said: "No, I discovered the drug andI'm going to make money from it. " So, having tried
every legal means, Heinz gets desperate and considers breaking into the man's store to
steal the drugjor his wife.
Should Heinz stea) the drug?
Should steal it- Cannot decide- Should not steal it-
IMPORTANCE:
Great Much Some Little No
-1 Whether a community's laws are going to be
upheld?
-2 Isn't it only natural for a loving husband to care
so much for his wife that he'd steal?
-3 Is Heinz willing to risk getting shot as a burglar
or going to jail for the chance that stealing the
drug mighthelp?
-4 Whether Heinz is a professional wrestler, or has
considerable influence with professional
wrestlers?
-5 Whether Heinz is stealing for himself or doing
this solely to help someone else?
-6 Whether the druggist's rights to his invention
have to be respected?
-7 Whether the essence of living is more encom-
passing than the termination of dying, socially
and individually?
-S What values are going to be the basis for go-
veming how people act towards each other?
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-9 Whether the druggist is going to be allowed to
hide behind a worthless law which only protects
the rich anyhow?
-] 0 Whether the law in this case is getting in the way
of the most basic claim of any member of
society?
-11 Whether the druggist deserves to be robbed for
being so greedy and cruel? ~
-12 Would stealing in such a case bring about more
total good for the whole of society or not?
From the list ofquestions above, select the four most important:
Most important- Second most important-
Third most important- Fourth most important-
Which method is more appropriate for measuring theodicy judgment?
Although both methods may be useful, we prefer the DIT on the basis
of inethodological considerations. Not only is the Semi-Clinical In-
terview a rather intricate method, but the objectivity of the test may also
be questioned. The way the interview is conducted may very well
influence the subject' responses. By posing certain standardised
questions the interviewer for instance may elicit answers a subject would
never have come to think alone. This critique applies to what Hinder
(1987, 60-62) calls the `Durchfi.ihrungsobjektiviti3t'. Second, the
objectivity is threatened by the difficulty in scoring the interview
material. There is always a gap between the subjects' actual responses
of the subject and the theoretical concepts underlying the questions.
Consequently, the scoring of the interview material partly involves a
subjective interpretation by the scorer. This critique applies to the
`Auswertungsobjektivitát' (Hinder 1987, 62-65; Rest 1979, 88). In short,
when the Semi-Clinical Interview method is used, there is a risk that the
data is not gathered independently from the interviewer or scorer and,
therefore, lacks objectivity (Hinder 1987, 59).
On the basis of these critical remarks we avoid using open-ended
questions, preferring the defining issues task set by Rest as well as the
format of the DIT in order to measure theodicy judgment. The DIT
consists of four steps (Rest 1979, 86-95; Hinder 1987, 84-87). The first
two steps correspond with the first and second steps of the Semi-Clinical
Interview. A hypothetical dilemma is presented, then the subject is asked
what should be done in the hypothetical situation. Next the subject rates
twelve statements, which exemplify the different concepts ofjustice or
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fairness, in terms of their importance in producing a solution to a moral
dilemma. Finally the subject selects the most important four of the
twelve statements, and ranks them in order of importance. On the basis
of these four items ranked as most important, Rest (1979, 100-101)
finally calculates the so-called P-index, which expresses the relative
importance of postconventional or principled (P) moral considerations
in making a moral decision. With regard to the above DIT-version of the
Heinz-dilemma postconventional moral reasoning is represented by item
8, item 10 and item 12.
The method we adopt for measuring theodicy judg-ment is based on
the DIT. We present a hypothetical contingency dilemma, regarding a
situation of innocent human suffering, and ask the respondent to decide
what should be done in this situation: whether to renounce faith or
maintain religious commitment (section 3.1.1). The respondent must
then rate three religious considerations that exernplify the three theodicy
models, in terms oftheir importance for producing a religious answer to
a contingency dilemma. This rating task is meant to reveal the
predominant perspective or theodicy model from which the respondent
perceives the problem represented by the contingency dilemma. This
instrument does not have a ranking task. Calculating an index based on
the ranking task would only offer information regarding the relative
importance of religious considerations that arise from the most rational
model. Since this investigation concerns the specific relationship
between comprehension of the three theodicy models and theodicy
judgment in terms of these models, the theodicy judgment scores are
calculated separately for each model.
With regard to each theodicy model we calculate an average score
based on the rating task with respect to four hypothetical contingency
dilemmas. In addition to the Birgit example shown here, we designed
three other hypothetical contingency dilemmas. These were used to
acquire information about the importance of the various religious
considerations involved in rendering a theodicy judgment. For each
respondent who decides that the principle character in the hypothetical
dilemma should not renounce faith, average scores are calculated for
each of the three theodicy models. Thus, three scales were used to
measure theodicy judgment. Each scale consisted of four items of the
Likert type. These scales were meant to measure the importance as-
cribed to basically identical religious considerations, from one particular
THEODICY RESEARCH 133
theodicy model, in deciding whether or not to seek help from faith in the
face of suffering
BIRGIT
Birgit, a fifteen-year-old girl, suffers from a serious eye disease. Recently she has
undergone a severe operatiazfor her illness, which unfortunately failed. Consequently,
Birgit will remain blind for the rest of here life. When the doctor informs her about her
predicament Birgit is desperate and very sad, life appears meaningless to her. The
hospital chaplain visits Birgit. He tells her that she has to put her trust in God and seek
comfort and support in herfaith. Birgit, however, finds this very hard. She does not have
faith in God and she does not believe that God helps people. '7f God helpspeople, why
did 1 became ill in the first place ", she asks herself. Birgit does not know what to do;
whether to seek comfort and support in God or to renounce herfaith.
Should Birgit seek comfort and support in God?
Yes- Cannot decide- No-
If you were Birgit, how importan[ would each of these considerations be in deciding
whether to seek comfort and support in God?
IMPORTANCE:
Great Much Some Little No
-1 Whether Birgit's eye disease is a divine punish-
ment?
-2 Whether God is compassionate with a sick
person?
-3 Whether the illness of Birgit is part of a divine
Pl~?
Do these four items indeed measure one and the same characteristic?
These items are theoretically seen as a set of interrelated variables that
represent one major variable. This view is supported by both factor
analysis and reliability analysis. For each scale Cronbach's alpha even
exceeds .80; a-.83 with regard to the scale representing the retaliation
model; a-.82 with regard to the scale representing the plan model and
a-.86 with regard to the scale representing the compassion model. The
four hypothetical contingency dilemmas as well as the additional figures
regarding scale construction are represented in appendix I.
Theodicy comprehension
Although we have already offered a definition of theodicy compre-
hension, the question of how to demonstrate this comprehension re-
mains. This question touches upon the issue of the performance or
intellectual operations involved in comprehension. In the previous
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chapter we analysed the learning task implied in leaming theodicy and
concluded that leaming theodicy, and learning theodicy models involves
learning defined concepts (section 4.2.2). Hence, when designing an
appropriate measurement instrument we must determine how an
individual can demonstrate the acquisition of defined concepts. Gagné
and Briggs suggest, "An individual is said to have learned a defined
concept when he can demonstrate the `meaning' of some particular class
of objects, events or relations (...). Demonstration of the meaning is
emphasised in order to establish a distinction between this kind of
mental processing and the kind involved in memorised verbal
information such as the statement "An alien is a citizen of a foreign
country"" (Gagné and Briggs 1979~, 66;Gagné 19854, 113-118). The
defined concept is understood when the individual can demonstrate its
meaning.
De Corte's (1973) previously mentioned classification system of
educational objectives is of use in determining how one can demonstrate
the meaning of a defined concept. On the basis of Guilford's SI Model
(section 3.2.1), De Corte distinguishes between reproductive and
productive skills. According to this distinction, demonstrating the
meaning ofa defined concept is a productive skill. It involves a task set
that cannot be dealt with by reproductive processes alone. De Corte
(1973, 152) subdivides productive skills into four operation categories
that each exhibit a different degree of complexity: interpretative
production of information, convergent production of information,
evaluative production of information and divergent production of
information. Demonstrating the meaning of defined concepts refers to
interpretative production of information, the less complex operation
category, while all other more complex operation categories pertain to
the application of previously learned information. Interpretative
production occurs when an individual can explain the main line of
thought in a given communication. Other appropriate action verbs to
denote interpretative production include to explain, to elucidate, to
summarise or to paraphrase information. These verbs indicate that a
productive skill is called upon without referring to the application of
previously learned information (De Corte 1973, 160). Hence, students
can demonstrate comprehension of the meaning of a defined concept,
such as a theodicy model, when they are able to explain or to para-
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phrase such a concept. Explaining or paraphrasing the meaning of a
given communication is considered a good indicator ofcomprehension.
In this study, comprehension of theodicy models was measured using
a multiple choice test consisting of twelve items in which each theodicy
model was represented by four items. Two examples of such multiple
choice items are shown below. The first item presents the respondent an
"God, I trust you to chance all things for the better. "
This statement fits in best with?
A The retaliation model.
B The compassion model.
C The plan model.
D None of these models.
Why is God an overall gooddeity according to the Compassion model?
A Because God ultimately puts an end to all human suffering.
B Because God has nothing to do with human suffering.
C Because God does not punish people, but instead wishes them well.
D Because God's compassion renders comfort and support to all people.
expression of faith and then asks which theodicy model is revealed by
this expression, and the second item asks for the specific way the divine
goodness is safeguarded by the compassion model. Both items measure
comprehension by asking the respondent to relate a certain paraphrase,
relatively unknown to the respondent, to a certain theodicy model, or to
explain how a certain theodicy model meets the demand of reconciling
the divine goodness to the existence of human suffering. We still need
to consider, with regard to the measurement instrument itself, whether
this test is a suitable and reliable instrument for measuring educational
achievement.
The degree of difficulty, whether the test items really measure educa-
tional achievement, is expressed by the p-values of the different items.
A p-value is computed by dividing the number ofrespondents (P) who
select the right answer at the posttest by the number of respondents
included in the entire sample (p - P: N); in this case the respondents
who were members of the experimental group. The p-values closer to
one denote less difficult items; p-values closer to zero denote more
difficult items. According to De Groot and Van Naerssen (1969, 249-
250), a p-value less than .45 indicates that an item is too difficult, while
a p-value more than .85 indicates that an item is too easy. Items that fall
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outside the .45 -.85 range have been removed from the analysis, since
they cannot be considered proper items for measuring educational
achievement.
In addition to the p-values, we have calculated a-values to evaluate
the objectivity of test items. A-values reflect the frequency of incorrect
answers. If an a-value is almost equal to or greater than the p-value, then
the test item is ambiguous. This can happen when the incorrect answer
is not really incorrect, or if the correct answer is not really correct. When
an a-value is close to zero, few respondents choose the incorrect
alternatives; these items do not appear to be serious alternatives (De
Groot 8c Van Naerssen 1969, 249-250). As a consequence, test items
with a-values almost equal to or greater than the p-values or with a-
values close to zero should also be removed from the test.
To assess the reliability of a measurement instrument we must
determine the extent to which the scores can be attributed to chance.
Reliability refers to the extent to which the test actually measures what
it claims to measure: differences in level of theodicy comprehension.
This is detennined by evaluating the internal consistency of the test.
Internal consistency can be evaluated by computing the correlation
coefficients of the items which are meant to measure the same
performance (ruvalues) and by computing Cronbach's alpha (a) for the
entire test and its sub scales. R;~values depend upon the number sample
size. Cronbach's alpha depends upon the number of test items (De Groot
8r. Van Naerssen 1969, 50-51). In this study, the experimental group
included more than 250 respondents (section 5.2.1), which means that
the r;~-values should be more than .15 (p ~.001). With regard to
Cronbach's alpha the following criteria were applied: a?.60 for each
sub scale (four items) and a?.80 for the entire test (twelve items) (Van
der Ven 1990, 169).
With the help ofthese criteria we measured the difficulty and objecti-
vity of each test item as well as the reliability ofthe test as a whole. The
test items and the additional figures can be found in appendix II. Three
test items that did not meet the above-mentioned demands were removed
from the test. Item 1, which was meant to measure comprehension ofthe
retaliation model, and item 6, meant to measure comprehension of the
compassion model, were too difficult (p-values of .18 and .29
respectively). Items 1 and 10, also meant to measure comprehension of
the retaliation model, contained a-values greater than the respective p-
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values. Therefore, items 1, 6, and 10 were not appropriate for measuring
theodicy comprehension and were removed from the test. As a result,
theodicy comprehension was measured using a multiple choice test of
nine items. The r;~values of the remaining items were al] more than .15
(p ~.001). Cronbach's alpha, however, was in all instances too low; a
-.61 for the entire test of nine items, a-.28 for the sub scale regarding
the retaliation model, a-.40 for the sub scale regarding the plan model
and a-.42 for the sub scale regarding the compassion model.
Several other instruments were used to measure the relevant background
characteristics: degree of urbanisation, socio-economic status, value
orientation, church involvement, religious belief, theodicy interest and
formal reasoning ability. The data is represented in appendix III.
Degree of urbanisation
Town size or degree of urbanisation was measured using the classifi-
cation system of Dutch municipalities designed by the Dutch Central
Bureau of Statistics (CBS 1991). For convenience, we reduced the
twelve categories distinguished by the CBS to three main categories:
rural municipalities (1), urbanised rural municipalities (2) and urban
centres (3).
Socio-economic status
To determine socio-economic status we asked respondents to list both
of their parent's occupation. Their answers were classified into one of
four employment-status categories based on the seven categories dis-
tinguished by Felling, Peters 8c Schreuder (1986b, 181-182): labou-
rers~low level employees (1), mid level employees (2), higher occupati-
ons (3) and housewives~men(4).
Value orientation
In accordance with Felling, Peters and Schreuder, we understand values
or value complexes as "the complexes of genera] aims that people strive
for, the ultimate foundations ofinen's motives" (Felling et al. 1986b, 2).
To measure the extent to which the respondent concurs with the five
value complexes (autonomy, hedonistic values, social criticism,
traditional family values and traditional achievement values), the re-
spondents were asked to rate several statements in terms of their im-
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portance for their personal lives on a five-point Likert scale. Five
statements or items represented traditional family values, traditional
achievement values, autonomy and social criticism were represented by
four items, and hedonistic values were represented by two items. Factor
analysis and reliability analysis confirmed that these respective items
represented five major variables or scales. The exact figures regarding
scale construction can be found in appendix III. For each scale an
example of a statement or item is given below:
A traditional family values: "Living for your family."
B traditional achievement values: "Being in a good financial situation."
C autonomy: "Being able to do whatever you like."
D social criticism: "Active commitment to a society in which everyone has a choice."
E hedonistic values: "Having fun."
Church involvement
Church involvement was measured by combining answers to several
questions regarding church membership ("Do you consider yourself a
member of a Christian church?", "What Christian church are you af-
filiated with?", "Are you a former member of a Christian church or
religious group?", "What Christian church or religious groups were you
affiliated with?", and "Are~were your parents members of a Christian
church or religious group?") along with several questions regarding
religious activities (praying, attending religious services, watching
religious services on radio or television, discussing faith issues and
being active in church associations), which resulted in six church-
involvement categories (Felling et al. 1986a, 60-66): second generation
of unchurched (1), first generation of unchurched (2), former church me-
mbers (3), marginal church members (4), modal church members (5) and
core church members (6).
Religious belief
The primary issue with respect to religious belief is transcendence
(Felling et al. 1986a, 42-43). Religious convictions conceming the
existence of an ultimate reality can be classified into three religious
outlooks. The theistic outlook concerns the existence of a personal deity,
the deistic outlook concerns the existence of an impersonal deity or
supernatural power, and the immanent or world-directed outlook rejects
the existence of a transcendent reality. The respondents were asked to
rate several statements regarding these different outlooks on a five-point
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Likert scale. The deistic outlook was represented by three items, and the
theistic and world-directed outlooks were each represented by two items.
Factor analysis and reliability analysis revealed that the items did
measure the particular religious outlooks they were meant to measure
(appendix III). Statements that represent each outlook include:
A theism: "There is a God, who is involved with every human being."
B deism: "I believe in the existence of a supreme deity."
C immanentism: "God only exists in the hearts of man."
7ïieodicy interest
According to Krathwohl's taxonomy ofeducational objectives (affective
domain) theodicy interest concerns the respondent's willingness to
respond to the theodicy issue (Krathwohl 2.2.; Van der Ven 1982, 530-
534). Factor analysis and reliability analysis confirmed that the four
statements we used to determine theodicy interest did represent this one
major variable (appendix III). Respondents rated statements such as the
following on a five-point Likert scale.
A"I would be interested in taking a course about the relationship between religious
faith and suffering"
B"I am prepared to look into the religious faith of people who suffer."
Formalreasoning ability
The Test of Logical Thinking (TOLT) devised by Tobin and Capie
(1981) was used to measure the respondent's ability to use formal modes
of reasoning. With the help of the TOLT we determined the extent to
which the respondent was capable of hypothetical-deductive reasoning
(Piaget and Inhelder 1969, 132). The TOLT measures five modes of
formal reasoning (Tobin and Capie 1981, 415; Piaget 8i Inhelder 1969,
140-144): proportional reasoning (comparing proportions), probabilistic
reasoning (calculate the probability of a certain outcome to occur),
combinatorial reasoning (calculate the amount of possible
combinations), correlational reasoning (comparing different amounts)
and reciprocity (relations between weights and lengths of the arms of a
balance). Each mode of formal reasoning is represented by two items
thus the entire test consisted of ten items in a multiple choice format.
The respondent must select the con-ect responses from five alternatives.
Then, to ascertain whether the respondent really used formal modes of
reasoning, the respondent had to identify the correct justification for that
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response. When correct responses and correct justifications were
identified for at least four items, the respondent was considered capable
of hypothetical-deductive reasoning. If the respondent selected con ect
responses and additional justifications for only three items, then the
respondent was classified in a transitional stage between concrete and
formal thought. And when only one item was correct, the respondent
was classified as being capable ofconcrete thought alone.
5.2 F[ELD WOruc
Several issues were involved in the actual performance of the field
research. First we will discuss the justification for choosing the research
population and the research sample. We will also discuss the
organisation and performance of the field research, offer a general
description of the research sample and compare the characteristics of the
experimental and control groups.
5.2.1 Research Population: Third GradeMA v0-Students
We have previously argued that the problem of theodicy is a desirable
and important subject matter for religious education (section 4.1.1). This
study involved third grade students of lower level secondary schools
(MAVO). It might seem that these students are too young to deal with
such a profound and serious topic, or that they lack the intellectual
capability and intellectual maturity to deal with theodicy as a subject.
Research indicates (Schweitzer, Nipkow, Faust-Siehl and Krupka
1995, 73-79; Hutsebaut 1995, 79, 89, 93), however, that even at this age
young people already feel that there is a tension between their worldly
experiences and the Christian faith in an omnipotent and overall good
deity. An insight which even makes Nipkow conclude: "Wo immer die
Kirche gegeniiber jungen Menschen p~dagogische Verantwortung hat,
ist die Theodizeefrage vorrangig zu behandeln" (Nipkow 1987, 57).
Therefore, the problem of theodicy is a suitable subject matter for
students of this particular level and age-group. Indeed, religious
education cannot avoid the problem of theodicy. There is a need for
educational processes that coincide with the students' every-day ex-
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periences. Young people see and experience terrible things and become
aware of the fact that suffering is an integral part ofhuman life.
Curriculum theorists also support our claim that the problem of
theodicy is a suitable subject-matter for third grade MAVO-students. Of
typical interest is J.S. Bruner's concept of the `spiral curriculum' (Van
der Ven 1982, 557-558), indicating that not only can every topic be
learned at any age, but, moreover, that these topics need to be learned at
younger ages, to ensure success at learning these topics in a more
broader and mature sense later in life. Following Piaget, Bruner
distinguishes between enactive operations that relate to Píaget's pre-
operational stage, in which the child is only able to learn by undertaking
activities in his environment; iconic operations, referring to Piaget's
concrete-operationa] stage, in which the child learns by making concrete
representations of the surrounding world; and symbolic operations,
which refers to Piaget's formal-operational stage in which the child can
learn by using symbolic language in order to hypothesise about the
surrounding world. With regard to theodicy this means that a young
child is not yet able to learn or comprehend theodicy models, but is able
to put flowers on grandma's grave (enactive operation) or to make a
drawing of grandma who is now in heaven (iconic operation). These
examples illustrate that at an early age it is possible to deal with the
experience of loss as a curriculum topic.
Consequently, the issue is not whether theodicy is a suitable subject
matter for third grade MAVO-students, but rather it is whether this topic
is presented to these students in accordance with their level of cognitive
development. Since the average age of third grade students is between
14 and 15 years, we may expect that most of these students are already
capable of symbolic operations and thus are able to learn theodicy
models. At this age, learning theodicy is not only possible, it is
desirable, in order to put basic experiences of suffering in a more
comprehensive, conceptual framework.
5.2.2 Sampling andData Collection
This field research was conducted among third grade-MAVO students
of Roman Catholic secondary schools in two southern Dutch dioceses:
Breda and `s-Hertogenbosch. A sample was drawn from these third
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grade MAVO-students, since it would have been impossible to submit
this entire population to our experiment.
We randomly selected thirty schools to form the experimental group
and fifteen schools to form the control group, from an existing list of all
Roman Catholic MAVO-schools in both dioceses. The teachers
responsible for religious education in each school were contacted and
asked whether he or she would be willing to participate in our research.
This request was made by telephone after the teacher had received
written information regarding our research and the experimental
theodicy curriculum. Eventually, twelve teachers, who together were
responsible for thirty-eight classes, agreed to take part in the
experimental group, and nine teachers, responsible for twenty-five
classes, agreed to take part in the control group. There were two
predominant reasons cited by the teachers who declined the invitation
to participate. First, religious education was no longer part of the cur-
riculum for third graders at a number of schools, making it impossible
for the teacher to participate. And second, several teachers were pre-
pared to participate, but not during the exact period they were asked to
do so. Some teachers had just begun a new series of lessons and were
unwilling to interrupt this in favour of our theodicy curriculum. Hence,
twenty-one teachers remained who were willing to cooperate, which by
the end of September 1990 left us with a sample of 1641 students.
After agreeing to participate, the teachers were more thoroughly
informed about the research design and the guiding research questions.
The twelve teachers in the experimental group were invited to a meeting
held at the Theological Faculty Tilburg (November 1990). During this
meeting the teachers received information about the experimental
theodicy curriculum and detailed instructions for seven lesson plans
(section 4.2.2). The teachers were urged to follow these instructions as
closely as possible and to refrain from personal interpretations when
presenting the material. Detailed instructions regarding the pre and
posttest questionnaires were provided, including instructions on how to
use the questionnaires in the class-room and how the students had to
complete them. And, finally, the teachers received a table of dates with
regard to the execution of the field work indicating the exact period the
theodicy curriculum should be taught and when the pretest and posttest
measurement should occur. Teachers who could not attend this meeting
were visited personally by the researchers. Almost every teacher re-
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ceived detailed information about our research. The nine teachers who
agreed to participate in the control group were not invited to the
meeting. They only received detailed written information regarding the
pre and posttest questionnaires and the table of dates. To prevent
accidental manipulation or influence on the students' responses to the
questionnaires, the control group teachers did not receive information
regarding the experimental theodicy curriculum.
Shortly before Christmas 1990, the questionnaires and text-books
were delivered to the participating schools so that the pretest mea-
surement (O,, OZ and O5, O6) could occur during the first and second
week of January 1991. The teachers were asked to return the question-
naires as quickly as possible. However, two teachers, one participating
in the experimental group and responsible for three classes and one
participating in the control group and responsible for four classes, did
not comply with this request, and dropped out of the research. They felt
that participating in our research would take too much time. As a
consequence, we lost seven classes from our research sample, just before
the start of the field work. It was impossible to find replacements on
such short notice. After the pretest measurement, the theodicy
curriculum was taught in the experimental groups' classrooms. We
occasionally had contact with the teachers during this ten week period,
in order to see whether the theodicy curriculum proceeded as planned.
By the end of March 1991, the posttest questionnaires (03, 04 and O,,
O8) were delivered to the schools. Again the teachers were asked to
return the questionnaires as quickly as possible. As a result, most
questionnaires had been returned by the beginning of Apri] 1991. After
about two weeks we contacted the teachers who at that time had still not
retumed the questionnaires. Most of the remaining questionnaires were
returned shortly after this contact. However, two additional teachers, one
participating in the experimental group and responsible for four classes
and one participating in the control group and responsible for two
classes, never returned the posttest questionnaires, even though they
promised to do so several times. Thus by the end of April 1991, the
seventeen teachers who continued to cooperate with the field work had
returned all their questionnaires. In total, data collection occurred for
1241 students divided among fifty classes: thirty-one classes in the
experimental group and nineteen classes in the control group.
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Another 427 students who did not answer both the pre and posttest
questionnaires reduced the sample size. Illness or absence for other
reasons explains most of the missing data. In the end, therefore, there
were 814 complete data sets entered into the computer. T'his task was
finished by the end of may 1991. Finally, as a result of the 750~o check
(Van der Ven 1990, 166), the data sets of another 68 students were
removed from the data file because they gave answers in the same
category to more than 750~0 of the items belonging to a well-defined set,
which rendered their responses unreliable. As a consequence, our sample
decreased to a total of 746 third grade MAVO-students coming from
sixteen different schools. The experimental group includes 462 students
and the control group 284 students.
5.2.3 Description of the Sample
The background characteristics provide a general picture ofthe students
involved in our research. The sample included 415 girls and 326 boys
(appendix III table 1), ranging in age from 14 years to 18 years, with an
average age of 15.6 years (appendix III table2).
With regard to town size or degree of urbanisation (appendix III
table 4) the students lived primarily in urban~rural, rural municipalities
(46.90~0) and urban centres (44.10~0). Only a small number lived in rural
municipalities (8.So~o).
As far as socio-economic status is concerned, the father's occupa-
tions were classified as labourersnow level employees (40.So~o), mid
level employees (30.20~0), higher occupations (19.80~0) and houseman
(O.lo~o) (appendix III table 5). Their mothers were primarily occupied as
housewives (41.70~0) or as labourer~low level employee (30.60~0). Only
a few indicated a mid level employee (9.20~0) or a higher occupation
(2.80~0) (appendix III table 6). However, a substantial part of the students
(15.70~0) did not answer this question, which suggests that the percentage
ofhousewives may be even higher.
Under the heading value orientation (appendix III table 8) the stu-
dents included in our sample deemed hedonistic values and traditional
achievement values of most importance for their personal life and
considered the values labelled social criticism the least important. On a
five-point Likert scale running from "unimportant" (1.0) up to "very
much important" (5.0), the average scores for the entire sample were:
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hedonistic values 4.6, traditional achievement values 4.1, traditiona]
family values 3.7, autonomy 3.1 and social criticism 2.9.
With respect to the six categories regarding church involvement
(appendix III table 10) two categories prevail: marginal church members
(28.60~0) and first generation of unchurched (13.10~0). Apart from these
figures, however, it is noteworthy that 9.70~0 of the students are still
modal church members and 5.90~o are core church members. This means
that, totalling marginal, modal and core church members, 44.20~0 of the
students consider themselves a member of a Christian church.
Furthermore, 7.20~0 of the students are former church members, while
9.7oro belong to the second generation of unchurched.
With respect to religious belief (appendix III table 12) the students
generally expressed doubt concerning the existence of an ultimate reality
in any form, theistic, deistic or immanent. On a five-point Likert scale
running from "not at all convinced" ( 1.0) up to "very much convinced"
(5.0), the average score for each outlook is close to "uncertain" (3.0):
immanent outlook 2.9, deistic outlook 2.9 and theistic outlook 2.8.
Uncertainty also prevails with regard to theodicy interest (appendix
III table 15) or the student's willingness to respond to the theodicy issue.
The average score of 2.7 is again close to "uncertain" (3.0).
Finally, we refer to formal reasoning ability. As expected in the
lower type of secondary schools (MAVO) involved in our research, only
38.60~0 of the students included in our sample were capable of
hypothetical-deductive reasoning. Another 27.20~0 of the students were
unable to use formal modes of reasoning at all, ]eaving 34.20~0 of the
students in a transitional stage between concrete and forma] thought
(appendix III table 17).
Analysis shows that there are statistically significant differences
between the experimental and contro] groups with respect to the fol-
lowing characteristics: degree of urbanisation, socio-economic status
(father's occupation), value orientation (autonomy) and formal rea-
soning ability. In general, the students in the experimental group were
from more urban areas than the students in the control group. Fur-
thermore, when measured according to their father's occupation, the
socio-economic status of the students in the experimental group was
lower than the socio-economic status of the students included in the
control group. With regard to value orientation, it appears that the
students in the experimental group deemed autonomy of more im-
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portance for their personal life than did the students in the control group.
And students in the control group were more able to use formal modes
of reasoning than were the students in the experimental group.
Thus in order to increase the internal validity of our research design
and to determine the treatment effect with greater accuracy, it is very
important to consider the possible influence these particular variables
may exert on the posttest scores. As variation in other variables is the
same in both the experimental group and the control group, possible
differences in posttest scores between these groups cannot be attributed
to the influence ofthese particular variables (section 5.1.3).
5.3 RESEARCH F(NDINGS
This field research was conducted to provide answers to two research
questions. The first question concerns the direct influence of the cur-
riculum on theodicy comprehension. The second question concerns the
indirect influence of the curriculum on theodicy judgment by way ofits
influence on theodicy comprehension. Furthermore, we expected the
influence of theodicy comprehension to increase to the extent theodicy
judgment is stated terms of a more rational theodicy model. Now,
whether these predicted effects really occurred we are about to see
below. We begin by considering our findings regarding the first research
question, and then examine our findings regarding the second question.
5.3.1 The Effect of the Curriculum on Theodicy Comprehension
Multiple regression analysis was used to determine the treatment effect
on theodicy comprehension, and explain the posttest scores. The posttest
scores for theodicy comprehension were the dependent variables and the
curriculum, pretest scores and background characteristics were the
independent variables (section 5.1.2; figure 5.1). It is important to
consider the influence of the pretest scores, since the degree of theodicy
comprehension shown by students prior to the implementation of the
curriculum may facilitate the learning process induced by this
intervention and thus may affect the posttest scores. Apart from the
curriculum and the pretest scores, the background charactenstics that
differ significantly between the experimental group and the control
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group must also be considered. These include degree of urbanisation,
socio-economic status (father's occupation), value orientation (auto-
nomy) and formal reasoning ability (cf. section 5.2.2). By treating the
pretest scores as well as the background characteristics as independent
variables, we control for possible student differences relevant to our
experiment, and thus are able to determine the treatment effect with
greater accuracy. The results of our analyses are represented in table 5.1,
table 5.2 and table 5.3
Two factors, the pretest scores concerning comprehension of the
model ((3 -.22) and the curriculum itself ((3 -.19), were of particular
importance in evaluating the posttest scores about comprehension of the
retaliation model (table 5.1) Comprehension ofthe retaliation model was
also influenced, though to a very small degree, by degree of urbanisation
(~3 --.08), the value complex autonomy (R --.08) and by formal
reasoning ability ((3 -.08). Overall, the influence of the pretest scores
and the influence ofthe curriculum were relatively significant.
Table 5.1: Comprehension of the Retaliation Model
variables j3 t-value sign.t RZadj..09
pretest compr. retal. .22 5.89 .000
curriculum .19 4.94 .000
urbanisation -.08 -2.16 .031
autonomy -.O8 -2.14 .032
formal reasoning ability .08 2.03 .042
With regard to comprehension of the plan model (table 5.2), the curri-
culum (R -.33) clearly appears to be the most important factor in
Table 5.2: Comprehension of the Plan Model
variables Q t-value sign.t RZadj..l4
curriculum .33 9.40 .000
pretest compr.plan .14 3.88 .000
formal reasoning ability .l 1 3.01 .002
explaining the posttest scores. This does not mean, however, that other
factors had no influence. The posttest scores concerning comprehension
of the plan model were also influenced by the respective pretest scores
((3 -.14) and by formal reasoning ability (~3 -.11). However, when
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compared to the influence of the curriculum, the influence of these fac-
tors was relatively small.
Fínally, with regard to comprehension of the compassion model
(table 5.3), the influence of two factors were especially apparent. The
posttest scores concerning the comprehension of the compassion model
have to be explained mainly in terms ofthe respective prestest scores ((3
-.22) and the curriculum ((3 -.21). Apart from these factors the posttest
scores concerning comprehension of the compassion model were
influenced by degree of urbanisation ((3 --.15) and formal reasoning
ability ((3 -.10). However, compared to the influence of the pretest
scores and cun iculum, the influence of these latter factors again
appeared to be relatively small.
Table 5.3: Comprehension of the Compassion Model
variables R r-value sign.t RZadj..ll
pretest compr. comp .22 6.09 000
curriculum .21 5.81 .000
urbanisation -.I S -4.14 .000
formal reasoning ability .10 2.82 .004
In our study, the variables with the most significant influence were the
curriculum and the pretest scores. With regard to comprehension of the
retaliation model, the pretest scores (R -.22) appeared to be even more
important than the influence of the curriculum (R -.19). The influence
of these same two factors was almost equal with regard to
comprehension of the compassion model; beta weights were .22 (pretest
scores) and .21 (curriculum) respectively. It was only in the
comprehension of the plan model that the influence of the curriculum ((3
-.33) clearly exceeded the influence of the pretest scores ((3 -.14).
Lastly, we present an overall picture of the influence the background
characteristics exerted on the posttest scores regarding theodicy
comprehension. Although the background characteristics did influence
theodicy comprehension, they did not represent very important factors
in explaining theodicy comprehension. Formal reasoning ability was the
only factor that influenced comprehension of all three theodicy models.
Beta weights were .08 for comprehension of the retaliation model, .11
for comprehension of the plan model and .10 for comprehension of the
compassion model. Thus to the extent the students were able to use
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formal modes of reasoning they were also capable of comprehending
theodicy models. Furthermore, comprehension ofthe compassion model
((3 --.15) and the retaliation model (R --.08) was influenced negatively
by degree of urbanisation. That is to say, students who acquired an
increased comprehension of the compassion model, and to a lesser
degree, the retaliation model, were usually from more rural areas. The
analyses also showed that the value complex of autonomy influenced
comprehension of the retaliation model ((3 --.08).This was a negative
relationship; those students who considered autonomy of less
importance for their personal life were more likely to comprehend the
retaliation model. Again we emphasize that the influence of the
background characteristics on theodicy comprehension is relatively
small. Theodicy comprehension is primarily explained by the pretest
scores and the curriculum.
Although the influence of the pretest scores certainly cannot be
neglected, the experimental theodicy curriculum was relatively suc-
cessful at improving theodicy comprehension especially with regard to
the plan model.
5.3.2 The Indirect Effect of the Curriculum on Theodicy Judgment
To determine whether the theodicy cun-iculum indirectly effected
theodicy judgment, we examined the factors that explain the posttest
scores regarding theodicy judgment. We used path analysis or multivari-
ate, multiple regression analysis in which the relationships between the
independent variables and their effect on the dependent variables were
studied. The posttest scores regarding theodicy judgment were the
dependent variables. The pretest scores, the curriculum, the theodicy
comprehension pretest and posttest scores and the background characte-
ristics were the independent variables. By treating the background
characteristics and pretest scores as independent variables, we controlled
for relevant differences in our student sample. Thus we were able to
determine the curriculums' effect with greater accuracy.
The results of the analyses are presented in a two ways. Figure 5.4,
figure 5.5 and figure 5.6 show the pathmodels, and the respective
statistics are represented in table 5.4, table 5.5 and table 5.6 With respect
to these statistics, the figures regarding the indirect effect for each
variable represent the product of the direct effect of this variable on the
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intervening variable, that is theodicy comprehension, and the direct ef-
fect of this intervening variable on theodicy judgment (Segers and
Hagenaars 1980, 295-298).
With regard to theodicy judgment in terms of the retaliation model
(figure 5.4 and table 5.4), the indirect influence of the
Figure 5.4: Pathmodel Regarding Theodicy Judgment in Terms of the
Retaliation Model
pretest judg. retal. .41
pretest compr.retal. ?2
~




formal reasoning ability- .OS
Table 5.4: Theodicy Judgment in Terms of the Retaliation Model
variables direct ( Q) indirect ((3) total (Q) RZadj..18
pretest judg. retal. .41 .41"
posttest compr. retal. .10 .10'
pretest compr. retal. .02 .02
curriculum .02 .02
urbanisation -.O1 -.O1
autonomy - .O1 -.Ol
formal reasoning ability .O1 .Ol
(p 5 .05; p 5 .Ol ~; p 5 .001'~`)
curriculum (~i -.02) is very small. As our findings point out, the posttest
scores concerning theodicy judgment in terms of the retaliation model
were, for the most part, explained by the respective pretest scores ((3
-.41) as well as, albeit to a much lesser degree, by the comprehension
posttest scores for the retaliation model (R -.10). Any influence by other
factors, including the curriculum, was almost entirely absent.
When it comes to theodicy judgment in terms of the plan model (fi-
gure 5.5 and table 5.5), the results were somewhat different. In this case,
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the influence of the prestest scores concerning theodicy judgment in
terms of the plan model ((3 -.40) was still the most important factor, fol-
lowed by the comprehension posttest scores for the plan model ((3 -.12)
and the comprehension pretest scores for the retaliation model ((3 -.09).
Nevertheless, the indirect influence of the treatment in this case was
increased to .04. The cun~iculum directly influenced theodicy judgment
using the plan model ((3 -.09). It was the third most important factor in
explaining the posttest scores. Still, when compared to the influence of
the respective pretest scores, the direct as we11 as the indirect influence
of the curriculum was relatively small.
Figure 5.5: Pathmodel Regarding Theodicy Judgment in Terms of the
Plan Model
pretest judg. plan .40
pretest compr.retal. .09
pretest compr. plan . 14 -~ posttest compr. -. 12~ posttest
plan. ~ judg.plan




Table 5.5: Theodicy Judgment in Terms of the Plan Model
variables direct ((i) indirect (R) total (p) Rzadj..19
pretest judg. plan .40 .40k'
posttest compr. plan .12 .12
pretest compr.retal. .09 .09
curriculum .09 .04 .09
pretest compr. plan .02 .02
formal reasoning ability .O1 .O1
(p 5.05; p 5.01'; P 5.001 ")
Finally, with regard to theodicy judgment in terms of the compassion
model (figure table 5.6 and table 5.6), the indirect influence of the
curriculum ((3 -.03) was again small. Here too, the influence of the
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pretest scores concerning theodicy judgment in terms ofthe compassion
model ((3 -.39) appeared to be most important followed by the posttest
scores concerning comprehension ofthe compassion model ((3 -.14) and
the pretest scores concerning comprehension ofthe plan model ((3 -.09).
The others factors, in tum, exerted their influence on theodicy judgment
in terms of the compassion model only indirectly and once again to only
a relatively small degree.
Figure 5.6: Pathmodel Regarding Theodicy Judgment in Terms of the
Compassion Model
pretest judg. comp. .39
pretest compr. plan .09
pretest con
curriculum .21 -~ posttest compr. -.14-~posttest
comp. judg. comp.
urbanisation -.15
formal reasoning ability- .10
Table 5.6: Theodicy Judgment in Terms of the Compassion Model
variables direct ( Q) indirect ( (3) total (R) RZadj..l9
pretest judg. comp. .39 .39~"
posttest compr. comp. .14 .14~
pretest compr. plan .09 .09
pretest compr. comp. .03 .03
curriculum .03 .03
urbanisation -.02 -.02
formal reasoning abílity .Ol .O1
(p~.OS;p~.01';p5.001~')
Now, in order to present an overall picture of our findings regarding the
indirect treatment effect, we discuss four features of the figures
presented above.
First, as our findings clearly indicate, the posttest scores regarding
theodicy judgment for the most part have to be explained in terms of the
influence of the respective pretest scores. Theodicy judgment scores
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express the importance students ascribe to theodicy considerations,
originating from our three theodicy models, in dealing with hypothetical
contingency dilemmas (section 5.1.3). Apparently, after the
implementation of the curriculum the students still found the same
theodicy considerations of importance as they did prior to the imple-
mentation of the curriculum. Therefore, we may conclude that our
curriculum was not that successful when it comes to facilitating theodicy
judgment.
Second, as we already expected, the curriculum's effect on theodicy
judgment was indeed almost entirely indirect. Although the influence of
the posttest scores regarding theodicy comprehension on theodicy
judgment remained relatively small when compared to the influence of
the pretest scores regarding theodicy judgment, the curriculum resulted
in comprehension of three theodicy models, which, in turn, influenced
theodicy judgment using these models. But there was also a direct
relationship between the curriculum and theodicy judgment using the
plan model. The relatively high beta weight ((3 -.09) concerning this
relationship, especially when compared to the small beta weights of the
indirect relationships between the curriculum and theodicy judgment,
indicates that we cannot neglect the influence of the curriculum. Thus,
not only was the indirect influence of the curriculum on theodicy
judgment relatively small; it exerted its strongest influence on theodicy
judgment in a direct way.
Third, in spite of the rather small influence of theodicy compre-
hension on theodicy judgment, it did reveal the expected pattern. That
is to say, to the extent theodicy judgment was put in terms of a more
rational theodicy model the influence of theodicy comprehension also
increased. The beta weight concerning the relationship between com-
prehension of the retaliation model and theodicy judgment using this
model was .10. For the relationship between comprehension of the plan
model and theodicy judgment using the plan model, the beta weight was
.12. And for the relationship between comprehension of the compassion
model and theodicy judgment using the compassion model, the beta
weight increased to .14. Naturally, the differences between these various
beta weights are relatively small, but they still reveal an interesting
pattern in view of our theoretical considerations. In another interesting
phenomenon, theodicy judgment was not influenced by comprehension
of more rational theodicy models than the one in terms of which the
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judgment itself was put. Theodicy judgment in terms of the retaliation
model was only influenced by comprehension of the retaliation model
(pretest and posttest scores), theodicy judgment in terms of the plan
model was influenced by comprehension of the retaliation model
(pretest scores) and the plan model (pretest and posttest scores) and
theodicy judgment in terms of the compassion model was influenced by
comprehension of the plan model (pretest scores) and the compassion
model itself (pretest and posttest scores). However, when we consider
these results from the point of view of the (in)direct effect of the
curriculum, it turns out that our experimental theodicy curriculum
particularly promotes theodicy considerations that stem from a less
rational theodicy model; i.e. the plan model. Thus although these
patterns themselves are in accordance with our theoretical considera-
tions concerning the degree of rationality of three theodicy models,
apparently the curriculum did not facilitate a rational theodicy judgment.
Finally, theodicy judgment did not appear to be directly influenced
by any of the background variables that differed significantly between
the experimental group and the control group. The background charac-
teristics only influenced theodicy comprehension (table 5.1, table 5.2
and table 5.3), which in turn influenced theodicy judgment. Thus the
influence the background characteristics exert on theodicy judgment is
only indirect by way of their influence on theodicy comprehension.
To summarize our most important results, the experimental theodicy
curriculum appears to be a relatively successful instrument for learning
theodicy models and influencing theodicy comprehension. But this is not
the case with respect to theodicy judgment, for the curriculum's indirect
effect on theodicy judgment is relatively small. With the exception of
theodicy judgment in terms of the plan model, our experimental
theodicy curriculum exerts little influence on the way students construct
a theodicy judgment.
CHAPTER SIX
PERSPECTIVES ON THEODICY EDUCATION
Having reported our research findings in the previous chapter, we are
now able to provide an answer to our research questions and to draw
sorne general conclusions regarding theodicy as a subject matter for
religious education. This sixth chapter marks the end of our study on the
relationship between theodicy comprehension and theodicy judgment,
which we investigated empirically by looking at the direct as well as the
indirect effects of an experimental theodicy curriculum. We begin this
chapter by recapitulating the most important theoretical insights we have
elaborated thus far. The research process is then reviewed and the re-
search questions are answered. In the second section of this chapter, we
critically evaluate our findings about the curriculums' effect on theodicy
comprehension and theodicy judgment. To conclude this chapter, we
will discuss some of the implications these findings may have for our
theoretical assumptions.
6.1 REVIEW: Tr[EODICY COMPREHENSION AND THEODICY 7UDGMENT
The problem of theodicy, posed as the genuine theological problem, "If
God is omnipotent and perfectly good, why do humans suffer?", is pivo-
tal to our entire study. This question, along with its theological implica-
tions, was presented in the first chapter together with three possible
`solutions' or `answers' in the form of three ídeal-typical theodicy mo-
dels. The retaliation model accounts for human suffering as a divine
punishment for sin. The plan model is based on the idea ofthe ultimate
goodness of creation in which every event serves God's purposes. And
the compassíon model considers human suffering to be inimical to a
caring and compassionate God.
In the second chapter of our study, we examined how these models
relate to one another and discovered an ordinal relationship between
them. It appeared that the compassion model offers the most plausible
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answer to the problem of theodicy, because it deals with this problem in
a logically satisfying way and it considers suffering from an abstract
perspective. We identified two features of a rational and thus more
plausible, religious answer to the problem of innocent human suffering:
the degree of logical consistency and the degree of abstraction.
Subsequently, in the third chapter we considered the role these mo-
dels can play in the coping process. We claimed that by upholding reli-
gious commitments and attributing religious meaning to suffering,
people can use their religious faith to cope with a situation of suffering,
but people can only do this when they are convinced that the
predicament that is causing their suffering does not interfere with their
faith in a good and omnipotent deity. In this respect, a religious
judgment about evil, or a theodicy judgment as we prefer to cal] it,
constitutes the very core of the coping process. That is to say, the
theological question, "If God is omnipotent and perfectly good, why do
I suffer?", needs to be answered if a person is going to maintain
religious commitments and attribute a religious meaning to suffering.
However, without a cognitive understanding of these theodicy models,
a person cannot render a theodicy judgment and thus cannot to attribute
a religious meaning to suffering. Thus, with regard to the role theodicy
models play in the coping process, we concluded that comprehension of
theodicy models is prerequisite for religious coping.
The educational issues concerning the learning of theodicy models
were explored in the fourth chapter of our study. In order to enhance a
student's ability to cope with suffering from a religious perspective, one
needs to increase their comprehension ofdifferent theodicy models. This
inference leads to two questions. First, how may religious education
contribute to the learning of theodicy models? And second, how may
learning theodicy models occur in such a way that it enhances the
leamer's ability to render a meaningful theodicy judgment? To deal with
these questions, we described three educational measures that were
meant to facilitate the learning of theodicy models. These measures refer
to three types of learning: experiential learning, information learning
and evaluative learning. Next we presented a detailed statement of an
instructional objective regarding theodicy and, subsequently, performed
a task analysis on it. This task analysis resulted in the learning hierarchy.
The experimental curriculum we designed was based upon this
hierarchy.
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The discussion concerning the way theodicy models can best be learned
marked the end of the theoretical part of our study. Our theoretical
considerations culminated in two claims. First, a theodicy curriculum
that exhibits special educational features results in theodicy comprehen-
sion, and second, that theodicy comprehension results in a rational theo-
dicy judgment. In order to gather empirical support for these two claims,
we conducted field research on the effects of our experimental theodicy
curriculum on theodicy comprehension and theodicy judgment. We
reported on this field research in the fifth chapter, where we accounted
for our research questions and broader research aim, explained our
conceptual model and quasi-experimental research design, presented the
measuring instruments we used and reported on the actual execution of
the field work, and, finally, presented our research findings.
Having summarized our most important theoretical insights in this
way, it is now time to provide an answer to our guiding research
questions and to finish this review. For the sake of clarity, we recapitu-
late these research questions first. They read as follows:
1 To what extent is theodicy education about the retaliation model, the
plan model and the compassion model of influence on comprehension
of these models?
2 To what extent does theodicy education about the retaliation model,
the plan model and the compassion model indirectly influence theodicy
judgment using these three theodicy models via its influence on theodicy
comprehension, when controlling for possible direct effects of theodicy
education on theodicy judgment?
The theoretical assumptions underlying these two research questions
predict direct as well as indirect effects of theodicy education. They
predict, first of all, that the implementation of a specific theodicy cur-
riculum will result in comprehension of theodicy models and, subse-
quently, that theodicy comprehension thus acquired will influence theo-
dicy judgment. The main question is whether these predicted effects
actually occur.
With regard to the first research question, we may conclude that there
is a direct effect. That is to say, our experimental theodicy curriculum
indeed results in comprehension of the three theodicy models and
especially results in comprehension ofthe plan model. However, aside
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from the influence of the curriculum, the pretest scores regarding theo-
dicy comprehension are of great importance especially with respect to
comprehension of the retaliation model and the compassion model. In
contrast, influence of the relevant background characteristics on theo-
dicy comprehension appeared to be negligible. So, on the basis of these
findings, we answer our first research question as follows: Theodicy
education about the retaliation model, the plan model and the compas-
sion model resulted particularly in comprehension of the plan model and
to a lesser degree, in comprehension of the retaliation model and the
compassion model.
However, with regard to our second research question things are not
that clear. The influence our theodicy curriculum exerted on theodicy
judgment was in part indirect via its influence on theodicy comprehen-
sion. The influence theodicy comprehension exerted on theodicy judg-
ment increased when theodicy judgment was put in terms of a more
rational theodicy model. Finally, differences between the control and
experimental groups, with regard to the background characteristics we
examined, did not affect our experiment. At first sight, these results
meet our theoretical expectations. When considered more closely,
however, our findings indicate that theodicy judgment is explained
mainly in terms of the pretest scores regarding theodicy judgment
instead of the post test scores regarding theodicy comprehension. That
is to say, theodicy comprehension enhanced by our experimental
theodicy curriculum only marginally influenced theodicy judgment,
causing the indirect treatment effect to be rather small. It is noteworthy
that with regard to theodicy judgments framed in terms of the plan
model, the curriculum exerted a direct effect that even exceeded the
observed indirect effect. Thus, although these findings did not clearly
contradict our theoretical assumptions, the relationship between the
theodicy curriculum, theodicy comprehension and theodicy judgment
was not as strong as we expected it to be. Accordingly, we answer our
second research question as follows: Theodicy education about the
retaliation model, the plan model and the compassion model exerted its
influence on theodicy judgments framed in terms ofthese models via its
influence on theodicy comprehension to a rather small degree, and also
directly influenced theodicy judgment in terms of the plan model.
Hence, the effects predicted by our two research questions did indeed
occur but only in a limited sense. Although this theodicy curriculum di-
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rectly influenced comprehension of all three models, (the first research
question), it especially influenced comprehension of the Plan model.
And with regard to the curriculums' predicted indirect effect (the second
research question), although theodicy comprehension influenced
theodicy judgment it did so to a relatively small degree. But what does
this mean? How are we to value these results in the light of our
theoretical assumptions? This matter is addressed in the subsequent and
final section of this chapter.
6.2 LOOKING BEYOND: THE PRAXIS OF THEODICY EDUCATION
Similar to our two guiding research questions the critical evaluation of
our research findings also consists of two parts. First, we address the
question of the relevance of these three theodicy models. As we have
seen, theodicy education, in the form of our experimental theodicy cur-
riculum results in comprehension of all three theodicy models. But why
is this a favourable result? Why not confine the learning of theodicy
models to only one model, for instance, the most rational model? To
show that it really is necessary to learn all three theodicy models, we
introduce the concept of intrapersonal pluralism, which is an important
characteristic of the religious consciousness of Dutch youth. Religious
education promotes interpersonal pluralism best by facilitating the lear-
ning of different and even contrasting religious symbols.
Next, we focus on theodicy judgment and ask why this is marginally
influenced by theodicy education, via its influence on theodicy compre-
hension. Although theodicy judgment is influenced by theodicy compre-
hension and this comprehension is enhanced by the curriculum, posttest
scores for theodicy judgment are more strongly influenced by their re-
spective pretest scores. Why is this? Or, more important, what may be
done in the field ofreligious education to increase the effectiveness of
theodicy education in this respect? To address this question, we consider
a possible curriculum supplement that focuses more on the emotional
infrastructure of our theodicy models. As we will show, such an addi-
tional approach for instance can be found in a theology of complaint.
16O LEARNING THEOD[CY
6.2.1 Theodicy Education and Theodicy Comprehension
Why is it worthwhile to increase comprehension of these three theodicy
models? Or put more strongly: Why is it worthwhile to increase compre-
hension of such theodicy models when the retaliation and plan models
are no longer generally theologically favoured? This focuses our
attention on a serious problem. As Tyler (19732), explained when
selecting educational objectives it is not only important to consider the
needs and interests ofthe students involved; it is equally important that
the contents reflect contemporary, academic thought. Yet the latter was
definitely not the focus of our theodicy curriculum. Why, then, do we
still hold the view that is better to learn a wide variety of religious
answers to the problem of theodicy, than it is to learn only the
theologically most acceptable answer?
As mentioned already in the introduction to this chapter, we seek to
tackle this problem by considering the religious consciousness of pre-
sent-day youth, which is characterized by what we referred to earlier as
a certain degree of intrapersonalpluralism (Vermeer, Van der Ven and
Vossen 1996, 83). Research shows that present-day youth have very
complex and even contradictory images of God. Young people tend to
construct their own images of God by picking and choosing from all
kinds ofreligious elements in their cultural surroundings, a phenomenon
referred to by several researchers as bricolage (Janssen, De Hart and
Gerardts 1994, 117; Angenent-Vogt and Van Hemert 1994, 22;
Hutsebaut 1995, 77-78; Van der Ven 1996, 39). `Bricolage' points to a
mental activity ofbuilding up or constructing one's own religion, which
in the case of many young people results in what we call `intrapersonal
pluralism', indicating that one and the same individual may adhere to
different and even contrasting images of God at the same time (Van der
Ven 1996, 50). For this reason, young people in the Netherlands, at least
as far as religion is concerned, are said to live in a`do-it-yourself
culture. Naturally, from the point of view of traditional or
institutionalized religion, this situation may not be of positive value,
since these contrasting images seriously question the teachings of the
church. For instance, a fully worked out system of articles of faith that
was recently presented in the new catechism of the Catholic Church
(1995) does not have any correlate in the religious consciousness of
Dutch adolescents. On the other hand, this modern cultural situation also
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offers new possibilities, but only if the praxis of religious education
takes this situation seriously. Hence, the question is, how will religious
education deal with intrapersonal pluralism?
Before answering this question it is important to discuss the religious
consciousness of present-day young people, and to explain in more
detail what `intrapersonal pluralism' means with respect to theodicy.
The latter we intend to do by focussing on how present-day youth
picture God (the contents of faith) and on the more or less pragmatic
character of their religious beliefs (the perfonmance of faith).
We begin by considering the Dutch youths' images of God. As re-
search conducted by Janssen et al. (1994, 111-113) shows, there are
basically two ways they describe God. Young people refer to the attri-
butes or essence of God and they refer to the acts of God. In the first
case, they describe God's qualities. For instance, "God is love", "God
is good" or "God is powerful". They also describe what God does to hu-
man beings: "God watches over us", "God supports us"or "God puts us
on the right track". And although both types of description are present
in the religious consciousness of Dutch youths, it should be noted that
they prefer to describe God by acts instead of by qualities. Furthermore,
these divine acts may be passive or active. The passive acts not produce
noticeable effects, for instance; "God watches over us", or "God knows
us" Active acts of God do produce an effect; "God creates the world",
"God performs miracles", and "God corrects people". Young people use
both active and passive description of God's acts, but most commonly
they refer to noticeable effects, with an emphasis on the divine wielding
of power. In summary, according to Janssen et al., whenever
contemporary Dutch adolescents are asked to describe God most of the
time they refer to a being who, through the wielding of its power, is
actively involved in the world.
Naturally, this is not the only way in which youths describe God. As
mentioned already above, other categories are also used to describe God.
Nevertheless, the emphasis is on God defined in relation to the effects
God produces. This insight is also confirmed by Hutsebaut (1995, 54-
75) who investigated the God images of Belgian youth and discovered
that, for the most part, throughout adolescence, they describe God in
terms of someone who renders help and support. For instance, God is
seen as someone who gets them through difficult periods, as someone
who makes them feel better when they are ill or as someone who
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protects them, and despite the fact that the God images of these youth
change during the transition from early adolescence into late adoles-
cence, the category `help and support' remains most useful in their
descriptions of God. Thus like Dutch youth, Belgian youth mainly
describe God as an actor who relates to people with tangible effect. God
is defined in relationship to the effects God produces.
This insight makes Janssen et al. (1994, 117) conclude that God is
not known or understood, but that God is used! This concerns the second
aspect we would like to discuss: the pragmatic character of the religion
of today's youth. Pragmatism here means that the essence of religious
belief is not so much the content, but its functions or effects. That is to
say, when it comes to religion young people are constantly searching
and looking for new images and ideas that fit in with the situation they
find themselves in at a certain moment. Hence, whether or not certain
representations of God are accepted or renounced depends almost
entirely on the usefulness of these representations in a given situation.
It is not the religious frame of reference that influences the way reality
is experienced. It is the other way round, everyday experiences influence
and shape their religious frame of reference. God images that are no
longer in accordance with today's feelings are thrown overboard and
new ones are constructed (Hutsebaut 1995, 77-78).
This brings us to an explanation of intrapersonal pluralism with
regard to theodicy. Intrapersonal pluralism implies that a person can
favour the compassion model, but also accept the plan or retaliation
model. This may seem strange, but when this generations' images of
God are considered, it is not strange at all. For, to the extent that each
model contains an image of God as someone who acts towards human
beings, producing tangible effects, each model also fits in fairly well
with the way present-day youth picture God. And as our systematic
survey in the first chapter (sectíon 1.2.2) pointed out, notwithstanding
specific theological differences such a representation of God can be
found within each theodicy model. Underlying both the retaliation
model and the plan model is an image of God as a powerful deity who
acts towards humanity, directly causing human suffering, either as a
divine punishment for sin or indirectly as part of the divine plan. To a
lesser degree this is also true for the compassion model. Although in this
model there is an altered understanding ofdivine omnipotence, God still
lovingly acts towards human beings. Hence, each of our three models is
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compatible with the way today's youth describes God and thus may be
of interest to them.
The same can be said when considering the `performance' of theo-
dicy models. In terms of Luhmann's system theory, the performance of
religion is a separate, autonomous system alongside other systems such
as art, science, politics, law, economics, family, and personal identity.
Religion provides assistance or helps other systems deal with specific
problems (Van der Ven 1996, 48). In the case of theodicy, which deals
with the problem of innocent human suffering, the system at issue is the
individual's own identity. Suffering, that is the experience of evil,
evokes existential questions that are expressions ofthe human awareness
that one's own identity is threatened (section 1.1.3). Consequently, by
attributing a religious meaning to suffering, theodicy models help to
restore or to uphold one's own identity in the midst of suffering. This is
how theodicy models perform as part of a religious system, in service to
the system of personal identity. This service of the religious system to
the system of personal identity may be `performed' by all three theodicy
models, because each model, despite specific theological differences,
pictures God as a deity who acts towards humanity and thus fits in with
the religious consciousness of present-day young people. In this way,
each of the three theodicy models may be helpful in dealing with the
existential questions evoked by suffering.
In spite of the theological appreciation, or lack thereof, received by
these theodicy models, as far as their contents and performance are con-
cerned, intrapersonal pluralism explains how all three models are com-
patible with the religious consciousness of today's youth. This brings us
back to how religious education should deal with this cultural phenome-
non.
Seen from an educational point of view, intrapersonal pluralism is a
very important characteristic of the students involved, which should be
taken into account when selecting educational objectives in the field of
religious education. Given this cultural situation, Hutsebaut (1995, 78)
argues that the aim of religious education is no longer to give ready-
made answers, but to guide students in finding their own personal
answer(s). This is exactly what our experimental theodicy curriculum
intends to do by confronting students with different and even contrasting
theodicy models and by teaching them of a twofold standard of
rationality that enables them to compare and examine these models
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critically (section 4.1.2). The learning process induced by our theodicy
cumculum is not guided towards finding theological truth in the sense
of ]earning the one currently most acceptable Christian answer to the
problem of theodicy. It is guided towards finding existential, religious
truth. That is to say, our curriculum itself does not value theodicy
models, instead the students are urged to value these models for
themselves, so that they, eventually, may raise the question: Does this
theodicy model reveal something that is ofpersonal significance to me?
(Schweitzer, Nipkow, Faust-Siehl and Krupka 1995, 128-129).
Here lies the relevance ofincreasing comprehension of all three theo-
dicy models. Following our above argument, learning different and con-
trasting theodicy models is in accordance with the present-day cultural
situation in the Netherlands and contributes to the growth of, what we
would like to call, religious maturity in the sense that it helps students
to construct (bricolage) their own system of ineaning with regard to an
overwhelming problem such as the problem ofevil. But this introduction
of the term `religious maturity' can easily be misunderstood. For in-
stance, one may ask whether it is really possible to contribute to the
growth of religious maturity by learning theodicy models like the
retaliation model or the plan model, which contain a more or less
heteronomous image ofhumanity. It should be perfectly clear that the
argument that learning three theodicy models contributes to the growth
of religious maturity, only regards the students' ability to deal with
religious symbols and metaphors in a competent and independent way
and that it does not regard the contents of the students' faith or their
acceptance of particular theodicy models. In short, religious maturity
involves the ability to choose freely from several religious symbols and
metaphors in order to further develop one's own religious frame of
reference.
Our usage of the term, `religious maturity', should not be confused
with what Oser (19882; 1988) calls `religious autonomy'. Despite his
structural-developmental perspective, Oser focuses strongly on the con-
tents of faith. According to his theory, the growth ofreligious autonomy
depends upon one's religious development. Reaching higher stages of
religious development means that individuals become more mature and
autonomous subjects in their relationship to the divine, because they are
freed from the fear that their lives are directly and randomly influenced
by the divine (Oser 1988, 47). As a consequence, it seems impossible
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that individuals who already exhibit a certain degree of religious auto-
nomy, at the same time adhere to or accept a theodicy model, such as the
retaliation model, which says that humanity totally depends on the
wielding of God's power. Thus, from Oser's perspective, increasing
comprehension ofthe retaliation model or the plan model would not be
recommended, since it does not contribute to the students' religious
development and perhaps may even result in a developmental
regression. But this inference does not apply to our approach, in which
the growth of religious maturity is related to intrapersonal pluralism, an
important characteristic of the religious consciousness of today's youths.
For, then, it becomes clear that learning different and even contrasting
religious concepts makes students more competent in developing a view
of their own regarding a certain religious topic, so that they,
subsequently, may decide for themselves whether the concepts they have
learned reveal something to them of personal significance. Seen from
this perspective, therefore, our experimental theodicy curriculum
resulting in comprehension of all three theodicy models, and not just the
most rational model, is a positive result.
6.2.2 Theodicy Education and Theodicy Judgment
Unexpectedly, the indirect effect of our experimental theodicy cur-
riculum on theodicy judgment is relatively small. This negligible effect
on theodicy judgement via the curriculum's effect on theodicy
comprehension, is not entirely satisfactory in view of our broader aim,
which is to facilitate religious coping behaviour (section 4.1.1).
Religious coping, in part, involves making meaningful theodicy
judgments, which, in turn, demands that students are aware of several
theodicy models. Apparently, the learning process initiated by our
experimental theodicy curriculum affects the students' ability to cope
with suffering from a religious perspective to only a small degree, even
though it did result in an increase oftheodicy comprehension. The least
we may conclude here is that our experimental theodicy curriculum
successfully teaches theodicy models, but it is less successful at
facilitating religious coping behaviour. This is not a positive result. But
having drawn this conclusion another question immediately arises: What
may be done in the field of religious education to increase this indirect
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treatment effect and thus strengthen the relationship between theodicy
comprehension and theodicy judgment?
Before addressing this question, we would like to stress that we see
no reason to alter or reconsider our initial theoretical assumptions re-
garding the relationship between theodicy comprehension and theodicy
judgment. We still adhere to the paradigm of cognitive psychology and
continue to put great emphasis on the cognitive activities involved in
coping with an emotional situation (section 1.1.2). According to Izard
(1984, 24), cognitive processes are at work as soon as an emotional
situation is felt and experienced in consciousness, resulting in a feeling
of emotion. These cognitive processes continue to work during the
coping process. Lazarus (1994, 112), another leading scholar in emotion
theory, even refers to cognitive coping strategies that are used when it
is no longer possible to change the situation itself. For instance, if one
suffers the death of one's spouse, nothing can be done to actually change
this situation; it is impossible to restore the life of a deceased person.
Here, all one can do is try to change the way the situation is interpreted
or attended to through cognitive coping. Religious coping is a form of
cognitive coping, whereby religious notions are used in order to
reinterpret or attribute a religious meaning to an emotional situation. As
we have seen above (section 3.1), at the very core of such a religious,
cognitive activity a theodicy judgment always prevails. For people are
only willing to attribute a religious meaning to suffering when they are
convinced that their evil predicament does not interfere with their faith
in an omnipotent and overall good deity. Consequently, coping with suf-
fering from a religious perspective also means providing at least a
preliminary answer to the theological dilemma: "If God is omnipotent
and perfectly good, why do humans (I) suffer?" This can only be done
if one has learned several theodicy models. In this respect, we are still
convinced that learning theodicy models serves in the development of
a religious frame of reference that is necessary for religious, cognitive
coping. Even if these considerations are at least theoretically `true', it
does not explain why increased theodicy comprehension via our cur-
riculum only marginally influenced theodicy judgment.
Perhaps this curriculum needs to be supplemented by an additional
approach that focusses on the emotional infrastructure of the theodicy
models at issue. In the remainder of this section, we would like to ex-
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plore this idea and outline a possible addition. We begin with the
theology of complaint.
A theology of complaint emerges out of the growing awareness that
in the end the problem of theodicy remains insoluble. That is to say,
none of the three theodicy models provide the ultimate answer to the
theological dilemma: If God is omnipotent and perfectly good, why do
humans suffer? As we have seen (section 2.2.1; Vermeer, Vossen and
Van der Ven 1991), both the retaliation model and the plan model fail
to safeguard the divine goodness and thus fail to provide a consistent
answer to the theological dilemma, whereas the compassion model
offers a more consistent answer due to an altered understanding of
divine omnipotence as defenceless potency, but this again at the cost of
other theological difficulties for instance with regard to soteriology
(section 1.2.2; Van Egmond 1985, 235-236). This insight makes Kuschel
(1996, 246) conclude that the problem of theodicy remains open-ended
and that one can only deal with this problem in a practical sense by
raising complaints against God! The latter Kuschel understands as a
legitimate way of dealing with God in the midst of suffering. For, this
protest or accusation against God is not meant to deny the existence of
God, nor does it offend God or make God responsible for the existence
of evil. On the contrary, human complaint actually presupposes faith; it
is an expression ofhope. It is the anticipation of a better future and so,
in the end, human lament and complaint is rooted in the expectation that
one day God will use divine power to make everything new. As Kuschel
puts it, "Um aber so klagen und anklagen zu k~nnen, wird der Glaube
an Gottes Gerechtigkeit, Giite und Weisheit vorausgesetzt. (...). Gegen
Gott zu protestieren aber ist Ausdruck unausrottbarer Hoffnung auf und
Erwartung an diesen Gott. Mit Gott zu kámpfen, bedeutet, ihm háchste
Anerkennung zu zollen" (Kuschel 1996, 254-255).
Suggesting a theology of complaint as an additional approach to the
problem of theodicy may put learning theodicy models into different
perspective. A theology of complaint does not focus on or contain an
answer to the theological dilemma, "If God is omnipotent and perfectly
good, why do humans suffer?" Instead, it acknowledges the human,
emotional response to the experience of evil, which ultimately finds its
expression in lament and complaint, by showing that such reactions can
be legitimate ways ofresponding to the experience of evil from a theo-
logical point of view. A theology of complaint once again draws our
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attention to the fact that the problem of theodicy, besides being a theo-
logical problem, is also an existential problem. This means that with re-
gard to theodicy education, an existential approach should also prevail.
To explore what an existential approach is and whether such an
approach would render the leaming of theodicy models superfluous, we
refer to the phenomenology of the experience of evil, elaborated by
Ricoeur (1986).
The experience of evil, or suffering as we prefer to say, Ricoeur
(1986, 17) describes as an experience between blame and lament. That
is to say, when evil occurs, people simultaneously feel they are culprits
as well as victims. With regard to moral evil, for instance, people may
experience a sense of guilt and know they are to blame for their own
wrongdoing. Yet at the same time they may feel that they are not
entirely in control and have been overwhelmed by other powers. This
makes them feel like victims of circumstance. Also with regard to
natural evil, conflicting feelings may arise. First, the feeling of being a
victim may prevail. Next the feeling emerges that this evil predicament
is in one way or another the result of some persona] or collective fault,
which causes feelings of guilt. So, according to Ricoeur, suffering is
always characterized by a dialectical tension between guilt and
innocence, which thus implies that suffering is made up of different or
even contrasting feelings or emotions. These might include anger,
anxiety, despair, guilt, loneliness, and so forth. Hence, when adopting
an existential approach to the theodicy issue, a variety ofemotions need
to be examined. This can be done by learning different theodicy models.
Each theodicy model could be related to a specific set of emotions that
constitutes what we would like to call the emotional infrastructureof the
model. In our view, therefore, an existential approach, which focuses
more on the emotional infrastructure of theodicy models, does not
render the learning of different theodicy models superfluous. On the
contrary, leaming different theodicy models remains very important. But
in view of our broader aim of facilitating religious coping behaviour,
learning theodicy models should occur in the context of the specific
emotions to which these models typically relate
With regard to the tendency of sufferers to feel guilty about their own
evil predicament, the retaliation model contains valuable, religious no-
tions. The notion that all suffering is a divine punishment for sin is not
only a recurrent theme in Christian theology that has biblical roots, espe-
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cially in the Old Testament (Berger 1996, 181). More importantly, it is
an idea that occurs to almost all people who suffer. When confronted
with suffering each and every religious believer, sooner or later wonders
whether their harmful situation or evil predicament is not some sort of
divine retribution. This does not mean that they necessarily agree with
the retaliation model. It does mean that the questions regarding guilt and
punishment are very likely to become part of their coping process.
Therefore, to enhance believers' ability to cope with suffering from a
religious perspective, it is very important that they become familiar with
the basic ideas underlying the retaliation model. This makes them aware
of the God image attached to the notion of suffering as a divine
punishment for sin and makes them sensitive to the theological
difficulties that go along with this idea. In this way, people become more
able to contemplate and critically evaluate their feelings of guilt during
the coping process.
In the same way, the plan model also contains religious notions that
may be of value during the coping process. It not only offers an alterna-
tive idea to the notion of suffering as a divine punishment for sin, but it
also enables people to deal with anxiery and fear. Whereas guilt refers
to the origin of evil, anxiety and fear refer to the future, suffering may
not only evoke feelings of guilt, it may also result in feelings of
uncertainty, as it destroys hope and all kinds offuture expectations. This
is apparent in questions such as: "Where will this situation lead to?",
"How will it end?", or "How long O Lord, do I have to suffer?" Just like
the feeling of guilt, the feeling of anxiety and fear about the near future
is also likely to arise when one faces a situation that causes suffering.
Consequently, it is almost unavoidable that people who are religious
believers think about the reasons God may have had for permitting this
kind of evil to occur (Kreiner 1997, 68). This makes it all the more
necessary for a person to be familiar with the plan model, which creates
awareness of the God image attached to the idea that all suffering serves
the good purposes of God and also of its underlying theological
difficulties. This, in turn, makes people more competent to critically
reflect on their own harmful situations or evil predicament, from the
perspective of their belief in an omnipotent and good deity, in order to
overcome their anxiety and fear.
In addition to guilt, arixiety and fear, other feelings such as loneli-
ness, despair and anger may also emerge as people question the situa-
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tions that cause their suffering and realize that neither the retaliation nor
the plan model may fully account for their personal situations. As we
learn from Ricoeur, at the very core of the experience of evil there is
always the feeling of being a victim of circumstance. In this respect, the
notion that one suffers due to a personal or collective fault appears to be
unjust, while the idea that suffering serves the good purposes of God
seems the expression of utmost cruelty (Houtepen 1997, 90-91). What
remains is a feeling of loneliness, which can be very intense. At this
point, the compassion model may become valuable, because within the
framework of the compassion model not only is there full
acknowledgement that people are innocent victims of circumstance, but
also that people are never left alone in their suffering. There is divine
companionship with those who suffer and divine involvement in the
human predicament. The idea of God as a`fellow-sufferer', therefore,
may be a powerful image in dealing with one's feelings of loneliness.
Even though the image of God as a`fellow-sufferer' is meant to pro-
vide comfort and support, it may also intensify feelings of angeror may
even result in despair. For, the notion that God suffers with humanity
does not necessarily diminish the indignation people feel towards their
situation of suffering, which may still be a very unjust and undeserved
situation. Furthermore, if God suffers with humanity, then God cannot
be held responsible for the existence of evil, which immediately robs
human beings of a counterpart or addressee to raise complaint against.
As we already mentioned above, underlying the human complaint there
is the expectation that one day God will use divine power to put an end
to suffering and to make everything new. Since God is denied this kind
of power within the framework of the compassion model, human
complaint is no longer an expression of hope and thus is transfonned
instead into an expressión of despair (Berger 1996, 195-202). On the one
hand, God as a`fellow-sufferer' may be a comforting and supporting
image in the sense that it fully acknowledges a person's feeling of being
an abandoned, lonely victim of circumstance. While on the other hand,
the fact that this idea is accompanied by an image of a Godhead that is
devoid of any real power again turns out to be a serious shortcoming,
since it makes human lament and complaint entirely useless (Ricoeur
1986, 43). In this way, the theological difficulties attached to the
compassion model bring us back again to one of the basic insights of a
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theology of complaint; the problem of theodicy always remains in-
soluble.
These remarks on the emotional infrastructure of theodicy models
demonstrate that it really is possible to relate a specific emotion or set
of emotions to a specific theodicy model. But what does all of this mean
with regard to theodicy education? Actually, the answer to this question
is now quite simple. The existential approach to the theodicy issue,
which we briefly sketched above, is of special importance, we argue, if
theodicy education is to influence the way students render a theodicy
judgment. By focussing on the emotional infrastructure of theodicy
models and by showing that each model typically addresses certain
emotions, students gain the insight that each model may be of value in
the coping process, which, in turn, is likely to affect the way they render
a theodicy judgment. Essentially, this plea for adopting a more
existential approach to the theodicy issue is nothing more than a further
elaboration of one of the educational measures we described in chapter
four. Under the heading `experientia] learning' (section 4.1.2), we
already stressed the importance of paying attention to the coping process
in order that learning theodicy models not be confined to the mere
learning oftheological concepts. In addition to this educational measure,
we now argue that attention should be paid not only to the coping
process, but also to the typical emotions that are involved in the coping
process and to the way these emotions relate to specific theodicy
models.
However, this plea for adopting a more existential oriented approach
does not mean that we reject our cognitive approach to the theodicy
issue with its focus on the degree of rationality exhibited by the three
theodicy models. On the contrary, as our findings indicate, this educa-
tional approach appears to be especially successful when theodicy edu-
cation is meant to increase theodicy comprehension. In this regard, the
cognitive approach remains of great value. Only with regard to our
broader aim regarding the facilitation of religious coping behaviour,
does this approach fall short and need to be combined with a more
existential approach. Hence, the most ideal theodicy curriculum, we now
believe, combines two educational approaches: a cognitive approach that
can improve theodicy comprehension and an existential approach that
strengthen the relationship between theodicy comprehension and theo-
dicy judgment.
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In conclusion, we summarize our two most important research findings.
First, given that intrapersonal pluralism is an important characteristic of
the religious consciousness of present-day young people, learning
theodicy models should not be confined to learning only the most
rational or theologically most acceptable model, but should also entail
the learning of less-rational models such as the retaliation model and the
plan model. And finally, leaming different theodicy models, we argued
above, allows students to choose their own position regarding the
theodicy issue in a competent and independent way and thus contributes
to the growth of their religious maturity. In an ideal cun-iculum, theodicy
models would be taught using two educational approaches. A cognitive
approach, focussing on the degree of rationality of theodicy models, is
needed in order to enhance theodicy comprehension, and an existential
approach, focussing on the emotional infrastructure of theodicy models,
is also needed, we claim, iftheodicy education is also meant to affect the
way students render a theodicy judgment. Will such an `ideal' theodicy
curriculum really be more successful with regard to theodicy judgment?
This still remains to be seen. Therefore, at the end of this study, we
make an appeal for further empirical research in which such a newly
designed theodicy curriculum is put to the test.
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APPENDIX I
This appendix contains the four hypothetical contingency dilemmas
used to measure theodicy Judgement including factor analysis and
reliability analysis
BIRGIT
Birgit, a fifteen-year-old girl, suffers from a serious eye disease. Recently she has
undergone a severe operation for her illness, which unjortunately failed.
Consequently, Birgit will remain blind for the rest of here life. When the doctor
inforrns her about her predicament Birgit is desperate and very sad; life appears
meaningless to her. The hospital chaplain visits Birgit. He tells her that she has to put
her trust in God and seek comfort and support in herfaith. Birgit, however, finds this
very hard. She does not have faith in God and she does not believe that God helps
people. "If God helps people, why did I became ill in the first place ", she asks
herself. Birgit does not know what to do; whether to seek comfort and support in God
or to renounce herfaith.
Should Birgit seek comfort and support in God?
Yes- Cannot decide- No-
If you were Birgit, how important would each of these considerations be in deciding
whether to seek comfort and support in God?
IMPORTANCE:




Whether Birgit's eye disease is a divine
punishment?
Whether God is compassionate with a sick
person?
Whether the illness of Birgit is part of a
divine plan?
MAARTEN
Maarten, a jourteen-year-old boy, is run over by a car while he is on his way home.
Severely wounded, Maarten is taken to a hospital for immediate surgery. The
operation succeeds, but the doctors still fearfor Maartens' life. This Situation makes
Maarten think about God: "Maybe God will help me ", Maarten wonders. He talks
about these thoughts with his friends, but his friends frnd these thoughts ridiculous.
To them religion is just nonsense. However, these thoughts about God continue to
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puzzle Maarten and he does not know what to do; whether to seek comfort and
support in God or to renouncefaith.
Should Maarten seek comfort and support in God?
Yes- Cannot decide- No-
If you were Maarten, how important would each of these considerations be in
deciding whether to seek comfort and support in God?
IMPORTANCE:
Great Much Some Little No
1 Whether Maarten's accident might be
intended by God?
2 Whether God feels sony for people who
suffer?
3 Whether God sometimes punishes?
STEFAN
Stefan is a twelve-year-old boy who has a passion for soccer. On hls way home after
training one day, he is involved in a serious accident. As a result both ojStefan's legs
are paralysed. The doctors are not sure if this paralysis is temporary or not.
However, Stefan is also a very religious boy, who attends church every Sunday with
hisparents. While he is in the hospital Stefan prays a lot. "God will help me, He will
not let me down ", Stefan thinks. But, then, the doctors tell Stefan that he will remain
paralysedfor the rest of his life. He cannot play soccer any more. This makes Stefan
very sad and at the same time he becomes very angry with God. "God has let me
down ", says Stefan and he develops serious doubts concerning his faith. Stefan
wonders whether he should continues to seek comfort and support in God.
Should Stefan still have trust and faith in God?
Yes- Cannot decide- No-
If you were Stefan, how important would each of these considerations be in deciding
whether to seek comfort and support in God?
IMPORTANCE:
Great Much Some Little No
1 Whether this accident fits in with God's
plan concerning Stefan?
2 Whether God cares about Stefan?
3 Whether God sometimes uses accidents to
make people pay for their faults?
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KARIN
Karin is a f:fteen-year-old who leads a very happy lije. This ends suddenly when she
develops an incurable disease. The news that she suffers an incurable disease upsets
Karin very much and she becomes very sad and angry at the same time. "Why me? "
she yells at her parents. Karin's parents try to comfort her. Since they are religious
people, they say to her: "Karin, until you thought you could live without God, you
attended church regularly. But now, you are in need of God again, Karin. Maybe,
you should seek comfort and support in God again. " However, Karin refuses to think
about God again. She tells her parents: "Suddenly, without any reason, ! became
very ill. What good, then, is faith to me?" But alone in her bed at night, she thinks
about what herparents said to her. "Maybe, havingfaith in God is not that bad. Still,
why did 1 became ill in the first place? " These thoughts continue to puzzle Karin and
she does not know whether to seek comfort and support in God again or not.
Should Karin seek comfort and support in God?
Yes- Cannot decide- No-
lf you were Karin, how important would each of these considerations be in deciding
whether to seek comfort and support in God?
IMPORTANCE:
Great Much Some Little No
1 Whether God remunerates the good and
punishes evil?
2 Whether God uses illnesses to attain a
certain objective?
3 Whether God is sympathetic with people
who suffer?
Factorand Reliabiliry Analysis
With regard to these four contingency dilemmas three average scores
are calculated: a score regarding the importance the students ascribe
to theodicy considerations stemming from the retaliation model, a
score regarding the importance the students ascribe to theodicy
considerations stemming from the plan model and a score regarding
the importance they ascribe to theodicy considerations stemming
from the compassion model. Thus, in order to measure theodicy
judgment, three scales are used. Each four-item Likert scale is
described below together with the results of factor analysis and
reliability analysis (table 1).
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Table 1: Factor Analysis and Reliability Analysis Regarding Theodicy
Judgment (Three Subscales)
item retaliation plan compassion
Stefan item 3 .84
Maarten item 3 .80
Birgit item I .74
Karin item 1 .74
Stefan item 1 .85
Maarten item 1 .83
Karin item 2 .78
Birgit item 3 .68
Maarten item 2 .89
Stefan item 2 .85
Karin item 3 .82
Birgit item 2 .79
factor eigen variance communality alpha
retaliation 2.62 65.6 ~.40 .83
plan 2.51 63.0 ~.40 .82
compassion 2.84 71.2 ~.40 .86
Theodicy judgment scores were calculated for students who made a
decision in favour of religious commitment, including those who
cannot decide, with respect to at least three out of four hypothetical
dilemmas. The students who held the opinion, with respect to two or
more dilemmas, that the principle character should renounce faith
were treated as `missing values'. Theodicy judgment scores were
calculated for 354 students of the experimental group and for 237
students of the control group (- 79.20~0 of the entire sample).
APPENDIX II
This appendix contains the twelve item multiple choice test used to
measure theodicy comprehension. For the sake of clarity, the items
are ordered according to the theodicy model they represent (still
bearing the original number of the questionnaire). The correct alter-
natives are printed in italics. An asterisk (~`) indicates items that have
been removed from the test.
Retaliation model
~` 1) Are the following statements consistent with the retaliation model?
1 "God uses suffering to make people mend their lives."
2"God uses suffering to restore the universal order of good and evil."
A Both statements I and 2 are consistent with the retaliation model.
B Neither statement 1 or 2 is consistent with the retaliation model.
C Statement I is consistent with the retaliation model, but statement 2 is not.
D Statement 2 is consistent with the retaliation model, but statement 1 is not.
5) According to the retaliation model: What can people do to avoid suffering?
A Pray more often to God for comfort and support.
B Start believing in God again.
C Obey the rules ofgood and evil.
D There is no way people can avoid suffering according to the retaliation model.
7) To which theodicy model does the following statement refer?
"People experience divine judgment in times of sickness and death."
A The retaliation model.
B The plan model.
C The compassion model.
D None of these models.
' 10) Why is God, despite suffering, still a good God according to the retalia-
tion model?
A Because God only punishes people for their own good.
B Because God upholds the moral order by way of His punishment.
C Because God only punishes people if they done something wrong.
D Altemative 2 and alternative 3 are both correct.
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Plan model
2) To which theodicy model does the following statement refer?
"God, I trust you to change all things for the better."
A The retaliation model.
B The plan model.
C The compassion model.
D None of these models.
3) Why is God, despite suffering, still a good God according to the plan model?
A Because God does not cause people to suffer.
B Because God cannot prevent all human suffering.
C Because God helps people to mend their lives.
D Because God makes sure that in the end all ends well.
Look at the following cartoon. It is about AIDS and the way AIDS is viewed by
different people. Mr. I, for instance, thinks AIDS is a punishment of God. Now look
at question 8 and question 9.
8) Mrs. II agrees with the plan model. What will she have written on her sign?
A God supports you!
B Admit your faults!
C Put yourfaith in God!
D Mend your lives!
I 1) Which theodicy model is referred to by the following statement?
"God, I know You always want to best for me."
A The retaliation model.
B The plan model.
C The compassion model.
D None of these models.
APPENDIX 11 185
Compassion model
4) According to the compassion model: How does God exhibit compassion?
A By way of [he help and support people lend each other.
B By way of the fact that human suffering diminishes.
C By way of the fact that people mend their lives.
D Alternatives 2 and 3 are both correct.
' 6) What is the best description of the compassion model?
A God makes sure that everything ends well.
B God's compassion
C In the help and support people lend each other God becomes manifest.
D God encourages people to endure suffering.
9) Mr. III agrees with the compassion model. What will he have written on his sign?
A You will not make it without God!
B God is severe but just!
C God is the answer!
D God never lets you down!
12) Why is God still an overall good deity according to the compassion model?
A Because God ultimately puts an end to all human suffering.
B Because God has nothing to do with human suffering.
C Because God does not punish people, but wishes them well instead.
D Because God 's compassion renders comfort and support to allpeople.
With the exception of item 1 (retaliation model), item 6 ( compassion
model) and item 10 (retaliation model), which have been removed
from the test, all items met the following statistical demands:
Specificiry: the pretest items p-values should not exceed 0.70.
Difficulty: the posttest items p-values should be between .45 and .85.
Item 1 (p-value . 18) and item 6(p-value .29) do not meet this de-
mand.
Objectivity: the posttest items a-values should not exceed the respec-
tive p-values. This is not the case with regard to item 1( frequencies
of two false alternatives ( 1 and 3) ~ p-value) and item 10 ( frequencies
of one false alternative (1) ~ p-value).
Discrimination: considering the number of respondents in the ex-
perimental group (N - 462) the r;~ values should be over .15 (p~.001).
Reliability: for the nine item test a-.61, for the retaliation subscale
a-.28, for the plan subscale a - .40 and for the compassion subscale
a-.42. This means that, for each scale, Cronbach's alpha was too
low. This is probably due to the limited number of nine items in-
cluded in our multiple choice test.
APPENDIX III
This appendix contains the statistics regarding the following
background characteristics: gender, age, degree of urbanisation,
socio-economic status, value orientation, church involvement,








Comparison between the experimental group and the control group













Comparison between the experimental group and the control group (t-
test) showed no statistically significant difference.
Table 3: Comparison between the experimental group and the control
group regardingage (t-test)
variable mean DF t-value sign.
age exp. 15.6 743 .Ol 990
con. 15.6
Degree of urbanisation
Table 4: Degree of urbanisation
frequency percent
rural municipalities 63 8.5
urbanized, rural municipalities 350 46.9
urban centres 328 44.1
missing 5 0.5
746 100.0
Comparison between the experimental group and the control group
(Mann-Whitney test).
mean rank experimental group: 396.6
mean rank control group: 329.8
W - 93673.0 Z - -4.2078
U - 53203.0 p - .000
As the results of the Mann-Whitney test show there is a statistically
significant difference between the experimental group and the control
group. The students of the experimental group live in more urbanized
areas than the students of the control group.
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SOCIO-eCO110lYIIC SÍatl~[S
Table 5: Father's occupation
frequency percent
labourers~low level employees 302 40.5
mid level employees 225 30.2




Comparison between the experimental group and the control group
(Mann-Whitney test):
mean rank experimental group: 324.1
mean rank control group: 361.9
W - 93011.0 Z - -2.4928
U-47825.0 p-.012
As the results of the Mann-Whitney test show there is a statistically
significant difference between the experimental group and the control
group. When considered from the perspective of their father's
occupation the socio-economic status of the experimental group is
lower than the socio-economic status of the students included in the
control group.
Table 6: Mother's occupation
frequency percent
labourers~low level employees 228 30.6
mid level employees 69 9.2
higher occupations 21 2.8
housewife 31 ] 41.7
missing 1 l7 15.7
746 100.0
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Comparison between the experimental group and the control group
(Mann-Whifiey test):
mean rank experimental group: 308.0
mean rank control group: 326.3
W - 78316.5 Z - -1.3243
U - 43963.5 p - .185
Although there is a difference between the experimental group and
the control group the results of the Mann-Whifiey test indicate that it
is not statistically significant.
Value orientation
Since this characteristic is measured with the help of Likert subscales
for each of the five different value complexes, we present the figures
regarding scale construction, factor analysis and reliability analysis
(table 7).
Table 7: Factor analysis and reliability analysis regarding value
orientation ~ve subscales)




















factor eigen variance communality alpha
traditional family values 2.80 56.9 ~.40 .80
traditional achievement values 1.93 48.4 ~.40 .64
autonomy 1.75 44.8 ~.40 .66
social criticism 1.80 48.4 ~.40 .57
hedonistic values 1.54 77.4 ~.40 .70
~ One item ( item 4) of the subscale autonomy has been removed. Due
to an error in the typewritten questionnaire this item did not fit in with
the subscale autonomy as is apparent from the very low factor loading
(.07).
Table 8: value orientation mean factor scores
N mean SD
traditional family values 745 3.68 87
traditional achievement values 745 4.1 1 .72
autonomy 745 3.13 .95
social criticism 745 2.99 .76
hedonistic values 745 4.63 .87
Scale runs from 1(unimportant) to 5(very much important)
Comparison between the experimental group and the control group (t-
test) reveals only a statistically significant difference with regard to
autonomy.
Table 9: Comparison between the experimental group and the control
group regarding five value complexes (t-test)
variable mean DF t-value sign.
traditional family values exp. 3.69 743 .38 .702
con. 3.66
traditional achievement values exp. 4.10 743 -.18 .856
con. 4.11
autonomy exp. 3.20 743 2.48 .013
con. 3.02
social criticism exp. 2.97 743 -.94 .347
con. 3.02




Table 10: Church involvement
frequency percent
core church members 44 5.9
modal church members 72 9.7
marginal church members 213 28.6
former church members 54 7.2
first generation of unchurched 98 13.1




Comparison between the experimental group and the control group
(Mann-Whitney test):
mean rank experimental group: 281.3
mean rank control group: 269.8
W - 56397.5 Z - -.8505
U - 34452.5 p - .395
The Mann-Whitney test reveals no statistically significant differences
between the experimental group and the control group.
Religious belief
Since this characteristic is measured with the help of three subscales
of the Likert type, referring to three different religious outlooks, we
present the figures regarding scale construction, factor analysis and
reliability analysis, first (table 11).
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Table I 1: Factor analysis and reliabiliry analysis regarding religious
belief (three subscales)








factor eigen variance communality alpha
theism 1.67 83.3 ~.40 .82
deism 1.77 59.3 ~.40 .67
immanentism 1.39 69.6 ~.40 .57
Table 12: Religious belief ineanfactor scores
N mean SD
theism 716 2.79 1.22
deism 726 2.97 .99
immanentism 701 2.98 1.09
Scale runs from 1(not at all convinced) to 5(very much convinced)
In order to measure this characteristic a six-point Likert scale was
initially used containing the additional category `never gave it a
thought'. During data analysis, however, this category has been
treated as `missing', which accounts for the relatively high number of
missing values.
Comparison between the experimental group and the control group (t-
test) reveals no statistically significant differences.
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Table 13: Comparison between the experimental group and the
control group regarding three religious outlooks (t-test)
variable mean DF t-value sign.
theism exp. 2.75 714 -1.12 .263
con. 2.85
deism exp. 2.93 724 -1.21 .225
con. 3.02
immanentism exp. 3.01 699 -0.87 .385
con. 2.93
Theodicy interest
Since this characteristic is measured with the help of a Likert type
scale consisting of four items, we commence by presenting the figures
regarding scale construction; that is, factor analysis and reliability
analysis (table 14).
Table 14: Factor analysis and reliability analysis regarding theodicy
interest
item factorloading
1 .85 eigen value: 2.69
2 .84 explained variance: 67.1
3 .81 communality: ~.40
4 .78 alpha: 84
Table 15: Theodicy interest mean factor score
N mean SD
725 2.75 1.00
Scale runs from 1(totally disagree) to 5(very much agree important)
In order to measure this characteristic a six-point Likert scale was
initially used containing the additiona] category `never gave it a
thought'. During data analysis, however, this category has been
treated as `missing', which accounts for the relatively high number of
missing values.
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Comparison between the experimental group and the control group (t-
test) reveals no statistically significant differences.
Table 16: Comparison between the experimental group and the
control group regarding theodicy interest (t-test)
variable mean DF t-value sign.
theodicy interest exp. 2.74 723 -.38 .704
con. 2.75
Formal reasoning ability
Table 17: Formal reasoningability
frequency percent
concrete thought 203 27.2
transitional stage 255 34.2
formal thought 288 38.6
746 100.0
Comparison between the experimental group and the control group
(Mann-Whitney test):
mean rank experimental group: 360.8
mean rank control group: 394.0
W - 11911.5 Z--2.1745
U - 59766.5 p - .029
As the results of the Mann-Whifiey test show there is a statistically
signiiicant difference between the experimental group and the control
group. The students of the control group are better able to use formal
modes of reasoning than are the students of the experimental group.
SAMENVATTING
Centraal in deze studie staat het probleem van de theodicee: Als God
goed en almachtig is, waarom is er dan zoveel menselijk lijden op de
wereld? Echter, dit probleem van de theodicee wordt hier niet bena-
derd vanuit de systematische theologie, maar vanuit de praktische
theologie. Dat betekent dat in deze studie geen poging wordt onder-
nomen om een theologisch antwoord te formuleren op deze vraag.
Veeleer wordt nagegaan hoe met deze problematiek kan worden om-
gegaan binnen de religieuze communicatie. En dan met name de reli-
gieuze communicatie zoals die gestalte krijgt binnen de religieuze of
levensbeschouwelijke vorming in het voortgezet onderwijs. Uitgang-
spunt van deze studie is immers dat het juist ook voor jongereri van
belang is om systematisch na te leren denken over de verhouding tus-
sen God en het lijden, omdat dit probleem veelal centraal staat in het
worstelen van veel jongeren met geloof en kerk. Daarnaast kan syste-
matische aandacht voor dit onderwerp in het onderwijs er wellicht ook
toe bijdragen dat de competentie van jongeren om om te gaan met
eigen lijdenservaringen wordt verhoogd.
Conform de praktisch-theologische insteek van deze studie wordt
in hoofdstuk een begonnen met een globale schets van het verloop van
het verwerkingsproces. Hierbij wordt gebruik gemaakt van het infor-
matieverwerkingsmodel om de functie van religieuze noties en sym-
bolen te verhelderen. Deze functie wordt vervolgens omschreven als
Kontingenzbew~ltigung. Religieuze symbolen, zo wordt betoogd,
dienen er onder meer toe om een betekenis te geven aan, of een ver-
klaring te bieden voor, de anomische ervaringen van het menselijk
lijden.
Hoe religieuze symbolen deze functie dan vervullen wordt in het
vervolg van het eerste hoofdstuk nader uitgewerkt vanuit een be-
schrijving van drie ideaaltypische theodiceemodellen. Zo wordt ver-
wezen naar het straf-model, dat deze functie van Kontingenzbew~lti-
gung kan vervult doordat het verwijst naar het lijden als straf. Het
anomische karakter van het lijden verdwijnt zo, omdat er een causale
relatie wordt gesuggereerd tussen menselijk handelen en menselijk
leed. Een ander model is het plan-model, dat meer een teleologische
oriëntatie biedt op het menselijk lijden. Het menselijk lijden wordt
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hier gezien als door God gewild en passend binnen Zijn bedoelingen
ten einde een groter goed te bewerkstelligen. Tenslotte worden de
contouren van het compassie-model geschetst. Het compassie-model
biedt als enige model geen verklaring voor het lijden, maar verwijst
juist naar de actieve betrokkenheid van God op de menselijke situatie.
Het compassie-model maakt duidelijk dat de mens niet alleen staat in
zijn lijden, maar juist gesteund wordt door God die het lijden afwijst.
De verschillende historische en theologische wortels van deze drie
modellen worden in hoofdstuk een uitvoerig beschreven.
In hoofdstuk twee wordt een andere vraag gesteld: Hoe verhouden
zich deze drie modellen tot elkaar? Zijn deze drie modellen gelijk-
waardig of is het ene model beter dan het andere model? Het oordeel
`beter' of `slechter' wordt in hoofdstuk twee opzettelijk venneden.
Ieder model kan van waarde zijn in een persoonlijk verwerkingspro-
ces. Wel wordt gezegd, dat het theologisch redeneerproces dat achter
ieder model schuilgaat meer of minder plausibel kan zijn. Om dit aan
te tonen wordt in hoofdstuk twee een rationaliteitstandaard ontwikkeld
die toepasbaar is op de theodicee. Deze standaard bestaat uit een twee
criteria: logische consistentie en abstractie. Een plausibel, oftewel
rationeel, theologisch antwoord op het probleem van de theodicee,
voldoet aan twee vereisten: een dergelijk antwoord is logisch con-
sistent en biedt een abstracte oriëntatie op het menselijk lijden.
Vervolgens worden deze twee criteria toegepast op de drie ideaal-
typische modellen die zijn onderscheiden. Het resultaat hiervan is dat
het compassiemodel als het meest rationele model naar voren komt.
Door een herbezinning op de almacht van God biedt het compassie-
model het meest consistentie antwoord en doordat het compassiemo-
del het menselijk lijden steevast in verband brengt met het lijden van
de mensheid als zodanig en oproept tot een alomvattende, menselijke
solidariteit, is hier tevens sprake van een zeer abstracte benadering
van het menselijk lijden. Deze conceptuele analyse van de drie theodi-
ceemodellen wordt in het tweede deel van hoofdstuk twee nauwkeurig
beschreven.
In hoofdstuk drie komt de praktisch-theologische oriëntatie van
deze studie wederom duidelijk naar voren. Hier wordt aandacht be-
steed aan het proces zelf van religieuze betekenisverlening aan het
lijden. Het verlenen van een religieuze betekenis, of zin, aan het lij-
den, betekent dat mensen een theodiceeoordeel vellen, zo wordt uit-
eengezet. Immers, zo luidt de redenering hier, wanneer mensen een
religieuze betekenis toekennen aan hun situatie, dan impliceert dit
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tevens dat mensen voor zichzelf een (voorlopig) antwoord hebben
gevonden op het probleem van de theodicee en dus op de een of an-
dere manier de almacht en goedheid van God in verband hebben ge-
bracht met hun eigen lijdenssituatie. Religieuze betekenisverlening
wordt in hoofdstuk drie daarom beschreven als een probleemoplos-
sende activiteit waarin het vellen van een theodiceeoordeel geïmpli-
ceerd ligt.
Mensen meer competent maken in het vellen van een theodicee-
oordeel wordt daarom in hoofdstuk vier omschreven als een belang-
rijke en nastrevenswaardige doelstelling voor de religieuze vorming.
Een doelstelling die onder meer te bereiken is door mensen te infor-
meren over de drie ideaaltypische theodiceemodellen. Echter, dit be-
tekent niet dat mensen enkel op de hoogte moeten worden gebracht
van de inhoud van deze modellen. Integendeel, het vermogen om zelf-
standig een theodiceeoordeel te vellen wordt enkel versterkt wanneer
het leerproces daar ook uitdrukkelijk op is gericht. Iets wat onder meer
kan worden bereikt door tijdens het leerproces uitdrukkelijk aandacht
te besteden aan de functie van theodiceemodellen in het verwerkings-
proces alsmede door het inoefenen van het theodiceeoordeel aan de
hand van de reeds eerder genoemde, tweevoudige standaard van ratio-
naliteit. Deze en andere didactische maatregelen worden in hoofdstuk
vier verder uitgewerkt, hetgeen uiteindelijk resulteert in de presentatie
van een gedetailleerde leerhiërarchie voor het inoefenen van het theo-
diceeoordeel.
Hierna wordt in hoofdstuk vijf verslag gedaan van de opzet en uit-
voering van het empirisch onderzoek. Op basis van de inzichten van
de voorafgaande hoofdstukken is een experimenteel theodiceecurri-
culum ontworpen ten behoeve van leerlingen van de derde klas
MAVO. Vanuit een beschrijving van het verwerkingsproces besteedt
dit experimentele curriculum aandacht aan de drie theodiceemodellen
en biedt het de leerlingen eveneens inzicht in de tweevoudige stan-
daard van rationaliteit. Maar werkt dit experimentele curriculum wel
als verwacht? Dat wil zeggen, draagt dit curriculum bij tot inzicht in
deze drie theodiceemodellen en beïnvloedt het aldus verkregen inzicht
vervolgens weer het theodiceeoordeel? Met andere woorden, worden
leerlingen meer competent in het vellen van een theodiceeoordeel als
gevolg van dit experimenteel lesmateriaal?
Teneinde op deze vraag een antwoord te kunnen geven, is het ex-
perimentele curriculum uitgeprobeerd in een groot aantal MAVO-3
klassen en zijn vervolgens de effecten van het curriculum gemeten
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voor wat betreft het theodicee-inzicht en het theodiceeoordeel. Dit
leidt uiteindelijk tot de vaststelling dat het curriculum zeker effect
heeft op de mate van theodicee-inzicht bij MAVO-3 leerlingen, maar
dat het aldus verworven inzicht nauwelijks van invloed is op de wijze
waarop deze leerlingen een theodiceeoordeel vellen.
Deze onderzoeksresultaten worden in het zesde en laatste hoofd-
stuk voorwerp van kritische reflectie. Hierbij staan twee vragen cen-
traal. De eerste vraag betreft het effect van het experimentele curricu-
lum op de mate van theodicee-inzicht, terwijl de tweede vraag gericht
is op het effect van theodicee-inzicht op theodiceeoordeel.
Voor wat het effect op het theodicee-inzicht betreft, wordt de vraag
gesteld: Is het in godsdienstpedagogische zin eigenlijk wel verant-
woord om leerlingen theodiceemodellen te leren, zoals bijvoorbeeld
het straf-model, die geen algemene instemming meer vinden binnen
de theologische wetenschap? Met een verwijzing naar het intraper-
soonlijk pluralisme als een belangrijk kenmerk van het religieus en
levensbeschouwelijk bewustzijn van hedendaagse jongeren, wordt dan
geantwoord dat dit zeker wel verantwoord is. Immers, als het waar is
dat jongeren tegenwoordig actief en bewust steeds wisselende religi-
euze en levensbeschouwelijke identiteiten `opbouwen', dan is het zeer
wel op zijn plaats om binnen de religieuze en levensbeschouwelijke
vorming aandacht te besteden aan uiteenlopende en elkaar soms uit-
sluitende religieuze visies. Dit verhoogt het reflexieve verrnogen van
leerlingen en draagt uiteindelijk bij tot een verhoging van hun reli-
gieuze volwassenheid.
Voor wat betreft de effecten op het theodiceeoordeel, wordt de
vraag gesteld: Welke maatregelen kunnen er worden genomen ten-
einde de invloed van theodicee-inzicht op theodiceeoordeel te verster-
ken? Met betrekking tot deze problematiek wordt tenslotte het ver-
moeden geuit dat de relatie tussen inzicht en oordeel wellicht te ver-
sterken valt wanneer in het leerproces meer aandacht wordt besteed
aan de emotionele infrastructuur van theodiceemodellen. Bij nadere
analyse blijkt dat ieder theodiceemodel een specifieke relatie heeft
met basale emoties die in ieder verwerkingsproces een rol spelen. Zo
verwij st schuld naar het straf-model, angst naar het plan-model en
verwijzen gevoelens van eenzaamheid onder meer naar het compas-
siemodel. Dit betekent in feite dat alle modellen waardevol zijn bin-
nen een en hetzelfde religieuze verwerkingsproces, omdat ze allemaal
een religieuze reflectie bieden op een specifieke emotie. Het verschaf-
fen van inzicht in deze specifieke relatie tussen theodiceemodel en
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basale emotie kan er dan wellicht toe leiden, dat leerlingen uiteindelijk
meerdere theodiceemodellen een rol laten spelen bij het vellen van een
theodiceeoordeel.
Of dit echter ook het geval zal zijn, kan enkel worden vastgesteld
in een volgend onderzoek. Tot besluit wil deze studie daartoe dan ook
een uitdrukkelijke oproep doen.
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